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The naval officer of 2020 must be different than the naval officer of today. The 
environment has changed and the military and the naval service must change with it. For the 
naval service to be effective and relevant in the dynamic and uncertain environment of the 
future, the Navy must be fast, responsive to change as measured in seconds and minutes rather 
than the hours and days of the past. This necessitates that the combat forces, at least, within the 
Navy be organized in a very flat hierarchy. There will be little or no time for information to 
flow up and down the chain of command. Decisions are going to have to be made at the lowest 
level possible. Consequently, the Navy will require officers capable of making decisions and 
officers capable of leading decision makers. The intent of this thesis is to frame a dialogue 
about the future naval officer by creating a vision of the naval officer of 2020 and presenting 
recommendations for the development and management of these officers. 
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The naval officer of 2020 must be different than the naval officer of today or the 
naval officer of the past. The environment has changed and the military and the naval 
service must change with it. For the naval service to be effective and relevant in the 
dynamic and uncertain environment of the future, the Navy must be fast, responsive to 
change as measured in seconds and minutes rather than the hours and days of the past. Since 
munitions can only travel so fast, every second needs to be cut from the decision cycle. This 
demands that the combat forces, at least, within the Navy be organized in a very flat 
hierarchy. There will be LITTLE or NO time for information to flow up and down the 
chain of command. Decisions are going to have to be made at the lowest level possible. 
Consequently, the Navy will require officers capable of making decisions and officers 
capable of leading decision-makers. As Figure 1-1 graphically displays, for the Navy to be 
effective and relevant in the dynamic and uncertain environment of the future, it will need 
speed of command. This speed of command in turn requires the use of information 
technologies as a component part of the current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a 
flat hierarchical network centric organization, and the naval officer of 2020. In addition, the 
Navy needs human resource management processes that are aligned with the strategy, tasks, 
technology, and structure of the Navy of the future. The intent of this thesis is to initiate a 
dialogue about the future naval officer by creating a vision of the naval officer of 2020 and 
presenting recommendations for the development and management of these officers. 
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This thesis seeks to answer the questions of how to adapt our leadership, education 
and training, and other human resource management practices to meet the high tempo, high 
technology demands posed by the new concepts in Joint Vision 2010 and other visions of 
future armed conflict. The answers to these questions were obtained by synthesizing: 
(1) selected readings on modem leadership and management, 
(2) recent literature on the future operating environment, the future of conflict, and 
the revolution in military affairs, 
(3) the Skills, Knowledge, and Attributes for the field grade Army officer of the 
21 st Century as identified by the Science Applications International 
Corporation for the Army's OPMS XXI Task Force, and 
(4) the interview results of 15 active duty military officers ranging in rank 
from 0-6 to 0-10,2 retired military officers (1 retired 0-6 and 1 retired 0-8), 
2 senior level civilian Department ofN avy officials, and 4 Professors from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
C. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
The interviews were conducted at the Pentagon, at National Center 1 in Arlington, 
VA, and at the Naval Postgraduate School. The sample consisted of 15 active duty military 
officers ranging in rank from 0-6 to 0-10, 2 retired military officers (1 retired 0-6 and 1 
retired 0-8),2 senior level civilian Department of Navy officials, and 4 professors from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. There were 21 white males, 1 non-white male, and 1 white 
female. In addition, out of the 15 active duty military officers interviewed, 13 were naval 
officers, 1 was an army officer, and 1 was a marine corps officer. A standardized interview 
protocol was used. The personal interviews were recorded on audiocassettes. The 
information was then transcribed, verbatim, for complete analysis. The analysis led to the 
development of 8 themes that are listed in Table S-I. 
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Major Themes from Interviews 
1. Theme I: The naval officer corps in 2020 will require more specialists and fewer but 
broader generalists/unrestrictedline officers (URL) than those in service today. 
2. Theme II: Information Technology is and is going to be a core competency for all Naval 
Officers. 
3. Theme III: Naval Officers, even at the most junior level, will be required to be mentally 
agile and able to make quick decisions in a dynamic and uncertain environments. 
4. Theme IV: Future Naval officers will have to be educated and trained in the joint arena 
to include coalition warfare at an early stage in their careers. 
5. Theme V: Information technology and the potential reduction in crew sizes will change 
what it means to be an effective leader. 
6. Theme VI: The officer of the future must be well-versed in building, participating, and 
leading multi-disciplinary teams. 
7. Theme VII: Outsourcing will pose some difficulties for the officer corps of 2020. 
8. Theme VIII: Demographic changes within the United States will be an opportunity for 
the Naval Officer of2020. 
Table S-I. Interview Themes (Source: Author) 
D. A VISION OF THE NAVAL OFFICER OF 2020 
Using the interviews and the current literature, a vision of the naval officer of 2020 
emerged. The following sections describes this vision. 
1. Specialists versus Generalists 
The naval officer corps of 2020 will need to be populated by more specialists than 
generalists/unrestrictedline officers (URL). There are three factors that will necessitate this 
shift. First, the future reduction in crew size and the probable shift in emphasis from 
manned to unmanned aviation and precision guided missiles will lead to the need for fewer 
generalists.l Second, the growing complexity of technology, especially information 
1 Unmanned aviation and precision guided missiles will never totally eliminate the need for manned aviation. There 
will, however, be a shift in emphasis that will reduce the need for naval aviators and consequently will reduce the 
need for generalistlURLofficers as aviators representthe largest part of the URL. 
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technology, will require specialists capable of understanding and applying technology to 
greater depths than ever before throughout the fleet. A prime example is the current absence 
of, and need for, a designated information warfare community. Under the current system, 
this area is assigned to both the cryptologists and fleet support officers in the Space and 
Electronic Support core competency. There has been a move to merge these two groups by 
the Chief of Naval Operations, but after a year it has still not taken place? This is an area for 
potential disaster as the Navy and as the rest the military grows more and more dependent 
on these information systems. Third and most importantly, the growing complexity of 
warfare will require the full immersion of the generalist warfighter into the study and use of 
all types of force in war and conflict short of war. As a senior military officer in one of my 
interviews noted, "the use of military power in the early 21 st century will be so subtle as to 
require extraordinary situational awareness that [only] comes with full immersion." There 
will not be time in the warfighters career to manage or learn how to manage an organization 
as large as the Navy or the Department of Defense. Consequently, the jobs in support of 
fleet operations that generalists have filled in the past will have to be filled primarily by . 
specialists. Generalists or more accurately specialists in warfare while on shore duty should 
generally perform functions that hone their combat skills andlor create combat skills in 
other specialists in warfare. In essence, the URL officer needs to become more generalist 
and concentrate more of his time and effort on becoming more a specialist in the practice of 
naval warfare. 
2. Skills, Knowledge, Abilities and Attributes of the Naval Officer of2020 
Table S-2 and Table S-3 list the Skills, Knowledge, Abilities, and Attributes 
(SKAA) of the officer of 2020. The SKAA are organized into Task clusters. Skills refer to 
the capability to perform job operations with ease and precision. Knowledge refers to the 
body of information necessary to make adequate job performance possible. Ability refers to 
2 Speech of V ADM Arthur K Cebrowsk~ Director Naval Warfare Development Center, Naval Postgraduate School, 
3 Aug. 98. 
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the cognitive capabilities necessary to perform a job function.3 Finally, attributes are the 
baseline characteristics that ALL naval officers need to be successful. These SKAA are 
applicable to the URL officer/specialist in warfare of the future at the senior division 
officer/department head level. They also apply, but to a lesser degree, to the specialists that 
we are going to need in the future. 
I. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities for the Naval Officer of 2020 
(A) Traditional platform centric cluster 
• Ship and aircraft handling and maneuver. 
• Knowledge of and the ability to apply technology on the platform level. 
• Knowledge of and the ability to perform single unit operations and tactics. 
(More emphasis is needed here than is typically done today) 
(B) Leadership cluster 
• Ability to lead in the new era with more emphasis on collective learning and 
less concentration on charismatic leadership. 
1. Ability to deal with the shifting nature of power in the information 
age and the ability to deal with the loss of control of leaders in an 
information technology revolution. 
2. Ability to undertake what Senge's calls the leader's new work.4 
• Design and! or engineer processes. 
• Education and training of subordinates, superiors, and peers. 
• Stewardship of subordinates and the mission. 
• Ability to delegate to the lowest possible level. 
• Ability to develop and embody a vision. 
• Ability to build, participate in, and lead multi-disciplinary teams. 
• Ability to lead and manage personnel from diverse backgrounds. 
• Knowledge of the human dimension warfare and the ability to use it one's 
own advantage. 
Table S-2. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (Source: 
Author) 
3 Paul M. Muchinsky, Psychology Applied to Work, (Brooks/ColePubJishing: Pacific Grove, CA, 1997), p. 182. 
4 Peter M. Senge, "The Leaders New Work: Building Learning Organizations," Sloan Management Review, (Fall 
1990). 
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I. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (CONT) 
(C) Decision making cluster 
• Ability to make quick decisions in a dynamic and uncertain environment. 
• Thorough understanding of naturalistic (intuitive) decjsion making. 
• Thorough understanding of the principles of heuristic decision making and risk 
management. 
• Ability to use a full complement of rational analytical skills 
(D) Integrative cluster 
• Ability to integrate naval, joint, and coalition forces to formulate, articulate, and 
to link mission requirements to direct actions. 
• General understanding of the art and science of war to include: 
- Understanding of how the U. S. military and our potential allies organize to 
conduct military operations. 
- Understanding of the tactical, operational, and strategic characteristics of 
potential adversaries ranging from terrorists to world powers. 
- Understanding of the historical and contemporary role of the military in 
American society. 
(E) Information technology cluster 
• Ability to employ sensors to optimal advantage. 
• Ability to utilize C4 I systems to obtain and disseminate information. 
• Ability to utilize information systems to direct weapons. 
• A general understanding of information technology and science to include topics 
on computers, satellites, etc. 
(F) Management Cluster 
• A general understanding of and the ability to apply modern management 
principles and techniques. 
• A general understanding of financial management, contract management, and 
general business practices. 
• A general understanding oflogistics management. 
( G) Communication cluster 
• Ability to communicate a vision and current reality. 
• A thorough understanding of the use of communications media: individual 
contact, meetings, video teleconferencing, e-mail, memos, etc.' 
• Ability to express oneself clearly and concisely in both writing and speaking. 
Table S-2. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (CONT) 
(Source: Author) 
xxv 
n. Attributes of the Naval Officer of 2020 
A. Engenders Trust through 
• Honesty/ Integrity 
• Responsibility 
• HonorlDedication to Duty 
• Courage 
B. Inspires Loyalty 
C. Creative/ Innovative 
D. Action-Oriented 
E. Views Their Self in Proportion 
F. DisciplinectJ Professional 
G. Mutuality/Systems Perspective 
Table 8-3. Attributes of the Naval Officer of2020 (Source: Author) 
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
My analysis has led to me to the following recommendations. 
1. Part 1: A Shared Vision of the Future Naval Officer 
The first step in our journey to the naval officer of 2020 is for the Navy to develop a 
shared vision of what will· make the future officer successful. This vision needs to be 
understood and actively supported by the entire organization from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to the "nub" ensign in the fleet. To formulate this shared vision, the officer corps 
needs to conduct an open dialogue throughout the organization. This is not a time for top 
down directed change. A great deal of work needs to be done in this area. 
2. Part 2: The Design of Congruent Processes 
Human resource management has seven functions: accession, development, promotion, 
evaluation, compensation, assignment, and separation! transition. The manner in which each of 
these functions is conducted needs to be in congruence with the task, technology, structure, 
and people in the organization for the organization as a whole to be more effective. Therefore, 
comprehensive studies need to be conducted that determine how best to align human resource 
management with the organization's shared vision. My ideas for aligning human resource 
management with the Navy's direction are summarized in Table S-4. My overarching 
conclusion, however, is that every aspect of human resource management should be 
decentralized and directly related to performance in one way or another, either group 
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perfolTIlance or individual perfoImance. Every aspect of our system should emphasize 
effectiveness, collaboration, and efficiency. 
Recommendations 
1. Reshape the officer corps. 
• Increase the population of specialists through post division officer or preferably 
post-department head lateral transfer of URL officers to the RL. Educate and 
train them in specialties such as: infolTIlation operations, fleet support, or 
engineering and create viable career paths for these officers to flag rank. 
• Shift the remaining URL/specialist in warfare officers to shore duties that involve 
the honing of their warfighting skills or the creation ofwarfighting skills in others. 
• Create a community or communities charged with information systems 
management, information systems defense, and offensive information war 
2. Access the Naval Officer 0(2020. 
• , The Navy needs to use all means to meet its officer diversity goals in its 12112/5 
Policy. In addition, the Navy needs to incorporate the accession of women 
officers into its diversity programs. 
3. Develop the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Integrate the indoctrination of the officer corps by placing the Naval Academy 
under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Training (N7). 
• Charge the officer accession sources and the initial and intelTIlediate level skills 
courses like the Submarine Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Surface 
Warfare Officer School's Division Officer and Department Head Courses with 
developing curriculum that support the SKAAs of the new naval officer. Enlarge 
program scope and length as necessary. 
• Conduct further study on the development of intuitive/naturalistic decision 
making. Design programs to create these abilities at all levels within the officer 
corps. 
• Increase tour length at sea and shore. Consider means to reduce the impact of 
longer tours on quality of life by looking at ways to reduce OPTEMPO/ 
PERSTEMPO through the use of multi-crew ships. 
• Assign all generalist officers and specialist officers as applicable to two 
professional military education experiences. The first should be more oriented 
toward the technical and science aspects of war while the later experience should 
be oriented toward the strategic art of war. Specialist officers as a minimum 
should have at least one professional military education experiences in their area 
of specialization. 
Table S-4. Recommendations (Source: Author) 
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Recommendations (CONT) 
3. Develop the Naval Officer of 2020. (CONT) 
• Develop competency to manage diversity in all officers through extensive and on-
going diversity training. 
4. Promote the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Advise Congress to revise or rescind DOPMA. 
• Consider establishing a rank-in-position promotion system rather than a rank-in-
person promotion system or if that is not feasible, enlarge promotion zones and 
adjust promotion rate targets as necessary to support a more stable up and stay 
career structure. 
5. Assign the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Consider shifting to a more decentralized assignment process whereby the officer 
applies for his next position directly to his prospective senior through the use of 
information technology. 5 
6. Compensate the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Base pay at least some extent on performance rather than totally on longevity. 
This performance measure can be either group or individual based depending on 
the context of the situation. 
• Reduce the emphasis on non-pecuniary benefits and shift this money to raise 
regular military compensation. 
7. Evaluate the naval Officer of 2020. 
• Ensure that the Behaviorally Anchored Ratmg Scale currently in use reflects our 
vision of the successful naval officer of2020. 
• Consider the use of a 360 degree evaluation system. 
8. Separate/ Transition the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Increase career length to at least 35 years and perhaps longer to maximize the 
utilization of the experience that we will be building in our specialists and our 
generalist warfighters. 
• Consider shifting retirement benefits to either a defined contribution plan like a 
40lK or maintain a defined benefits plan that vests somewhere between the 5 and 
10 year point but does not payout benefits until actual retirement age. 
Table 8-4. Recommendations (CONT) (Source: Author) 
5 Jules Borak, Interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 April 1998. 
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The naval officer of 2020 must be different than the naval officer of today or the 
naval officer of the past. The environment has changed and the military and the naval service 
must change with it. For the naval service to be effective and relevant in the dynamic and 
uncertain environment of the future, the Navy must be fast, responsive to change as measured 
in seconds and minutes rather than the hours and days of the past. Since munitions can only 
travel so fast, every second needs to be cut from the decision cycle. This demands that the 
combat forces, at least, within the Navy be organized in a very flat hierarchy. There will be 
LITTLE or NO time for information to flow up and down the chain of command. Decisions 
are going to have to be made at the lowest level possible. Consequently, the Navy will 
require officers capable of making decisions and officers capable of leading decision-makers. 
As Figure 1-1 graphically displays, for the Navy to be effective and relevant in the dynamic 
and uncertain environment of the future, it will need speed of command. This speed of 
command in turn requires the use of information technologies as a component part of the 
current Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), a flat hierarchical network centric 
organization, and the naval officer of 2020. In addition, the Navy needs human resource 
management processes that are aligned with the strategy, tasks, technology, and structure of 
the Navy of the future. The intent of this thesis is to frame a dialogue about the future naval 
officer by creating a vision of the naval officer of 2020 and presenting recommendations for 
the development and management of these officers. 
B. BACKGROUND 
In December of 1997, The National Defense Panel (NDP) released their final report 
Transforming Defense - National Security in the 21st Century. This report was completed in 
accordance with Section 924 of the Military Force Structure Act of 1996 and was intended to 
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Figure 1-1. The Importance ofthe Naval Officer of2020 and the RMA to Speed of Command 
and Effectiveness 
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identify the changes needed to ensure United States leadership and security of the American 
people in the twenty-first century. The panel was convinced that the challenges of the twenty-
first century will be quantitatively and qualitatively different from those of the Cold War. 
Consequently, they argued that the United States must undertake a broad transfOImation of its 
military to meet the next century's challenges.6 The National Defense Panel is not alone in this 
conclusion. There seems to be agreement throughout the defense establishment that the 
challenges of war have changed. The environment of today is more dynamic, complex, and 
uncertain than ever before. Non-governmental organizations are becoming major participants 
in world affairs as international commerce blurs the traditional boundaries between nation-
states. In addition, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has made the use of force 
immensely more dangerous and difficult. At the same time, information technology and 
precision guided munitions have increased the potential lethality of military forces. 
Joint Vision 2010 captures the Joint Staff's vision of war in the future providing a 
"conceptual template for how America's Armed Forces" will prepare for war in the future. It 
concludes that "the United States must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging 
unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying 
levels of intensity." Preparation for this environment will" center around the ability to achieve 
massed effects with dispersed forces instead of relying on the massed forces and sequential 
operations of the past. The massed effects of dispersed forces are to be synchronized and 
integrated through information technology. Consequently, there will be an 
"increased capability at lower echelons to control more lethal forces over 
larger areas, thus leveraging the skills and initiative of individuals and small 
units. These capabilities could empower a degree of independent maneuver, 
planning, and coordination at lower echelons, which were normally exercised 
by more senior commanders in the past. Concurrently, commanders at higher 
echelons will use these technologies to reduce the friction of war and to apply 
precise centralized control when and where appropriate. ,,7 
6 National Defense Panel, Transfonnmg Defense: National &curity for the 21st Century, (1997), p. iv. 
7 Joint Chiefs of Staff, JomtVision2010, (19%) pp.1, 10-11, 15,27. 
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Subsequently, 10int Vision 2010 states that turning these concepts into capabilities will require 
"adapting our leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizations, and material to meet 
the high tempo, high technology demands posed by these new concepts. ,,8 
The conclusion of these future visions is that the demands on military officers and 
enlisted will change dramatically. Unfortunately, there has been little work done in identifying 
and preparing for these changes. The RAND Corporation completed a study on career 
management options for the future in Future Career Management Systems for u.s. Military 
Officers (1994) which recommended 
• using greater numbers of warrant officers for use as technicians, 
• having a less inclusive line by breaking officers into four categories: line, specialist, 
support, and professional, 
• having longer careers be the rule with the requisite lengthening of promotion zones to 
preserve the ability to put people on the fast track, 
• achieving less turnover by instituting a modified up and stay where officers who are 
committed to a career are allowed to stay, 
• separating officers on non-command track career paths from officers that are on the 
command track. 9 
There were several potential alternatives analyzed in the RAND study, but it treated officer 
requirements only in the aggregate and did not look at the impact of technology trends in any 
real depth. Recently, RAND has worked on a study to determine the implications of the 
revolution in military affairs on the individual characteristics of enlisted personne1. The sponsor 
for this study was the 10int Staff 0-1), but the study has since fallen into funding problems and 
the completion of the study is in jeopardy. 
The 8th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC) concluded in its 
report, Rewarding, Organizing and Managing People in the 21st Century: Time for a 
Strategic Approach, that (1) the scope of the human resource management function should be 
8 Ibid, 27. 
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expanded to encompass a more strategic role within the DoD, (2) the DoD should adopt a 
more flexible human resource management system that is aligned with the strategy of the 
organization, and (3) DoD should adopt strategic human resource management by instituting a 
fonnal and well defined decision making process. 10 This work, while significant, failed to shed 
any light on how to adapt our leadership, doctrine, education and training, organizations, and 
material to meet the high tempo, high technology demands posed by these new concepts in 
Joint Vision 2010. 
The Army's Officer Personnel Management System XXI Study (OPMS XXI) 
concluded that the current Army officer personnel management system required field grade 
officers to do too many different things for them to excel at anyone of them. In addition, it saw 
that the requirements in the Army After Next, the Army's vision for the future, would greatly 
exacerbate the problems in the field grade officer ranks. Consequently, they recommended that 
the Army: 
• Adopt a strategic approach to human resource system design and management. 
• Separate officers into 4 different career fields: Operations, Operational Support,. 
Infonnation Operations, and Institutional Support. These career fields would be fonned 
by grouping the existing branches and functional areas. 
• Assign all Army Competitive Category officers to a career field after they are selected 
for promotion to the rank of major (0-4). 
• Conduct promotion boards so that officers compete for promotion to lieutenant 
colonel (0-5) and colonel (0-6) with other officers in their career field. 
• Should adopt a holistic approach by linking officer personnel management, character 
and leader development, and the Officer Evaluation Report into a total Officer 
Development System. 
9 National Defense Research Institute, Future Career Management Systems for u.s. Military Officers, Harry J. Thie 
and Roger A Brown, Study Directors, (RAND: Santa Monica, CA, 1994), pp. xxviii - xxxi. 
10 8th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Rewarding, Organizing, and Managing People in the 21st 
Century: Time for a StrategiC Approach, Executive Director Robert Emmerichs, (Defense Technical Infonnation 
Center: Washington,D.c., 1997), pp.9-1O. 
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• Send all officers selected for promotion to major to resident intermediate-level 
military education and all officers selected for promotion to colonel to resident senior 
service college education. 
• Establish new functional areas and eliminate others to address changing requirements 
• Develop a mechanism to align officer authorizations and officer inventories. 
In addition, OPMS XXI felt "that the fundamental developmental assignment patterns and 
goals for company-grade officers are about right. "I I 
OPMS XXI has gone further than any other study in discerning the future of the 
officer corps. It does start to answer some of the questions of how to adapt our leadership, 
doctrine, education and training, organizations, "and material to meet the high tempo, high 
technology demands posed by the new concepts in Joint Vision 2010, but it falls short in 
many areas because it fails to note the effects of information technology on where and how 
combat decisions are going to be made in the future. The required speed of command will 
dictate that these decisions migrate from the field grade officers that OPMS targets to the 
company and platoon level officers of the future. Therefore, OPMS XXI, while significant, 
does not adequately address the issues that will be facing the military in 2020. 
C. SCOPEIMETHODOLOGY 
This thesis seeks to answer the questions of how to adapt our leadership, education 
and training, and other human resource management practices to meet the high tempo, high 
technology demands posed by the new concepts in Joint Vision 2010. The answers to these 
questions were obtained by synthesizing: 
(1) selected readings on modem leadership and management, 
(2) recent literature on the future operating environment, the future of conflict, and 
the revolution in military affairs, 
(3) the Skills, Knowledge, and Attributes for the field grade Army officer of the 
21 st Century as identified by the Science Applications International 
Corporation for the Army's OPMS XXI Task Force, and 
11 OPMS XXI Task Force, Officer Personnel ManagementSystem XXI Final Report, (1997), pp. iii-iv, 3-8. 
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(4) the interview results of 15 active duty military officers ranging in rank 
from 0-6 to 0-10,2 retired military officers (1 retired 0-6 and 1 retired 0-8), 
2 senior level civilian Department of Navy officials, and 4 Professors from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
D. BENEFIT OF THE STUDY/ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
This thesis contributes to a dialogue within the Navy about where we are going in 
terms of officer development and management. We need a shared vision of the naval officer of 
the future and we need processes that are designed to create that officer. This study presents 
one vision of the naval officers of2020 and provides some recommendations on how to create 
and manage these officers. 
In order to provide a foundation for looking at the future, Chapters II through V 
describe the present. Chapter IT discusses several conceptual models useful as frameworks for 
analyzing the future Navy and implications for the future naval officer. Chapter III presents a 
picture of the Navy of today, while Chapter IV describes the naval officer of today. Chapter V 
discusses the current officer career management system. 
Chapters VI through X discuss the future. Chapter VI provides a synthesized view of 
the future environment, while Chapter vn presents a brief picture of the Navy of 2020. In 
Chapter VIII, data and themes from the interviews conducted are presented. Chapter IX 
provides a vision of the naval officer of 2020. Lastly, Chapter X discusses major conclusions 
and provides recommendations for officer development and management. This chapter utilizes 
a 7 part human resource model to discuss the alignment of Navy human resource management 
practices with the direction we need to take to obtain the naval officer that will be needed to 




II. CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
A.OVERVIEW 
This thesis uses 5 conceptual models to help analyze the future environment and 
technology's impact on the officer of the future. This chapter summarizes the key features of 
these models for further development in later chapters. The first model is the Systems Model 
which is used to portray the different elements of organizational design. The second is 
Mintzberg's organizational model that allows us to analyze how organizations integrate and 
synchronize work processes. The third is Roberts Organizational Configurations Model which 
is used to describe how public sector organizations relieve the natural tension between 
effectiveness and efficiency. The fourth is Nadler and Tushman's Congruence Hypothesis which 
is used to describe the relationship between the different elements of the organization in the 
Systems Model. Finally, the Navy Human Resource Management Model separates the human 
resource management functions that the Navy performs into 7 distinct areas. 
B. THE SYSTEMS MODEL 
The Systems Model views organizations as the sum of 5 interdependent design factors: 
(1) Task, (2) Technology, (3) Structure, (4) People, and (5) Processes! Subsystems. These 
design factors are shaped by the organization's environment/context, the key success factors, 
and the system direction and strategy, and are intended to create a culture that leads first to 
outputs and then to outcomes. 12 See Figure 2-1. 
1. Environment/Context 
The first element in the Systems Model is the environment/context of the organization. 
In this element" the organization's external environment or the context within which the 
organization operates is analyzed. The intent is to determine whether the organization exists 
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in a relatively stable environment or it exists in a complex, uncertain environment. In addition, 
the environment may be described as political, economic, social, or technological. These 
different external environments lead to different successful configurations for organizations. 
2. Key Success Factors 
What does it take for a system to be successful? The answer is largely dependent on the 
environment/context of the organization. Organizations in political environments are typically 
successful if they respond to stimuli in a very political manner. For organizations in stable 
environments, the typical key success factor is efficiency. In uncertain, complex environments, 
the key success factor is often effectiveness usually gained through innovation. In environments 
that are uncertain and where resources are scarce, collaboration is the typical key success 
factor for through collaboration, both effectiveness and efficiency are optimized. The answer to 
this question of what it takes for a system to be successful is critical to Robert's Organizational 
Configuration Model which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
3. System Direction/Strategy Formulation 
The next element in organizational design is the system direction/strategy formulation 
element. It derives from the previous two elements and it drives the development of the design-
factors. There are many approaches to systems direction/ strategy formulation, all of which are 
beyond the scope of this thesis. The important point in this context is the need for a system to 
have a direction to be successful and the obvious fact that the system's direction needs to 
dictate the formulation of the design factors. 
4. Design Factors 
The design factors are the aspects of an organization that form its culture. They include 
tasks, technology, structure, people and process as defined below: 
• Tasks refers to the basic jobs/tasks of the organization including the specification 
and differentiation that is required for successful completion of the task. 
• Technology refers to the work flow of the organization, the key interdependencies 
among the work units or activities in the work flow, and the physical facilities and 
equipment used to accomplish the work. 
11 
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• Structure refers to the basic grouping of activities and people, how these groupings 
fit the work flow, and how these groupings are integrated through either: 
hierarchy, task force, integrating roles, integrating departments, matrices, or 
networks. 
• People deals with who the people are and what skill, knowledge, abilities, and 
attributes they need to be successful. 
• Process/Subsystems refer to: 
I. financial management/measurement/controls which deal with how people 
are held accountable. for resources, how unit performance is measured, and 
how budgeting is conducted. 
2. human resource management pertains to how people are accessed into the 
organization, trained and developed, and how they are rewarded. 
3. planninglcommunicationfmformation management deals with how the 
organization plans, how it communicates, and how it gather, processes, 
distributes, and evaluates information. 
5. CUlture/Outputs/Outcomes 
Culture is the result of the previous organizational elements and leads to both outputs 
and outcomes. It pertains to the prevalent norms and values of the system, and how conflict is 
managed within the system. It deals with both formal and informal patterns of interaction and 
whether the culture impedes or facilitates integration of effort. Output is what the system 
offers or produces in terms of goods and services. It can be tangible depending on how results 
are measured, and it serves as an indicator of performance for the system. Outcomes refer to 
the implications or consequences of the outputs for the stakeholders, and how these outputs 
are interpreted in view of the stakeholders' environment. 
C. MINTZBERG'S ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL 
According to Henry Mintzberg, organizations can be divided into five components: the 
operating core, the strategic apex, the middle line, the technostructure, and the support staff 
12 
The operating core consists of the members of an organization "who perform the basic work 
related directly to the production of products and services." The. operating core performs four 
major tasks: (1) they secure the inputs for production, (2) they transfer the inputs into outputs, 
(3) they distribute the outputs, and (4) they provide direct support to the input, transformation, 
and output functions. The strategic apex are the people with overall responsibility for the 
organization. Their duties are (1) direct supervision, (2) interaction with the organizations 
environment, and (3) development of the organizations strategy. The strategic apex is joined 
with the operating core by a chain of middle line managers. These middle line mangers have the 
job of direct supervision of the operating core, liaison with the other middle line managers and 
the strategic apex, and development of strategy for his unit. In simple and small organizations, 
the middle line is not necessary, but in larger more complex organizations the middle line is 
essential to limit the manager's span of control to manageable proportions. The fourth 
component of an organization is the technostructure. The technostructure serves the 
organization by affecting the work of others. They design the work and train the people who 
do the work, but do not do the main work of the organization, themselves. The final part of the 
organization is the support staff The support staff are specialists that exist to provide support 
that is outside the operating work flow. Their jobs run the gamut from legal counsel to 
personnel management. 13 Mintzberg created a simple diagram to illustrate the relationship 
between the five components. See Figure 2-2. 
Mintzberg further develops his model by categorizing organizations by their dominant 
component. The five major categories according to Mintzberg are the simple structure, the 
machine bureaucracy, the professional bureaucracy, the divisionalized form, and the adhocracy. 
The simple structure is based on direct supervision in which the strategic apex is the dominant 
13 Henry Mintzberg, Strncture in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1992), pp. 10-
18. 
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Figure 2-2. Mintzberg's Organizational Model (Source: Henry Mintzberg, Structure in Fives: 
Designing Effective Organizations, 1992) 
component. The machine bureaucracy is based on the standardization of work processes in 
which the technostructure is the dominant component. The professional bureaucracy, on the 
other hand, is based on the standardization of skills in which the operating core is the dominant 
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component. The fourth category, the divisionalized form, is based on the standardization of 
outputs in which the middle line is the dominant component. The fifth and final category is the 
adhocracy. The Adhocracy is based on mutual adjustment in which the support staff sometimes 
with the operating core is the dominant component. 14 An important thing to note from this 
discussion, however, is that there are no pure organizational forms. One organization can 
exhibit the traits of more than one category, but in most cases there is one form that dominates. 
D. ROBERT'S ORGANIZATIONAL CONFIGURATION MODEL 
General managers face two basic challenges when leading and managing public 
bureaus. Leaders and managers are expected to strive for organizational efficiency whereby 
results are produced with the minimum expenditure of resources. At the same time, they are 
expected to be effective in areas where managers must be more concerned with doing the right 
thing. Efficiency is created in part through focus, precision, repetition, discipline, and control 
whereas effectiveness "typically comes from an understanding and interpretation of the external 
environment as it signals what ongoing adaptations are required in organizational technology, 
knowledge, strategy, and values." Both of these organizational attributes are required for 
successful performance, but they tend to interfere with each other especially in the competition 
for scarce resources as "effectiveness thrives on exploration and experimentation, but efficiency 
attempts to drive them out. ,,15 
From this conflict of effectiveness versus efficiency, leaders have developed four basic 
management configurations. In this context, configuration refers to a coherent pattern or 
cluster of organizational environments, strategies, structures, processes, cultures, and outcomes 
that commonly occur together. As shown in Figure 2-3, these configurations are the 
14 Ibid, 23. 
15 Nancy Roberts, "Public Deliberation: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," Public 
AdministrationReview, (March/April 1997), p. 124. 
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political/reactive configuration, the directive configuration, the adaptive configuration, and the 
generative configuration.16 
Organizational Configuration Model 
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Figure 2-3. Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management (Source: Nancy Roberts, 
"Public Deliberation: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction, " 
Public Administration Review, (MarchiApril1997) p. 125.) 
1. PoliticallReactive Configuration 
In the political/reactive configuration, the manager "relieves the tension between 
efficiency and effectiveness by reducing the pressure on each dimension." The general manager 
does not seek to achieve optimal effectiveness nor optimal efficiency, nor does he seek to 
reconcile the competing demands of the two dimensions. He, inconsistently and in a disjointed 
pattern, shifts his efforts from one dimension to the next. One minute he seeks efficiency, the 
next, he seeks effectiveness depending on which one is in his own self-interest. Hierarchical 
structures are often in place to integrate effort, but these structure are often ignored as informal 
patterns, that are much different from the formal hierarchy, dominate the work place. There is 
16 Nancy Roberts, "Organizational Configurations: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management, " Naval 
Postgraduate School, UnpUblished, (January 1998,) pp.3-19. 
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no vision in this configuration as there is no consensus on system direction/strategy, and 
consequently, there is no consensus on the tasks that the organization is to perform. This 
configuration is often equated to the metaphor of firefighting as the members of the 
organization shift their efforts form crisis to crisis because there is no set of coherent, integrated 
policies to guide the organization .. 17 The purpose of politicaVreactive configuration is provide 
enough maneuvering room for the general manager to react to politics or play politics because 
this is the only way to succeed in some highly political environments. 18 Therefore, the key 
success factors for this configuration are reactiveness or politics. 
2. Directive Configuration 
General managers in the directive configUration "resolve the tension between efficiency 
and effectiveness by designing bureaus for optimal efficiency and minimal effectiveness." They 
face relatively stable environments and achieve efficiency by running their organization as a 
machine bureaucracy. Leadership avoids questions of adaptation and experimentation because 
that would force a reexamination of current operations. The managers efforts are centered 
around internal order and maintaining control. Order is maintained by extending influence 
externally to minimize threats. Jobs are formalized and the work is coordinated through· 
standardized procedures. Centralized hierarchical structures are used to integrate efforts. 
Change is resisted, but if necessary, it is accomplished by top-down directives to change work 
routines or standard operating procedures. 19 
3. Adaptive Configuration 
In the adaptive configuration, general managers design their organizations for optimal 
effectiveness. There major concern is adaptation to the complex and hyper-competitive external 
environment because that is the principle way to achieve effectiveness. Efficiency is not the 
driving concern. Leaders take the role of champion of innovation rather than that of controller. 
Organizations in this configuration are typically decentralized and organized around project 
17 Roberts, "Public Dehberation: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," p. 125. 
18 Roberts, "Organizational Configurations: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management, " p. 19. 
19 Roberts; "Public Deliberation: An Alternative Approach to Crafting Policy and Setting Direction," p. 125. 
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work and cross-disciplinary teams. Leaders rely on general visions rather than specific goals to 
guide the organization. Innovation and entrepreneurship are highly rewarded. 20 This 
configuration is often referred to in management literature as an "adhocracy." 
4. Generative Configuration 
General managers in the generative configuration "are challenged to be managers of 
organizational tensions and masters of paradox. No longer content with trade-offs between 
efficiency and effectiveness, they search for ways to reconcile what appears to be competing 
expectations." The role of the leader in these organizations is to help his or her subordinates 
find some underlying framework or solution to problems that would resolve the paradoxes of 
modem organizations. The keys to success in this configuration are the promotion of· 
generative learning or the "learning that develops people's capacity to create new solutions to 
old problems," and collaborations among internal and external stakeholders to address the 
paradoxes that are formed by attempting to reconcile effectiveness and efficiency. Through 
generative learning, effectiveness is achieved, while efficiency is achieved through the 
integration achieved by collaboration. Organizations that have approached this new 
configuration have been described as "boundaryless" network organizations, cellular 
organizations, virtual organizations, and learning organizations. 21 Table 2-1 offers a 
comparison of the 4 configurations. 
E. NADLER AND TUSHMAN'S CONGRUENCE HYPOTHESIS 
20 Ibid. 
Nadler and Tushman's Congruence Hypothesis states that 
"other things being equal, the greater the total degree of congruence or fit 
among various components [ design factors], the more effective will be the 
organization- effectiveness being defined as the degree to which actual 
organizational output is similar to expected or planned, as specified by 
strategy ... Therefore, the question is not how to find the 'one best way of 
21 Nancy Roberts, "Public Deliberation: An Alternative Approach to crafting Policy and Setting Direction," p. 125, and 
Nancy Roberts, "Organizational Configurations: F OlE Approaches to Public Sector General Management, " pp. 17-19. 
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Comparison Across Four Configurations 
Reactive/Political Directive Adaptive Generative 
Purpose react to politics order, minimize innovate learn 
play politics uncertainty 
Organizational neutral organization; machine adhocracy network, 
Type political organization bureaucracy virtual organization 
External competing coalitions, stable, simple hypercom- turbulent, 
Environment stakeholder conflicts, petitive; complex; 
regulated environment complex hard to separate 
internal and 
external elements 
Direction Setting muddling through; tOp-dOWIl, vision and strategic 
and Planning piecemeal, disjointed comprehensive values drive issues 
planning; partisan hierarchy of from top; identified by 
mutual adjustment goals and strategies top; from 
strategies; emerge stakeholder 
sequential throughout collaborations 
planning organization 
process based on experi-
mentation and 
groping along; 
Basis of responsive to rational, rational dialogue and 
Decision Making political authority; technical analysis in deliberation of 
political decision analysis technical core; strategic issues; 
making; garbage can politics at mid- co-learning 
process level and at 
strategic apex 
Change Initiated By shifting political strategic apex finding stakeholder 





Organizational none characteristic mechanistic, organic, cellular forms of 
Structure unless political centralized, decentralized, organizing; multi 
coalition establishes functional project functional, self -
temporary authority management organizing teams; 
partnerships, 
alliances 
Table 2-1. Comparison Across Four Configurations (Source: Nancy Roberts, "Organizational 
Configurations: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management, ''Naval Postgraduate 
Schoo~ unpublished, January 1998, p. 35.) 
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Comparison Across Four Configurations (CONT) 
ReactivelPolitical Directive Adaptive Generative 
Organizational ill defined, standardized, expert based, cross training; 
Tasks/Jobs fluid, determined specialized, non-standardized jobs expanded & 
by associations fonnalized to support the enlarged to 
project/program empower self-
managed teams 
Organizational through interplay through through liaison through 
Coordination of politics and hierarchy, roles, coordina- infonnation 
coalitions specialized ting committees, sharing among 
work, sops, task forces, network 
& routines and mutual members 
adjustment 
Implementation unaligned design top-down alignment alignment 
elements; lack of alignment of with vision between strategic 
coherence among design elements through issue and 
organizational parts with direction experiments action plan 
Controls & based on inputs based on rules, based on based on nonns for 
Evaluation and pleasing standardized feedback linked learning; feedback 
political authority inputs required to vision and linked to strategic 
per unit of outcomes and issue, outcomes & 
output customer satisfaction stakeholder satisfaction 
Organizational appearance of order and team work, active listening, 
Norms responsiveness to stability; creativity, collaboration, 
political authority; invention, appreciation of 
flexibility differences 
Role of General crisis manager or planner, visionary, steward, teacher, 
Manager gamesman controller champion of designer 
innovation 
Role of Organizational firefighter or "soldier" entrepreneur, co-learner 
Member political actor innovator 
Central Skills manages crisis, conducts inspires others focuses on key 
bargains and rational to action; builds questions, structures 
negotiates, analysis & enthusiasm and and facilitates dialogue 
fonns coalitions, . cost benefit commitment; and deliberations; 
conducts power analysis articulates evokes trust in the 
analysis, builds a vision; manages process; leads large-
power base conflict group collaborations 
Table 2-1. Comparisons Across Four Configurations (Cont.) (Source: Nancy Roberts, 
"Organizational Configurations: Four Approaches to Public Sector General Management, 
"Naval Postgraduate School, unpublished, January 1998, p. 36.) 
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managing,' but how to find effective combinations of components [design 
factors] that will lead to congruence among them. ,,22 
Congruence in this context means the degree to which the needs, goals, objectives, and 
structures of one organizational element or design factor are consistent with the needs, goals, 
objectives, and structures of other organizational elements or design factors. Simply put, the 
design factors and organizational elements as described earlier in the systems must be congruent 
for the organization to reach its optimal level of performance. Therefore, this charges managers 
with creating processes that are congruent with the entire system. 
F. NAVY HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT MODEL 
In general, a human resource management system acquires people, moves them through 
the organization over time, and eventually transitions them out of the organization. Harry Thie 
and Roger Brown contend that the military human resource management system has five 
primary functions: accessing, promoting, developing, assigning, and transitioning?3 Accessing 
includes attracting officer candidates into the system, screening them, and indoctrinating them 
into the culture of the Navy, promotion involves the advancement of these individuals through 
the structure of the organization. Development pertains to· the acquisition of knowledge, skills, 
ability, and attitudes that are desired by the organization. Assigning or detailing distributes 
officers across the organization into billets Gobs), and finally, transitioning moves people out of 
the organization into the civilian sector or into retirement. The Thie and Brown model however 
seems to neglect two important aspects of the military's human resource management system: 
(1) the pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation system and (2) the performance evaluation 
system. I am adding the compensation function and the evaluation function to the Thie and 
Brown model and will use it in chapter IV to discuss the Navy's officer career management 
system. 
22 Nadler and Tushman, Strategic Organizational Managemen~ (Scott Foresman and Company, Glenview IL, 1988), pp. 
29-30. 
23 Thie and Brown, pp.72-74. 
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m. THE NAVY OF TODAY 
A. OVERVIEW 
In order to have a vision of the future, one must have a :firm grasp on the present. This 
chapter will present a picture of the Navy of today using the models which were introduced in 
Chapter II as analytical tools. 
The Navy of today operates firmly within the realm of the Directive Configuration. 
Traditionally, the military has been built on discipline and order and the Navy has been no 
exception. The structure of the Navy is mechanistic, centralized, and functional. Operations are 
coordinated through an extensive vertical hierarchy (chain of command), standard operating 
procedures, . and routines. The Navy's planning and direction setting is conducted using a 
comprehensive hierarchy of goals and strategies that come from the strategic apex of the 
organization. Decisions are based on rational technical analysis originating from the 
technostructure. 
Using the Systems Mode~ this chapter will discuss the design factors for the Navy of 
1998 which place it so firmly in the Directive Configuration. First, I will discuss the tasks that 
naval officers perform as delineated by the National Military Strategy and the Navy's 
Forward .. From the Sea series of strategy documents. This will be followed by a discussion of 
the technology/work flow of the Navy with regards to doctrine and warfighting equipment. 
Finally, I will discuss the structure of the Navy. Chapter IV will contain a description of the 
naval officer of today with regards to skill, knowledge, abilities, and attributes. The Navy's 
Processes/Subsystems in particular the Navy's human resource management system will be 
discussed in Chapter V. 24 
24 The Measurement and Controls, Financial Management and to some degree the Planning, Communication,· and 
Information Management Processes of the Navy are omitted from this analysis as they are beyond the scope of this 
study. This is not to suggest that they are unimportant or that they need not be in congruence with these other design 
factors. All parts of the system need to be in congruence. Work in these areas will be left to others. 
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B. THE TASKS 
The tasks of the Navy are delineated in the National Military Strategy and the Navy 
Strategy as documented in the Forward .. From the Sea series of strategic documents. This 
section will review these tasks. 
1. The National Military Strategy 
The National Military Strategy provides the overarching rationale for military 
capabilities and forces and is derived from the president's national security strategy, the 
projected international security environment, and domestic fiscal constraints. The current 
national military strategy is delineated in the Secretary of Defense's 1997 Report of the 
Quadrennial Defense Review and the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs National Military 
Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era. According to 
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the national military strategy is to "help shape the 
international security environment in ways favorable to U.S. interests, respond to the full 
spectrum of crises when directed, and prepare now to meet the challenges of an uncertain 
future. ,,25 The key elements of this strategy are shaping, responding, and preparing. 
Shaping the international environment includes (1) promoting stability, (2) preventing 
or reducing conflicts and threats, and (3) peacetime deterrence. The promotion of stability is to 
be achieved through peacetime engagement activities such as international exercises, foreign 
military sales, the International Military Education and Training program and information 
sharing. These activities are designed to "promote regional stability, increase the security of 
allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure global environment. ,,26 The 
prevention or reduction of conflicts and threats is to be achieved through civilian assistance 
programs and arms control measures with the goal of reducing the need for greater military 
effort later. Peacetime deterrence involves "preventing potential adversaries from taking 
25 Department of Defense, Report of the Quadre1Vlial Defense Review, (1991), p. 3-2. 
26 Department of Defense, National Military Strategy: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New 
Era, (1991), p. 3-2. 
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aggressive actions that threaten our interests, allies, partners, or mends. ,,27 Deterrence is to be . 
accomplished by the strategic positioning of conventional and strategic forces in order to 
demonstrate the US. Anned Forces ability to rapidly project and concentrate military power?8 
Responding to the full spectrum of crises when directed, includes (1) deterring 
aggression and coercion in a crisis, (2) conducting smaller scale contingency operations, and 
(3) fighting and winning major theater wars. Deterring aggression and coercion in a crisis is to 
be accomplished through enhancing our warfighting capability in a theater, communicating 
US. intentions, enforcing sanctions, and conducting limited strikes. The goal of deterring 
aggression is again to reduce the need for greater military effort later. Conducting smaller scale 
contingency operations "encompasses the full range of joint military operations beyond 
peacetime engagement activities but short of major theater warfare and includes: show-of-force 
operations, interventions, limited strikes, non-combatant evacuation operations, no-fly zone 
enforcement, peace enforcement, maritime sanctions enforcement, counterterrorism operations, 
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief ,,29 Fighting and winning major 
theater wars is the most stressing military requirement for the US. military in that it includes 
the ability "to deter and defeat large-scale, cross border aggression in two distant theaters in 
overlapping time frames, preferably in concert with regional allies. ,,30 The key capabilities in 
accOmplishing this strategic requirement according to both the QDR and the National Military 
Strategy are (1) the ability to "rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objective in 
two theaters in close succession, one followed almost immediately by another" and (2) the 
ability "to achieve our war aims against an adversary who uses or threatens to use NBC 
weapons, information warfare, terrorism, or other asymmetric means against us. ,,31 
Preparing now to meet the challenges of an uncertain future has four main parts. (1) 
The first part is the pursuit of a focused modernization effort in order to replace aging systems 
and incorporating cutting-edge technologies into the force to ensure continued US. military 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Report of the QuadrermialDefenseReview, p. 3-4. 
30 Ibid. 
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superiority. Second, the military needs to continue to exploit the "Revolution in Mlitary 
Affairs" (RMA) in order to improve the U.S. military's ability to perform near-term missions 
and meet future challenges, Third, the military needs to exploit the "Revolution in Business 
Affairs" to radically reengineer Department of Defense (DoD) infrastructure and support 
activities. Finally, the military needs to insure or hedge against unlikely, but significant, future 
threats in order to manage risk in a resource-constrained environment. 32 
2. The Nation's Naval Strategy 
While the national military strategy directs the efforts of the military at large, the Navy 
is directed by strategic concepts delineated in ... From the Sea (1992), Forward .. From the Sea 
(1994) and Forward .. From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997). See Table 3-1 for 
a summaty of the tasks delineated in these strategic documents. 
a. ... From the Sea (1992) 
... From the Sea (1992) refocused the military from cold war maritime 
strategies to the "littoral" operating environment. The key, according to ... From the Sea to thi~ 
new "littoral" environment, is the "Naval Expeditionary Force- Shaped for Joint Operations, 
Operating Forward From The Sea, and Tailored for National Needs." Naval Expeditionary 
Forces as envisioned by .. .From the Sea are to consist of a tailored force of 
1. Aircraft Carriers and Naval Tactical Air Wmgs 
2. Submarines 
3. Amphibious Ships with embarked Marines 
4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
5. Surface Combatants 
6. Mine Warfare Forces 
7. Naval Special Warfare Forces 
The core tasks ( operational capabilities) of these expeditionary forces are Command, Control, 
3lIbid, p.3-5. 
32 Ibid., p. 3-6. 
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The Navy's Tasks Today 
.. From the Sea (1992) 
Command Control 
Surveillance 
- collect intelligence 
- disseminate intelligence 
- deny/manage our enemies 
intelligence 
- target and direct strikes 
Battlespace Dominance 
- maintain our access 
- deny enemy access 
Power Projection 









- coalition building 
- humanitarian assistance 
- naval presence 
- conventional deterrence 
-TBMD 
- strategic deterrence 
Crisis Response 
- prevention of conflict 
escalation 
Regional Conflict 
- serve as transition force 
for land based units: 
a. blunting of initial 
assault 
b. seizure and defense of 
advanced land bases 
c. enabling deployment 
ofland based forces 
d. provision of initial 
command and control 
capabilities 
Joint and Combined 
Operations 
- power projection 
Forward .. From the Sea 
(1997) 
Peacetime Engagement 
- ensure freedom of 
navigation 
- support compliance with 
international law of the sea 
- humanitarian assistance 
- naval presence 
- coalition building 
Deterrence and Conflict 
Prevention 
- conventional deterrence 
- strategic deterrence 
- prevention of conflict 
escalation 
- ability to halt initial 
enemy aggression 
- information dominance 
-TBMD 
Fight and Win 
- halting of fait accompli 
strategies 
- serve as transition force 
for land based units 
- power projection! 
precision naval fires 
-TBMD 
- sanction enforcement 
Table 3-1. The Navy's Tasks as Delineated by the ... From the Sea Series of Strategic 
Documents 
and Surveillance, Battlespace Dominance, Power Projection, and Force Sustainment. 
• Command, control and surveillance refers to the ability to collect intelligence through 
overt and covert surveillance, the dissemination of information to commanders, the 
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denial and/or management of information to our enemies, and the targeting and 
direction of strikes against our enemies from a variety ofland, sea, and air platforms. 
• Battlespace dominance pertains to the maintaining of access from the sea to permit the 
effective entry of equipment and resupply while denying access to our adversaries. 
• Power projection is the application of precise offensive power in the form of bombs, 
missiles, shells, bullets, and bayonets. 
• Finally, sustainment is the ability of naval forces to supply. and maintain forward 
deployed forces regardless of service. 33 
The important thing to note about these core tasks is that these capabilities are the foundation 
for the more advanced tasks that are identified by both Forward .. From the Sea (1994) and 
Forward .. From the Sea: The Naval Operational Concept (1997). 
h. Fonvard .. From the Sea (1994) 
Forward .. From the Sea (1994) expounded on the concept of Naval 
Expeditionary Forces introduced in .. From the Sea. The Naval Expeditionary Force as 
envisioned by Forward .. From the Sea consists of naval "building blocks" in the form of 
aircraft carrier battle groups with multi-purpose naval tactical aviation wings and the 
amphibious ready groups with special operations capable Marine Expeditionary Units. These 
forces are charged with peacetime forward presence operations, crisis response, regional 
conflict, and joint and combined operations. 
• Peacetime forward presence operations include peacetime coalition building, 
humanitarian assistance, naval presence, conventional deterrence with theater ballistic 
missile defense (TBMD), and strategic nuclear deterrence. 
• Crisis response pertains to deterrence of aggression through the rapid response of 
forward deployed forces which provide theater commanders with a variety of flexible 
options. 
33 Department of the Na"Y, ... From the Sea, (1992), pp. 2, 6-9. 
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• Regional conflict relates to the Navy's capability of serving as a transition force for land 
based forces early in a conflict. The tasks implicit in this capability are the blunting of 
the initial enemy assault, the seizure and defense of advanced land bases, the enabling 
of the flow ofland based air and ground forces to the scene, and the provision of initial 
command and control capabilities. 
• Finally, joint and combined operations refers to the integration of the Navy's power 
projection capabilities with the effort of the other services and allied nations in major 
regional conflictS.34 
c. FOTWQ1'd •• From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997) 
Forward .. From the Sea: The Navy Operational Concept (1997) updates the 
tasks and concepts espoused in the two previous strategic documents especially with its 
emphasis on operational primacy in the littoral environment. It maintains the focus on carrier 
battle group and amphibious ready group Naval Expeditionary Forces, but at the same time it 
acknowledges the benefits of mission tailored task groups consisting of individual units or 
groups of units such as maritime interception forces. In addition, it couches the tasks of the 
Navy in the framework of the National Military Strategy namely peacetime engagement, . 
deterrence and conflict prevention, and fight and win. 
• Peacetime engagement in this case refers to ensuring freedom of navigation on 
international trade routes, supporting United States efforts to bring excessive maritime 
claims into compliance with the international law of the sea, providing humanitarian 
assistance, naval presence, and peacetime coalition building. 
• Deterrence and conflict prevention pertains to the signaling of United States capabilities 
and resolve to friend and foe. It encompasses conventional deterrence with forward 
deployed forces, strategic deterrence, prevention of conflict escalation through shows 
of force, the ability to halt initial aggression and therefore prevent aggressors from 
34 Departnient of the Navy, Forward .. From the Sea, (1994), pp. 3-8. 
29 
achieving a fait accompli, infonnation dominance through the Navy's intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, and force protection through TBMD. 
• Fight and win is the concentration of "combat power from dispersed, networked 
forces." It encompasses the halting of fait accompli strategies early in the conflict, the 
enabling of joint campaigns as the Navy serves as a transition force for land based units, 
the delivering of "precision naval fires to accomplish strategic, operational, and tactical 
objectives" of joint and combined operations, the sustained protection of joint and 
coalition forces ashore through TBMD and the enforcement of sanctions after the 
joint/combined campaign conc1udes.35 
c. TECHNOLOGY 
Technology in this context refers to both the work flow of the Navy and the tangible 
equipment of the Navy. The work flow of the Navy is governed by Naval Doctrine which in 
turn governs how the Navy uses its tools to complete its tasks. This section will summarize 
Navy doctrine and it will identifY the technological tools that the Navy utilizes to complete the 
tasks assigned to it. 
1. Doctrine 
''Naval Doctrine is !he foundation upon which our tactics, techniques, and 
procedures are built. It articulates operational concepts that govern the 
employment of naval forces at all levels. ,,36 
Doctrine is the conceptual starting point from which naval forces develop solutions and 
options to address the specific warfighting demands. Naval doctrine is delineated in the Naval 
Doctrine Publication Series and is designed to form "a bridge between the naval component of 
our nation's military strategy and our tactics, techniques, and procedures. ,,37 As with the 
nation's naval strategy, naval doctrine emphasizes the naval expeditionary force and the 
"littoral" operating environment. In addition, naval doctrine expands on the navy's core 
35 Department of the Navy, Forward. .. From the Sea:: The Naval Operational Concept, (1997), pp.2-7. 
36 Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Waifare, (1994), p. ii .. 
37 Ibid. . 
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capabilities of command and control, battlespace dominance, power projection, and force 
sustainment. 
a. Command and Control 
Command and Control is the foundation of unity of command and as such 
encompasses the gathering, processing, and distribution of information vital to the conduct of 
military planning and operations. 38 
The process is modeled using the Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop or 
"OODA Loop" which was developed by Colonel John R Boyd, USAF (Ret) (1987). In the 
"OODA Loop", the decision maker starts in the observation stage where he senses and 
processes the environment to develop a common tactical picture. The next stage is the 
orientation stage whereby the decision maker derives knowledge from the common tactical 
picture to develop situational awareness. The third stage is the decision stage in which the 
decision maker makes the decision and comes up with a plan in the form of commander's intent 
and/or orders. The final step is the action step whereby the commander's forces execute the 
plan in the battlespace~ 39See Figure 3-1. 
Command and Control Doctrine stresses two decision making theories (1) the 
analytical process and (2) the intuitive process. The analytical process according to doctrine 
involves generating options, identifying criteria, evaluating criteria, and rating each option 
according to the criteria. This should be used for deliberate planning prior to military action. 
The Intuitive approach "relies on an experienced commander's ability to recognize the key 
elements of a problem, rapidly integrate them, and make a proper decision." This approach is 
"more appropriate for the fluid, rapidly changing environment of combat, when time and 
uncertainty are critical factors. ,,40 
In addition to two ·decision making theories, there are two methods of control: 
(1) detailed control and (2) mission control. Detailed control is centralized control in which the 
38 Ibid., p. 61. 
39 Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Command and Control, (1995), p. 18-19. 












~ L~ ____ s_iru~a~ti_o_ruU ____ ~ ~ _ Awareness 
Make Decisions 
Figure 3-1. The "OODA Loop" developed by Colonel John R. Boyd (1987) (Source: U. s. 
Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Command and Control, 
1995, pp. 18-19.) 
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commander gives explicit orders and plans. It emphasizes vertical information flow, with 
information flowing up the chain of command and orders flowing down the chain of command. 
Mission control, on the other hand, is decentralized and flexible. The 
commander directs the actions of his subordinates by imparting the mission requirements using 
succinct orders and then allows his subordinates freedom of action. According to doctrine, 
neither method is appropriate for every occasion. Detailed Control is more appropriate in 
performing precise tasks of a technical nature while mission control is better suited for high 
tempo operations.41 Command and Control is accomplished through the technology ofC4ISR 
Systems. The goal of achieving efficient Command and Control through technology is high 
tempo operations on the theory that combat is the hostile interaction of independent wills with 
independent decision and execution cycles or "OODA Loops." High tempo operations allow us 
"to set in motion a series of actions and reactions, each of which may expose- if only for a 
moment - a critical vulnerability of the enemy" with which we can exploit to defeat him. 42 
Control of Combat Tempo gives a tremendous advantage to the side that has it and is the 
center of command and control doctrine. 
b. Bottlespace Dominance 
Battlespace dominance is the establishment of zones of superiority and is a key 
factor in the survival and combat effectiveness of our force. Modern battlespace is multi-
dimensional. It encompasses air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and time. As such, 
battlespace dominance is achieved by detecting, identifying, targeting, and neutralizing any 
hostile force that approaches our own forces. It uses the command and control network to 
integrate the efforts of ships, submarines, aircraft, and ground forces.43 
41lbid., pp. 26-27. 
42Ibid., p. 57. 
43 Naval Doctrine Publication 1: Naval Warfare, pp.63-64. 
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c. Power Projection 
"Our ability to project high-intensity power from the sea is the cornerstone 
of effective deterrence, crisis response, and war."- Naval Doctrine Publication 
1: Naval Warfare 
In the absence of any serious threat to the nation's sea lanes, power projection 
in the "littoral" operating environment is the Navy's most important capability in both peace and 
war. Power Projection is the application of offensive military force against an enemy at a time 
and place of our choosing. Through power projection, the Navy can either deter aggression 
through forward presence in peacetime or carry the fight to the enemy in times of war. Naval 
doctrine dictates that the primary tools to accomplish power projection are aircraft carrier 
based strike aircraft, amphibious ready groups, sea launched precision guided munitions, 
special warfare forces, naval surface fire support, command and control warfare, and maritime 
prepositioning.44 The building blocks of power projection are the carrier battle group and the 
amphibious ready group. 
d Force Sustainment 
One of the requirements of any and all military operations is force sustainment. 
Force sustainment is "made possible by a logistic support system that has two major 
components: fleet based sustainment assets and strategic sustainment assets. ,,45 Fleet based 
sustainment assets include the combat replenishment ships, direct fleet support units, combat 
service support units, mobile repair units, and advanced logistic support hubs. Strategic 
sustainment is provided via sea and air by assets that are shared by all the services. Force 
sustainment is built around six core competencies: (1) supply, (2) maintenance, (3) 
transportation, (4) general engineering (construction battalions), (5) health services, and (6) 
others services which include administrative functions, security, and· personnel support 
requirements.46 
44 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 
45 Ibid., p. 68. 
46 Ibid., pp. 68-70. 
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2. The Navy's Technological Tools 
The Navy's primary technological tools are those identified by .. .From the Sea for 
composition of Naval Expeditionary Forces namely: 
1. Aircraft Carriers and Naval Tactical Air Wmgs 
2. Submarines 
3. Amphibious Ships with embarked Marines (Amphibious Ready Groups) 
4. Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
5. Surface Combatants 
6. Mine Warfare Forces 
7. Naval Special Warfare Forces 
Table 3-2 provides the QDR mandated force size in terms of the aforementioned technological 
tools. The characteristics and capabilities of these tools are briefly described in Appendix A 
QDR Mandated Force Structure 
Force Structure ActivelReserve 
Aircraft Carriers 1111 
Naval Tactical Air Wmgs 10/1 
Amphibious Ready Groups 12 
Surface Combatants 116 
Fast Attack Submarines 50 
Ballistic Missile Submarines 18 
Naval Special Warfare Teams 8 
Table 3-2. QDR Mandated Force Structure (Source: The Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 
V-I - V-3.) 
D. STRUCTURE 
Structure in this context refers to the basic groupings of activities and people, how 
these groupings are integrated, and what integrating devices are used. In analyzing the 
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structure of the Navy, I will utilize Mintzberg's organizational model which was introduced in 
Chapter II. 
1. The Navy as a Machine Bureaucracy with Overlapping Hierarchical 
Structures 
At first glance, many would consider the Navy to be a professional bureaucracy with 
standardized skills being the coordinating mechanism between units. To some degree this is 
true, but the dominant coordinating mechanisms within the Navy are first, written procedures 
and checklists originating from the technostructure and second, a hierarchical command 
structure. As such, the Navy operates more as a machine bureaucracy. 
Due to the complex environment, the Navy operates with two overlapping hierarchical 
structures. These overlapping hierarchical structures are the product of the drive for jointness 
between the military services. The first hierarchical structure is "The Navy Bureaucracy" which 
is responsible for the organizing, training, equipping, maintaining, assigning, and supporting of 
naval forces for the nation. The second structure is "The Joint Bureaucracy" which is 
responsible for military operations. Consequently, "The Navy Bureaucracy" is the 
technostructure for "The Joint Bureaucracy." Both of these structures are primarily machine in 
nature. 
In "The Navy Bureaucracy," the technostructure, in the form of systems commands 
and tactical development commands, tends to be the dominant component. These 
organizations create the procedures by which all work is accomplished in the operating core. 
The ships and squadrons in the fleet are standardized by the technostructure through manuals 
such as Naval Air Training and Operating Procedures (NATOPS), the Reactor Plant Manual, 
and a myriad of other manuals and publications. Ships and squadron are inundated with these 
manuals as they govern all aspects of the organization's work from anti-missile defense to 
changing a lube oil filter on a nuclear powered submarine. 
"The Jomt Bureaucracy" is also machine like in nature in that "The Navy Bureaucracy" 
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Figure 3-3. "The Joint Bureaucracy" (The differences from Figure 4 will appear in gray) 
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"The Navy Bureaucracy" dictates through doctrine and tactics how naval forces fight and 
operate. The Unified Commands do direct the operations and set the strategic direction in their 
area of responsibility, but it is the individual services that direct how the work is to be 
accomplished and indeed in some circumstances have overridden the desires of the Unified 
Command Commander-in-Chief(CINC) in deployment offorces. The overlapping hierarchical 
structures are graphically depicted in Figures 3-2 and 3-3. The following sections will describe 
the components of the Navy's hierarchical structure using Mintzberg's conceptual framework. 
2. The Strategic Apex 
The strategic apex for both structures starts with the National Command Authority 
which is by law the President of the United States and the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary 
of Defense is supported by his staff and in "The Pure Navy Bureaucracy" by the Secretary of 
the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operation and their respective staffs. The Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 modified "The Joint Bureaucracy" to bypass the Secretary of the Navy and the 
Chief of Naval Operations in operational matters. By law, the commanders in chef of the 
unified commands (the CINCs) report to the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff As discussed previously, "The Navy Bureaucracy" is charged with the 
organizing, training, equipping, maintaining, assigning ,and supporting of naval forces while the 
direction of operations is the purview of the strategic apex of "The Joint Bureaucracy" 
primarily the CINCS.47 The number of naval officer billets in the strategic apex are given in 
Table 3-3. 
3. The Middle Line 
The middle line is the link that ties the strategic apex to the operating core. It provides 
the direct supervision that that the strategic apex can not perform due to the size and dispersed 
nature of the Navy. In "The Navy Bureaucracy," the middle line starts with the two major 
fleets, Commander in Chief Atlantic Fleet and Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet 
47 Department of Defense, The Joint Staff Officers Guide 1993, (1993) pp. 2-3 - 2-36. 
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(CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT), and then to the six type commands divided by major· 
fleet and platfonn: air, surrace, and submarine. After the type commands comes the groups and 
functional air wings and then at the bottom of the middle line is the ship squadrons and air type 
Navy Officer Billets in the Strategic Apex 
Organization Navy Officer % of Total Navy 
Billets Officers Billets 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 142 .25% 
Office of the Secretary of the Navy 167 .2g<>10 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 935 1.6% 
The Joint Staff 351 .61% 
9 Unified Commands 1407 2.5% 
Allied Commands: NATOINORAD 162 .28% 
Strategic Apex Total 3168 5.5% 
Table 3-3. Navy Officer Billets in the Strategic Apex (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body and 
Billet File, September 1997) 
wings. In "The Joint Bureaucracy," the first part of the middle line is the component 
commanders. The component commanders direct the numbered fleets and then the numbered 
fleets direct the task forces. An important thing to note about the task forces is that they do not 
typically have standing staffs. The staffs tend to be on an ad hoc basis depending on the needs 
of the theater CINe. These ad hoc staffs are usually manned by the carrier group staffs 
(CARGRU), the destroyer squadron staffs, and the submarine group staffs. For the purposes of 
this analysis, I am only counting the CARGRU staffs in the Joint Bureaucracy due to the fact 
that both the DESRON staffs and the submarine group staffs are already counted in "The Navy 
Bureaucracy". The number of naval officers employed in the middle line of the two 
bureaucracies are displayed in Table 3-4. 
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Naval Officer Billets in the Middle Line 
Organization 
Pure Navy Bureaucracy 
ClNCLANTFLT/CINCPACFLT 
6 Type Commands 
33 Groups! Functional Air Wmgs 
62 Ship Squadrons! Air Type Wings 
Pure Naval Bureaucracy Sub-Total 
The Joint Bureaucracy 
Component Commands 
Numbered Fleets 
Task Forces· (CARGRUs only) 
The Joint Bureaucracy Sub-Total 
Middle Line Total (Only counts LAN1FLT and 

























Table 3-4 .. Navy Officer Billets in the Middle Line (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body and 
Billet File, September 1997) 
4. The Operating Core 
The operating core for the Navy is the ships, submarines, aircraft squadrons, and 
special operations forces that actually do the work of the Navy. The major operating units of 
the Navy are the carrier battle group, the amphibious ready group, the fast attack submarine, 
the ballistic missile submarine, and the naval special warfare team. The carrier battle group and 
the amphibious ready group can be divided further into individual ships and aircraft squadrons. 
Each of these units has its own administrative and operational command structure. The top of 
both command structures is the unit commanding officer. In the administrative chain of 
command the commanding officer is followed by the executive officer and then by the 
department heads and the division officers. Each division officers is in charge of a division of 
enlisted personnel. He is typically leads his division with the aid and guidance of a leading chief 
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petty officer or a leading petty officer. See Tables 3-5, 3-6, 3-7 and 3-8 for sample officer 
administrative billet structures. 
TICONDEROGA CLASS CRUISER BILLET STRUCTURE: 
CG-68ANZIO 
BILLET GRADE DESIG 
COMMANDING OFFICER 0-6 1110 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER 0-5 1110 
DEPARTMENT HEADS 
OPERATIONS OFFICER 0-4 1110 
SlllP ENGINEER 0-4 1110 
COMBAT SYSTEM OFFICER 0-4 1110 
SUPPLY OFFICER 0-4 3100 
DMSION OFFICERS 
FIRE CONTROL SAM 0-3 1110 
FIRE CONTROL OFFICER 0-3 1110 
muS-CIC 0-3 1110 
SHIP NAVIGATOR 0-3 1110 
DAMAGE CONTROL 0-3 1110 
CHAPLAIN 0-3 4100 
SlllP ELECTRONIC MATERIAL 0-3 6180 
ASW OFFICER 0-2 1110 
FlRSTLT AFLOAT 0-2 1110 
STRIKE WARFARE 0-2 1110 
MAIN PROPULSION ASSISTANT 0-2 1110 
STORESIFOOD SERVICE 0-2 3100 
FIRE CONTROL SAM 0-2 6160 
DMSIONWEAPONS ASW 0-1 1160 
ELECTRICAL DIVISION OFFICER 0-1 1160 







COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER 0-1 1160 0089S 
ADP SYSTEMS 0-1 1160 0091S 
DISBURSING 0-1 3100 
muS-CICffOI DIV 0-1 6120 
SHIP ELECTRONIC WARFARE W-3 7440 
Table 3-5. Sample Surface Ship Officer Billet Structure (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body 
and Billet File, September 1997) 
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LOS ANGELES CLASS FAST ATTACK SUBMARINE 








NA VIGATION/OPERATIONS 0-4 
SHIP ENGINEER NUCLEAR 0-4 
COMBAT SYSTEMS OFFICER 0-3 
SUPPLY OFFICER 0-3 
DIVISION OFFICERS 
MAIN PROPULSION ASSISTANT 0-3 
DAMAGE CONTROL ASSISTANT 0-3 
ELECTRICAL ASSISTANT 0-2 
ASSISTANT WEAPONS 0-2 
COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER 0-2 
FIRSTLT AFLOAT 0-1 
RADIOLOGICAL CONTROL 0-1 
SHIP REACTOR CONTROL 0-1 

















Table 3-6. Sample Submarine Officer Billet Structure (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body and 
Billet File, September 1997) 
FIGHTER ATTACK SQUADRON BILLET STRUCTURE: 
VFA-25 
BILLET GRADE DESIG SUBSPECIALTY CODE 
COMMANDING OFFICER 0-5 1311 
EXECUTIVE OFFICER 0-5 1311 
DEPARTMENT HEADS 
4 DEPARTMENT HEADS 0-4 1311 
DIVISION OFFICERS 
AlCOMNTGEN 0-4 1520 
AlCOMNTMTL 0-3 6330 
AlCOMNT AVIWP 0-2 1520 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER 0-2 6410 
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE 0-1 1630 
AlCOMNT AVIWP 0-1 6360 
AlC OMNT/MTL W-3 7340 
AlC MTLCTL & AL W-3 7340 
4 AVIATOR 0-3 1311 
7 AVIATOR 0-2 1311 
Table 3-7. Sample Aircraft Squadron Officer Billet Structure (Source: Bureau of Personnel 
Body and Billet File, September 1997) 
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SEAL TEAMS BILLET STRUCTURE: SEAL TEAM 3 
























TRAINING-SEAL 0-3 6150 
8 * SEALPLTN CMDR 0-3 1130 
8 * SEAL-ASST PLTN CMDR 0-2 1130 
CMBT SYS-SEAL W -4 7150 
TRAINING-SEAL W-4 7150 
SEAL-AIR OPS OFF W-3 7150 
TRAINING-SEAL W-3 7150 
GUN/ORD-SEAL W-3 7150 
0029P 
Table 3-8. Sample Seal Team Officer Billet Structure (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body and 
Billet File, September 1997) 
Navy Officers Billets in the Operating Core 
Navy Officer % of Total 
Navy 
Type of Operating Unit Billets Officers Billets 
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1,847 3.2% 
COMBATANTS 2,730 4.8% 
M1PHIBIOUS SHIPS 1,479 2.6% 
COMMAND SHIPS 127 .22% 
MINE COUNTERMEASURE SHIPS 195 .34% 
BROWNWATER BOATS 121 .21% 
AUXILIARY SHIPS 595 .10010 
:MILITARY SEALIFT SHIPS 69 .12% 
FAST ATTACK SUBMARINES 1,074 1.9% 
Table 3-9. Navy Officers Billets in the Operating Core (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body 
and Billet File, September 1997) 
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Navy Officer Billets in the Operating Core (CONT) 
Navy Officer % of Total Navy 
Type of Operating Unit Billets Officers Billets 
BALLISTIC i\1ISSILE SUBMARINES 519 .90% 
SEAL TEAMS/ SDVT TEAMS 277 .48% 
SPECIAL WARFARE UNITS 311 .54% 
FIGHTER! ATTACK SQUADRONS 725 1.3% 
FIGHTER SQUADRONS 539 .94% 
ELECTRONIC ATTACK SQUADRONS 446 .78% 
AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING SQUADRONS 372 .65% 
SEA CONTROL SQUADRONS 453 .79% 
PATROL SQUADRONS 1,028 1.8% 
ELECTRONIC/ COMMUNICATIONS 437 .76% 
SQUADRONS 
VRSQUADRONS 138 .24% 
VRCSQUADRONS 107 .19'110 
VCSQUADRONS 73 .13% 
VFCSQUADRONS 29 .05% 
VRSQUADRONS 18 .03% 
HSSQUADRONS 274 .48% 
HSLSQUADRON 597 1.0% 
HMSQUADRON 68 .12% 
HCSQUADRON 418 .73% 
i\1ISC AVIATION COMMANDS 76 .13% 
TOTAL OPERATING CORE 15,169 26.5% 
Table 3-9. Navy Officer Billets in the Operating Core (CONT) (Source: Bureau of Personnel 
Body and Billet File, September 1997) 
In addition to the administrative command structure, each operating unit has an 
operational command structure in the form of the watch organization. On a F/A-18, this can 
be as simple as a pilot, but as the platform gets bigger the watch organization gets more 
complex. On a submarine, the officer of the deck is in charge of the operational structure of 
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the ship under the supervision of the commanding officer. Typically, there are at least two 
officers assisting him, a junior officer of the deck and a nuclear engineering officer of the 
watch. On Ticonderoga Class cruisers the watch organization is even more complex and can 
consist of up to five or six officers at a time. An officer's time is typically split between his 
administrative duties and his watch responsibilities. See Table 3-9 for the number of officer 
billets in the operating core. 
5. The Technostructure 
The technostructure serves the organization by affecting the work of others. They 
design the work and train the people who do the work, but do not do the work themselves. In 
"The Navy Bureaucracy", the systems commands and the training and education commands 
serve as the technostructure. They dominate the organization through standardization in the 
form of tactics and procedures This is the most technical part of the Navy as it deals with 
weapon development and employment. In "The Joint Bureaucracy", the technostructure is by 
and large the entire Pure Navy Bureaucracy. The number of officers employed by the 
technostructure is displayed in Table 3-10. 
Navy Officer Billets in the Technostructure 
Navy Officer % of Total Navy 
Type of Operating Unit Billets Officers Billets 
SYSTEMS COMMANDS/ 2,913 5.1% 
TACTICS AND WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT 
OFFICER EDUCATION 702 1.2% 
TRAINING 2,535 4.4% 
STUDENTS 8,400 14.7% 
TOTAL TECHNOSTRUCTURE 14,550 25.4% 
(pURE NAVAL BUCREAUcy) 
Table 3-10. Navy Officer Billets in the Technostructure (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body 
and Billet File, September 1997) 
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6. The Support Staff 
As previously discusses, the support staff are specialists that exist to provide support 
that is outside the operating work flow. This work includes, public affairs, intelligence 
gathering, personnel! administrative management, recruiting, shore based C4ISR, reserve 
administration, and the list goes on. Some officers support the core work of the Navy by 
serving in Non-Department of Defense Agencies, Department of Defense Agencies, and 
Department of the Navy Agencies. The number of naval officers employed in the support 
structure is displayed in Table 3-11. 
Navy Officer Billets in the Support Staff 
Navy Officer % of Total Navy 
Type of Operating Unit Billets Officers Billets 
NON-DOD GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 67 .12% 
DOD AGENCIES 1,033 1.8% 
DON AGENCIES 101 .18% 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 67 .17% 
LEGAL SERVICES 400 .70% 
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT/ ADMIN 738 1.3% 
RECRUITING 790 1.4% 
INTELLIGENCE 574 1.0% 
SHORE BASED C4ISR CO:M:MANDS 393 .69<'/0 
OCEANOGRAPHY/ METEOROLOGICAL 253 .44% 
CO:M:MANDS 
RESERVE ADMINSTRATION 308 .54% 
POLITICAL! FOREIGN AFFAIRS 421 .73% 
DEPOTLEVELNUUNTENANCE 760 1.3% 
BASE SUPPORT 2973 5.2% 
(INCLUDES CONSTRUCTION BATTALIONS) 
Table 3-11. Navy Officer Billets in the Support Staff (Source: Bureau of Personnel Body and 
Billet File, September 1997) 
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Navy Officer Billets in the Support Staff (CONT) 
Navy Officer % of Total Navy 
Type of Operating Unit Billets Officers Billets 
SHORE BASED LOGISTICS COMMANDS 897 1.6% 
MEDICAL 10,400 18.1% 
OTIIER MILITARY SERVICE LIAISONS 161 .28% 
MISCELLANEOUS 450 .79% 
SUPPORT STAFF TOTAL 20,786 36.3% 
Table 3-11. Navy Officer Billets in the Support Staff (CONT) (Source: Bureau of Personnel 
Body and Billet File, September 1997) 
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IV. THE NAVAL OFFICER OF TODAY 
A.OVERVIEW 
In the Systems Model, people or in this case naval officers refers to who the people are 
and what skills, knowledge, abilities, and attributes they have. This chapter will describe who 
naval officers are using rank and demographic data. It will describe occupational differentiation 
between officer communities, it will describe the general skills, knowledge, and abilities of 
officers, and in addition it will describe the traditional naval officers attributes. 
B. RANK AND DEMOGRAPmCS: WHO ARE NAVAL OFFICERS 
1. Rank 
Officers Rank Distribution 
Rank Number Percentage 
0-10 Admiral 9.02% 
0-9 Vice Admiral 26 .05% 
0-8 Rear Admiral (Upper Half) 96 .2% 
0-7 Rear Admiral (Lower Half) 139 .3% 
0-6 Captain 3,270 5.8% 
0-5 Commander 7,059 12.6% 
0-4 Lieutenant Commander 10,702 19.1 % 
0-3 Lieutenant 19,544 34.8% 
0-2 Lieutenant Junior Grade 5,827 10.4% 
0-1 Ensign 7,375 13.1% 
W-l -W-5 Chief Warrant Officer 2,079 3.7% 
Table 4-1. Officers Rank: Distribution (Source: Navy Bureau of Personnel Website, 18 April 
1998 and Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1998t8 
48 The sum of the percentages do not equal 100010 due to rounding. 
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The most obvious means of grouping naval officers is by rank. Rank under the current 
design is a measure of longevity. The current structure has 10 commissioned officer ranks 
ensign through admiral and 5 chief warrant officer ranks. The rank distribution is weighted 
heavily toward the rank of lieutenant with 34.8%. See Table 4-1 for rank distribution. 
2. Composition by Sex and RaciaI/Ethnic Group 
As shown in Table 4-2, there are 55,576 naval officers. These officers are 
predominantly white males at 74.3%. White females are the second largest group with 11.3%. 
The proportion of all officers who are African American is 6.3%, and the proportion who are 
Hispanic is 3.9<'10. 
Officer Demographic Data (W-1 to 0-10) 
Male Female Total 
White 74.3% 11.3% 85.6% 
Native American 0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 
Asian American 2.7% 0.7% 3.4% 
African American 4.9% 1.4% 6.3% 
Hispanic 3.3% 0.6% 3.9% 
Other/Unknown 0.4% 0.1% 0.4% 
Total 86.0% 14.0% 55,576 
Table 4-2. Navy Officer Demographic Data (Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, June 
1998) 
Table 4-3 provides a more detailed view of the composition of the officers corps by sex 
and racial/ethnic group by showing the distribution by paygrade within the Navy. Within the 
Navy, the highest concentration of African Americans is in the lower paygrades. About fifteen 
percent of warrant officers and 7.2% of ensigns through lieutenants are African American 
whereas African Americans are only 3.2% of the flag officers and are only 4.1% of Lieutenant 
Commanders through Captains. Women are more heavily concentrated in the middle and lower 
ranks. In the junior ranks, 15% of ensigns through lieutenants and 13.5% of lieutenant 
commanders through captain are women, while only 3.7% of flag officers and 5.1 % of warrant 
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Pay Grade and 
Racial/Ethnic Number Percent 
Group 
Distribution Male Female Total Mal,e Female Total 
0-7 through 0-10 
White 200 7 207 92.2% 3.2% 95.4% 
Native American 1 0 1 0.5% 0.0% 0.5% 
Asian American 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
African American 6 1 7 2.8% 0.5% 3.2% 
Hispanic 2 0 2 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 
Other/Unknown 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Total 209 8 217 96.3% 3.7% 100.0% 
0-4 through 0-6 
White 16668 2395 19063 79.1% 11.4% 90.5% 
Native American 72 18 90 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 
Asian American 362 86 448 1.7% 0.4% 2.1% 
~frican American 627 242 869 3.0% 1.1% 4.1% 
Hispanic 465 82 547 2.2% 0.4% 2.6% 
Other/Unknown 36 17 53 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 
Total 18230 2840 21070 86.5% 13.5% 100.0% 
0-1 through 0-3 
White 23019 3799 26818 71.0% 11.7% 82.7% 
Native American 151 18 169 0.5% 0.1% 0.5% 
Asian American 1093 281 1374 3.4% 0.9% 4.2% 
African American 1820 520 2340 5.6% 1.6% 7.2% 
Hispanic 1354 226 1580 4.2% 0.7% 4.9% 
Other/Unknown 129 15 144 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
Total 27566 4859 32425 85.0% 15.0% 100.0% 
W-1 through W-5 
White 1391 72 1463 74.6% 3.9% 78.5% 
Native American 8 0 8 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 
~sian American 50 1 51 2.7% 0.1% 2.7% 
iAfrican American 257 18 275 13.8% :J.O% 14.8% 
!Hispanic 26 2 28 1.4% 0.1% 1.5% 
iQther/Unknown 37 2 39 2.0% 0.1% 2.1% 
Total 1769 95 1864 94.9% 5.1% 100.0% 
Table 4-3. Number and Percentage Distribution of Active Duty Naval Officers, by Paygrade, 
RaciallEthnic Group, and Sex, June 1998 (Source: Defense Manpower Data Center, June 
1998) 
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officers are women. Hispanics are more heavily concentrated in the lower ranks with 4.9% of· 
ensigns through lieutenant being Hispanic and only 2.6% of lieutenant commanders through 
captain and .9% offlag officers being Hispanic. Asian Americans like women are more heavily 
concentrated in the middle and lower ranks with 4.2% of ensigns through lieutenant and 2.1 % 
of lieutenant commander through captain being Asian American. 
C. OCCUPATIONAL DIFFERENTIAITION: SPECIALISTS VERSUS 
GENERALISTS 
Officers are divided into four groups: unrestricted line officers (URL), restricted line 
(RL) officers, staff officers, and limited duty officers/warrant officers. See Table 4-4 for officer 
grouping distribution. The URL grouping is 47.0% of the officer corps and consists of officers 
that are capable of being assigned directly to warfighting billets. These officers are typically 
referred to as the generalists, but this is somewhat misleading. These officers are specialized by 
platform and to a large degree spend most of their career within their platform specialty until 
they reach flag rank. A better categorization of this group would be specialist in warfare. The 
Officer Grouping 
Distribution Number Percentage 
Unrestricted Line 26,257 47.0% 
Restricted Line 6,061 10.9% 
Staff 17,559 31.4% 
Limited DutylWarrant 5,961 7.7% 
Table 4-4. Officer Grouping Distribution (Source: The Naval Bureau of Personnel Website, 
May 1997.) 
RL grouping is 10.90/0 of the officer corps and consists of specialists who due to extensive 
training and education are managed separately from unrestricted line officers. The staff 
grouping is 31.4% of the officer corps and consists of specialists who have direct civilian 
equivalents e.g. doctor, lawyer, civil engineer. The fourth grouping of limited duty and warrant 
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officers is 10.7% of the officer corps and consists of highly technical specialist who perfonn 
operational support for the warfighting portion of the Navy. Officers in this grouping were 
typically top perfonning senior enlisted who due to their technical knowledge and superior 
perfonnance were accessed into the officer ranks. 
1. Unrestricted Line Officers: Warfare Specialists 
The unrestricted line consists of platfonn specialists in surface warfare, submarine 
warfare, special warfare, special operations, and aviation. Aviation specialists are divided into 
pilots and naval fight officers. The distribution of the URL between the platfonn specialties is 
shown in Table 4-5. Pilots make up the largest portion of the URL. They are followed closely 
by surface warfare specialists and then by naval flight officers and submarine warfare 
specialists. The smallest groups in the URL are the special warfare community and the special 
operations community. The special warfare community or SEALS specialize in unconventional 
warfare, counter-insurgency, coastal and riverine interdiction, and tactical intelligence 
collection. The special operations community specializes in ordnance management and 
disposal, mine warfare, and diving and salvage. 
Unrestricted Line Specialties 
Designator Function Number of Officers Percentage of Officer 
Population 
111X and 116X Surface Warfare 8,184 14.7% 
112Xand 117X Submarine Warfare 3,705 6.6% 
113X, 118X, Special Warfare! 856 1.5% 
114X and 119X Special Operations 
131X and 139X Pilot 9,090 16.3% 
132X and 137X Naval Flight Officer 4,422 7.9% 
Total Unrestricted Line 26,257 47.0% 
Table 4-5. Unrestricted Line Specialties (Source: Bureau of Personnel Website, May 1997) 
2. Restricted Line Officers 
The restricted line grouping consists of specialists that support both operational and 
institutional parts of the Navy. This grouping includes engineering and maintenance specialists, 
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intelligence and cryptology officers, public affairs and fleet support officers, and 
meteorological/oceanographic (METOC) specialists. These officers are separated due to their 
extensive training and education and serve almost exclusively in billets in their specialty. The 
distribution within the restricted line grouping is listed in Table 4-6. The largest specialty within 
the restricted line group is the fleet support specialty followed closely by the naval intelligence 
Restricted Line Specialties 
Percentage of 
Specialties Number Officer Population 
14XX ENGINEERING DUTY OFFICER 899 l.6% 
151X AEROSPACE ENGINEERING 362 .7% 
DUTY OFFICER 
152X AEROSPEACE MAITENANCE 463 .8% 
DUTY OFFICER 
161X CRYPTOLOGIC OFFICER 719 l.3% 
163X NAVAL INTELLIGENCE 1,188 2.1% 
OFFICER 
165XPUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER 194 .4% 
170X FLEET SUPPORT OFFICER 1,820 3.3% 
18XX METEOROLOGICAL/ 416 .8% 
OCEANOGRAPIllC OFFICERS 
TOTALRL 6,061 10.9% 
Table 4-6. Restricted Line Specialties (Source: Bureau of Personnel Website, May 1997.) 
specialty and the engineering duty officer specialty. The smallest specialty is the public affairs 
specialty with only 194 officers. 
3. Staff Officers 
Staff officers represent the professional support branch of the Navy. Staff officers 
specialize in occupations that have direct civilian equivalents and often require advanced 
civilian education. Specialties within the staff corps include doctors, dentists, medical service 
administrators, lawyers, nurses, supply officers, chaplains, and civil engineers. The distribution 
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of officers within this grouping is listed in Table 4-7. The largest community within the staff 
grouping is the medical community. The supply community acting as the Navy's business 
managers are the second largest with the medical service corps closely behind. The smallest 
community in the staff grouping are the lawyers in the Judge Advocate General Corps. 
Staff Corps Specialties 
Percentage of 
Designator Number Officer Corps 
19XX PROSPECTIVE STAFF CORPS 198 .4% 
210X :MEDICAL 4,043 7.2% 
220X DENTAL . 1,293 2.3% 
230X :MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS 2,628 4.7% 
250X JUDGE ADVOCATE CORPS 861 1.5% 
290X NURSE 3,216 5.8% 
310X SUPPLY 3,037 5.4% 
410X CHAPLAIN 940 1.7% 
510X CIVIL ENGINEERING CORPS 1,343 2.4% 
TOTAL STAFF CORPS 17,559 31.4% 
Table 4-7. StaffCorps Specialties (Source: The Bureau of Personnel Website, May 1997) 
4. Limited Duty Officers and Chief Warrant Officers 
The limited duty officer and warrant officer grouping consists of highly technical 
specialists who perfonn operational support for the warfighting portion of the Navy. Officers in 
this grouping were typically top performing senior enlisted who due to their technical 
knowledge and superior perfonnance were accessed into the officer ranks. Table 4-8 lists the 
specialties of the limited duty officer and warrant officer grouping. 
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Limited Duty Officer! Chief Warrant Officer Specialties 
Limited Duty Officers 
Number of Officers 
% of Officer Corps 
Designators 
611X SURFACE DECK 
3,941 
7.1% 
612X SURFACE OPERATIONS 
613X SURFACE ENGINEERINGIREP AIR 
616X SURFACE ORDNANCE 
618X SURFACE ELECTRONICS 
619X SURFACE COMMUNICATIONS 
621X SUBMARINE DECK 
623X SUBMARINE ENGINEERIREP AIR 
626X SUBMARINE ORDNANCE 
628X SUBMARINE ELECTRONICS 
629X SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS 
631X AVIATION DECK 
632X AVIATION OPERATIONS 
633X AVIATION MAINTENANCE 
636X AVIATION ORDNANCE 
638X AVIATION ELECTRONICS 
639X AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL 
640X NUCLEAR POWER 
641X ADMINISTRATION 











653X CIVIL ENGINEERING 
655XLAW 
Chief Warrant Officer 
Number of Officers 
% of Officer Corps 
Designators 
711X SUFACE BOSUN 
2,020 
3.6% 
712X SURFACE OPERATIONS 
713X SURFACE ENGINEERING 
714X SURFACE RERAIR 
715X SPECIAL WARFARE TECHNICIAN 
716X SURFACE ORDNANCE 
718X SURFACE ELECTRONICS 
719X SURFACE COMMUNICATIONS 
720X SUBMARINE DIVER 
72lX SUBMARINE BOSUN 
723X SUBMARINE ENGINEERING 
724X SUBMARINE REPAIR 
726X SUBMARINE ORDNANCE 
728X SUBMARINE ELECTRONICS 
731X AVIATION BOSUN 
732X AVIATION OPERATIONS 
734X AVIATION MAINTENANCE 
736X AVIATION ORDNANCE 
738X AVIATION ELECTRONICS 
740X NUCLEAR POWER 
741X SHIPS CLERK 








752X FOOD SERVICE 
753X CIVIL ENGINEERING 
Table 4-8. Limited Duty Officer/ Chief Warrant Officer Specialties (Source: Bureau of 
Personnel Website, May 1997 and The Naval Officer Career Planning Guidebook, 1990.) 
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5. Trends in Officer Differentiation 
In the past 20 years, the Navy has seen a decline in the relative URL/warfare specialist 
representation within the officer corps by over 10% as shown. by Figure 4-1. The relative 
representation of the RL and staff groupings within the Navy have consequently increased. 
This shift from the URL grouping to the RL and Staff grouping is the result of two factors. The 
first, is the creation of the Fleet Support community as a part of the restricted line. In the past, 
these officers were categorized as general unrestricted line officers and were subsequently a 
part of the URL grouping. The second is that the number of pilots has been on a steady decline 
since the 1970s. This trend was exacerbated with the military wide drawdown in the early 
1990s. 
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Figure 4-1. Trends in Officer Differentiation (Source: Naval Bureau of Personnel OPIS 
Database, 1997) 
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D. SKILLS, KNOWLEDGE, ABllJTIES OF THE NAVAL OFFICER OF TODAY 
The senior level division officer/ department head level naval officer of today generally 
has three clusters of skills, knowledge, and abilities (SKA): a traditional platform centric 
cluster, a leadership cluster, and a management cluster. In this context, a cluster of SKAs refers 
those skills, knowledge, and abilities that are required to complete a certain aspect of a job. 
While, skills refer to the capability to perform job operations with ease and precision. 
Knowledge refers to the body of information necessary to make adequate job performance 
possible. Ability refers to the cognitive capabilities necessary to perform a job function.49 The 
SKA clusters are summarized in Table 4-9. 
SKA Ousters of the Naval Officer of Today 
1. Traditional platform centric cluster 
• Ship and aircraft handling and maneuver. 
• Knowledge of and the ability to apply technology on the individual platform level. 
• Knowledge of and the ability to perform single unit operations and tactics. 
2. Charismatic Leadership Cluster 
• Skills, knowledge, and ability to through sheer force of will convinces his 
subotdinates to do what they would not normally do and do this without question. 
• Knowledge of human motivation. 
• Skills and ability to give clear concise orders. 
• Ability to delegate. 
• Skills and ability to use the chain of command to accomplish assigned tasks. 
3. Management Cluster 
• Skills and abilities in the management of tasks and technology. 
• Knowledge and ability in aspects of human resource management including 
evaluation/counseling, training, and in the enlisted promotion process. 
• Skills and abilities to manage diversity 
Table 4-9. SKA Clusters of the Naval Officer of Today (Source: Author) 
1. The Traditional Platfonn Centric Cluster 
This SKA cluster refers to the skills, knowledge, and abilities that relate directly to an 
officers specialty. For most URL officers, this includes ship and aircraft handling, a knowledge 
49 Paul M Muchinsky, Psychology Applied to Work, (Brooks/Cole Publishing: Pacific Grove, CA, 1997), p. 182. 
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of and the ability to apply technology on the platfoIm leveL and the knowledge and ability to 
perroIm single unit operations and tactics. For the speCialists, it includes the requisite 
knowledge of their specialty e.g. METOC officers must be well versed in meteorology and 
oceanography. 
2. The Leadership Cluster 
"During the engagement off Samar Island at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 
October 1944, a small task force, Taffy 3, was destined to enter the halls of 
combat glory by defending the landing force in some of the heaviest fighting 
ever seen at sea. Admiral Clifton A. F. "Ziggy" Sprague's small escort carriers, 
their embarked air groups, and sailors on destroyers and destroyer escorts 
fought 'against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected.' 
When Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN, commanding officer of the 
destroyer USS Johnston (DD-557), saw the pagoda masts of enemy battleships 
and cruisers on the horizon off Samar Island, he laid a smoke. screen to protect 
the escort carriers and steered his small and outclassed ship directly toward the 
enemy. After closing within firing range, the Johnston fired all ten torpedo 
tubes, striking the enemy cruiser Kumano (which later sank). The Johnston 
then took evasive action and ducked into a rain squall. 
After receiving hits on the bridge and elsewhere, the Johnston received a 
general order for all destroyers to make torpedo attacks. Johnston rejoined the 
fray, making dummy torpedo attack runs and fighting on with her modest 
complement of guns-- attempting to draw enemy fire and force the enemy to 
take evasive action. The Johnston took on the 30,000 ton battleship Kongo, 
scoring fifteen hits before ducking into her own smoke screen in safety. During 
the enemy counter-attack, Commander Evans lost two fingers and, in the force 
of a blast, all the clothing above his waist was blown off 
When an enemy cruiser engaged one of the escort carriers, Evans closed the 
cruiser and scored four hits with his guns. As a squadron of four Japanese 
destroyers and a light cruiser maneuvered to box in the escort carriers of the 
American defending force, Commander Evans seized the initiative by attacking 
the whole squadron. Johnston's furious close-in gunfire so startled the enemy 
that their torpedoes were launched prematurely, causing no damage to the 
escort carriers. The enemy force singled out Johnston for their vengeance. 
After a series of mortal blows, Johnston was sunk. Commander Evans was 
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never recovered ... Commander Evans was awarded the Medal of Honor," 
[posthumously].50 
Commander Evans in the Battle of Leyte Gulf personifies the traditional Navy 
leadership model. This model views the leader as a charismatic and heroic individual who 
through sheer force of will convinces his subordinates to do what they would not normally do 
and do this without question. General W. H. Rice, USMC sums up leadership in this model as 
"know yourself, know your troops, and know your job!" The leader here is expected to know 
what leadership style best fits his or her personality and what leadership style best fits his or her 
situation. The leader is expected to know his troops, know the names of their spouses and 
children, and know what motivates them. The leader has be an expert in hislher area. The 
leader must be able to give clear and concise orders. To sum it up, the basis for leadership in 
this model is personal example, moral responsibility, good management, tact, dependability, 
and a sense of humor. 51 
Two important aspects of this leadership model are accountability and the chain of 
command. Both of these aspects are derived from the heroic view ofleadership. If the leader is 
truly the heroic individual and is to be followed without question, then that leader must make 
the right decisions. This is enforced by requiring the officer to be responsible for the actions of 
his unit regardless of intent. The classic example of accountability is the ship captain whose ship 
runs aground while he is asleep. He is accountable for the grounding even though he was not 
on the bridge. At least in theory, he is at fault for creating a situation where an accident like this 
could happen. 
Since individuals can only successfully manage a certain span of control, the concept of 
the chain of command was developed to ensure that officer accountability was maintained. 
Consequently, a hierarchical command structure in the shape of a pyramid was formed so that 
50 James Tritten, Navy Combat Leadership for Tomorrow: Where Wi/I We Get Such Men and Women?, (Naval 
Doctrine Conunand: Norfolk, VA, July 1995), p. 1. 
51 Karel Montor, et al., Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience, (Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MO, 1987), pp. 3, 
7-16. 
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each successive layer could hold the other accountable through delegation. This ensures that 
one individual is not overwhelmed by information and the need for action. 
"In simple tenns, the chain of command is the pyramid structure of 
communications, authority, and responsibilities which allows every individual in 
an organization to know what is going on with those below and what is 
expected by those above. ,,52 
It acts as both a conduit for infonnation and a filter of infonnation deemed extraneous. This is a 
crucial concept for accountability for this is how officers acquire the information necessary to 
make the right decisions and can thus be held accountable. The chain of command is at least in 
theory to be bypassed only when "doing so is necessary for the national good. ,,53 
3. The Management Ouster 
In the context of the Systems Model, leadership refers to the setting of the system's 
direction whereas management refers to mastery of the system's design factors. 54 
Consequently, management is a necessary component part of being a leader, but not sufficient 
for success. There are several areas of management: financial management, technology 
management, human resource management, etc. Today's naval officers in general are required 
to have SKAs in the management of tasks and technology and in some areas of human 
resource management e.g. personnel evaluation/counseling, training, promotion. Organization 
design/Structure, financial management, and information management are required in some 
areas by some naval officers, but as a whole, naval officers are not educated in these areas. In 
addition, naval officers are required to have skills and abilities in managing diversity in the 
workplace as minority and female populations within the Navy increase. 
E. TRADmONAL NAVAL OFFICER ATTRIBUTES 
Attributes refer to the baseline characteristics of that all naval officers need top be 
successful. Montor et al. list the traditional attributes of the naval officers as the following: 
S2 Ibid p. 112. 
S3 Ibid p. 113. 
54 Nancy Roberts, Interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 20 August 1998. 
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• Officers must be loyal. Loyalty in this context has three aspects. First, an officer 
must be loyal to his country. Second, an officer must be loyal to his or her 
superiors through serving them efficiently and well. Third, an officer must loyal to 
his or her subordinates whereby the leader looks out for the legitimate interests of 
his or her subordinates. 
• Officers must show courage, physical and moral. 
• Officers must have honor and be honest and truthful. They must have an acute 
sense of right and wrong and adhere strictly to what they believe is right. They 
must refuse to lie, defraud, steal, or deceive under any circumstances. 
• Officers must have initiative the ability to plan ahead, and imagination. They 
need to do what ought to be done without being told. They must be able to look 
toward the future and see what must be done and when necessary devise new 
methods to accomplish tasks. 
• Officers must be decisive when necessary. 
• Officers must be enthusiastic for through enthusiasm leaders can build enthusiastic 
supporters. 
• Officers must have faith. In this context, faith refers confidence in oneself, 
confidence in mankind, and confidence in one's cause. As such, faith acts like 
enthusiasm in that it is contagious. 
• Officers must have religious faith. Montor et al state that "the leader who 
sincerely believes and has faith in a creator, regardless of the particular 
denomination to which he belongs, is endowed with a fortitude and a serenity 
which will sustain him during periods of stress and misfortune. " 
• Officers must be reliable and prompt. 
• Officers should have a sense of humor in order to relieve the tension that is 
endemic with combat. 
• Officers should be modest and have tact. 
62 
• Officers should have self-confidence and not be afraid to undertake the difficult . 
assignment. 
• Officers are required to have common sense and good judgement thus enabling 
officers to make intelligent choices or decisions. 
• Officers must be of good health, have energy, and be optimistic. 
• Officers should be professional and have self-control. 55 




V. THE NAVY'S OFFICER CAREER MANAGKMENT SYSTEM 
A.OVERVIEW 
Chapter IV discussed the naval officer of today. This chapter discusses how the Navy 
manages these officers. The Navy's officer personnel management system as introduced in 
chapter IT has seven primary personnel functions: accession, development, promotion, 
assignment, compensation, personnel evaluation, and separation/transition. The Navy manages 
these functions primarily through the centralized bureaucracy of the Chief of Naval Operations 
Staff (the Nl and N7 organizations), the Navy Personnel Command now located in Millington 
Tennessee, the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET) and various other naval 
education and training commands, and the Unites States Naval Academy in Annapolis, 
Maryland. 
B. ACCESSING 
The accession process for officers includes the recruiting of officer candidates, the 
screening out of "undesirable" candidates, and the indoctrination of officer candidates into the 
officer corps. The Navy has four categories of programs to perform this function: 
1. programs for high school and college students, 
2. programs for college graduates, 
3. programs for junior enlisted who demonstrate sufficient aptitude to be officers, S6 
and 
4. programs for professionals and senior enlisted personne1.57 
This section will concentrate on the attributes of the first two program categories, those 
targeted at high school students, college students, and college graduates namely the United 
States Naval ACademy (USNA), the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) 
56 Programs for jtmior enlisted personnel include the Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) and the Broadened 
Opportunity for Officer Selection Training Program (BOOST). 
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Scholarship and Non-Scholarship Programs, and the Officer Candidate School Program 
(OCS). Programs targeted at junior enlisted personnel are similar to the first two program 
categories. The major difference being the recruiting target population is junior enlisted 
personnel instead of civilians. In fact, most of these programs require the same schooling as the 
first two program categories. 58 The fourth category is targeted at professionals and senior 
enlisted personnel for entry into the professional support communities. 59 These programs 
directly commission officers and then send them to indoctrination training often giving them 
credit in the form of advanced rank for their professional skills. These direct commission 
programs are of such a specialized nature that they are not totally germane to the topic of 
future naval officers. Table 5-1 displays FY1997 Navy Officer Accessions by source of 
commission. Figure 5-1 displays recent trends in officer accessions. The percentage of ROTC 
and Direct Appointment accessions has been decreasing over the past several years while the 
proportion of Naval Academy and OCS accessions has increased. 
1. Programs for High School and College Students 
Programs for high school and college students include USNA, NROTC Scholarship 
Program, and the Non-Scholarship NROTC Program. These programs provide the majority of 
the officer accessions especially into the unrestricted line communities. In addition, these 
programs provide more :firm specific training than the other programs and individuals in these 
programs typically demonstrate more loyalty to the Navy as witnessed by higher retention 
rates. See Table 5-2. However, the weakness of these programs is their long lead time, namely 
the four years of a college education. This long lead time hinders the ability of manpower 
managers to use these programs exclusively to meet annual end strength requirements. 
57 Professionals in this context refers to people who have obtained a "professional" skill such medicine or law. 
58 Students in the Enlisted Commissioning Program instead of attending military science classes as a part of the ROTC 
program attend a 7 week course at the Naval Science Institute in Newport., Rhode Island. 
59 This program category encompasses the recruitment of professionals into the staff corps and the commissioning of 
senior eiilisted personnel as limited duty officers and warrant officers. 
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Officers by Source of Commission 
Source of Commission Number of Officers % of New Officers 
Programs for High School and College Students 
Naval Academy 811 
NROTC Scholarship 691 
NROTC Non-Scholarship 73 
Programs for College Graduates 
OCS 899 
Programs for Junior and Senior Enlisted Personnel and Professionals 












Table 5-1. FY97 Navy Officer Accessions by Source of Commission (Source: Defense 
Manpower Data Center Interactive Data Management System, Dec. 1997) 
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Table 5-2. 20 Year Cumulative Continuation Rate By Accession Source (Source: OPIS 
Database, 1997)60 
60 Nmnber of Officers Completing a 20 Year Career Out of an Initial 100 = 100 * Product of the Average Year of 








Figure 5-1. Accession Source Trends (Source Defense Manpower Data Center, Dec. 1997) 
The unifying characteristic of these programs is that they lead to a college degree and a 
commission as an officer in the Navy. Officer candidates are recruited primarily through direct 
mailing, school guidance and career counselors, and the internet. The screening requirements 
for these programs are given in Table 5-3. Once selected, officer candidates attend college full 
time, but are required to take some additional courses in technical areas, military science, and 
leadership. The result of these programs is a 'reserve commission as an ensign in the Navy or as 
a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. 
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Naval Academy and NROTC Candidate Screening Requirements 
Screening Requirement Naval Academy ROTC 







- Congressional Nomination 
- Presidential or Vice Presidential 
Nomination, 
- Activel Reserve Navyl 
Marine Corps Nomination, 
- NROTCI JNROTC Nomination, 
- Children of Disabled! Deceased 
Veterans and POW!.MIAs 
Nomination, Medal of Honor 
Winner Nominations 
















English - 22 
Math-22 
Table 5-3. Naval Academy and NROTC Candidate Screening Requirements (Source: United 
States Naval Academy Website, 21 May 1998 and OPNAVN01E 1533: 1999 NROTC 
Scholarship Programs, 13 March 1998) 
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Naval Academy and NROTC Candidate Screening Requirements (CONT) 
Screening Requirement Naval Academy ROTC 
Scholastic Record College Preparatory: Not Specifically 
4 Years of Math including Trigonometry Mentioned as a 
Medical 
Physical 
4 Years of English Requirement 
2 Years of a Modern Foreign Language 
1 Year of Physics 
1 Year of Chemistry 
1 Year ofEuropean/W odd History 
Medically Qualified to serve in the 
Unrestricted Line 
300 YD Shuttle Run 
Kneeling Basketball Throw 





Pulls-Ups (Men)/ Flexed Arm Hang (Women). 
Table 5-3. Naval Academy and NROTC Candidate Screening Requirements (CONT) (Source: 
United States Naval Academy Website, 21 May 1998 and OPNAVNOlE 1533: 1999 NROTC 
Scholarship Programs, 13 March 1998) 
2. Programs for College Graduates 
In order to meet officer end strength goals, the Navy uses programs targeted at college 
graduates. Officers in this category attend the OCS for indoctrination and then are 
commissioned and are sent to serve in the area for which they were recruited . These officers 
typically already have a college degree and thus do n<?t have long lead times before 
commissioning. Consequently, these officer candidates are less expensive to access and give 
Navy manpower managers more leeway in meeting end strength requirements. 
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The OCS indoctrination at Newport, Rhode Island lasts 16 weeks and includes physical 
training, close order drill, leadership training, engineering courses, and naval science courses. 
Officer candidates in this group are recruited largely through college career fairs, college career 
counselors, direct mailings, and the internet. Candidates are screened into these programs using 
the Officer Aptitude Rating (OAR), their college grade point averages, extracurricular 
activities, employment record, and physical examination results. The OAR is a composite of the 
aviation selection test battery (ASTB) which measures academic, mechanical, and spatial 
aptitudes. Candidates are generally required to score at least a 40 on the OAR 61 
C.O~CERDEVELOPMENT 
There are four major components of officer development in the Navy: the development 
ofleadership skills, the development of a primary warfightinglsupport skill, the development of 
a specialty, and the obtainment of joint duty qualification. Leadership training is conducted 
throughout the officers career, while primary warfighting/support skill training is given after the 
officer is granted a commission or becomes a warrant officer and at periodic intervals 
throughout an officer's career. Each officer is given skills training in their chosen primary field, 
and it is this training that sets each officer on the path for their specific community. 
Specialty education and joint duty training are given at certain times in the individuals 
career dependent on the needs of the warfightinglsupport community that the officer belongs 
to. Officers obtaining a specialist training or education earn a subspecialty code and are 
consequently managed differently dependent on their specialty. Finally, the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act of 1986 requires almost all officers to be joint warfare qualified through both joint 
education and joint tour experience before attaining flag rank. 
In this section, I will briefly discuss officer leadership development, warfightingl 
support skill development for the major officer groupings, the subspecialty system, and the 
61 Mark Eitelberg, Janice Laurence, and Dianne C. Brown, Becoming Brass: Issues in the Testing, Recruiting, and 
Selection of American Military Officers, (Josey and Bass Co: San Francisco, CA, 1989), pp. 36-57. 
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joint duty qualification process. There will be an emphasis on the unrestricted line group of 
communities. 
1. Officer Leadership Development 
Naval leadership is developed over an officer's entire career. Leadership development 
encompasses both on-the-job training and formal class room instruction. On-the-job training 
occurs continually while the officer is assigned to both sea and shore assignments. To 
complement the on-the-job leadership training, the Navy provides formal classroom instruction 
in three distinct, but supporting stages. The first stage is leadership development courses during 
all officer accession programs. These programs emphasize integrity, moral courage, ethical 
behavior and responsibilities, standards of conduct, personal behavior, and Navy core values. 
The second stage is the leadership continuum. The leadership continuum is a series of short 
courses given at the division officer, department head, executive officer, and the commanding 
officer level. The continuum is focused on the application of core values. The third and final 
stage is intermediate and senior level professional military education. This stage is given at the 
Naval War College, the Naval Postgraduate School and other Service colleges and is 
accomplished through the integration of leadership, character, and ethics into the course work 
to obtain a knowledge of the ethical dimension of the profession at arms and an understanding 
of the ethical considerations of developing warfighting disciplines.62 
2. The Unrestricted Line Officer's Primary WaJ1ighting Skills Development 
a. Surface, Submarine, and Aviation Officers 
The career paths for surface warfare officers, submarine warfare officers, and 
aviators are similar in design. Each path has five major milestones: a division officer tour, a 
department head tour, an executive officer tour, a commanding officer tour, and a major 
command tour. The communities differ with regards to the timing of these milestone billets and 
in some cases the community will require the officer to serve in multiple milestone billets. See 
62 Chief of Naval Education and Training, ''Navy Officer Military Education Policy- Draft," 19 December 1997. 
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Figure 5-2 for the career paths for the standard career paths for surface warfare officers, 
submarine warfare officers, and aviators. More detailed career path figures are in Appendix B. 
Each community's division officer tour is preceded by initial skills training. This 
training ranges from 22-25 weeks for surface warfare officers to 50-70 weeks for pilots.63 
Surface Warfare training is conducted at Surface Warfare Officer School (SWOS) and consists 
of four phases: an 11 week operations and combat systems phase, a 6 week platform 
engineering phase, a 3-6 week billet specialty phase, and the 2 week division officer installment 
of leadership continuum training.64 A small group of surface warfare officers attend the 24 
week Nuclear Power School and the 24 week Nuclear Prototype Training Unit prior to 
attending SWOS in order to serve in the engineering departments of the nuclear surface fleet. 
Submarine warfare officers attend the 24 week Nuclear Power School and the 24 week 
Nuclear Prototype Training Unit acquiring the necessary skills to operate the submarine nuclear 
reactors. After nuclear reactor training, submarine officers attend the 12 week Submarine 
Officer Basic Course (SOBC) at the Submarine School. SOBC consists of a 10 week 
introduction into submarine operations and combat systems and the 2 week division officer 
installment of the leadership continuum. In addition, submarine officers attend one week short . 
courses in sonar, navigation! communication, missile employment, torpedo employment, and 
junior officer tactics during the first year of their division officer tour.6S The aviator initial skills 
training pipelines are displayed in Figures 5-3 and 5-4. The pipeline for pilots ranges from 50 to 
70 weeks of instruction while the NFO pipeline ranges from 40 to 60 weeks of instruction. This 
training is initially very general in nature as the aviators attend either Primary Flight Training or 
Basic Naval Flight Officer Training. After the completion of this phase, the aviators are 
separated into different training paths dependent on the platform in which they are ultimately 
going to specialize. After completion of the training pipeline, aviators are sent to the Fleet 
Replenishment Squadron commonly referred to as the "RAG" for the acquisition of platform 
specific training in operations and tactics. 
63 The variable training length is due to different platfonns and different billets requiring additional training. 
64 Surface Warfare Officer School Website, ''Division Officer Course Overview," 8 August 1998. 
65 Naval Submarine School Website, "Officer Training," 8 August 1998. 
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The division officer tour for surface warfare officers is divided into two . 
separate tours. The first, is approximately 24 months long while the second, is 18 months long. 
Aviators have two "division officer" tours which are broken up by a 36 month shore tour. The 
second "division officer" tour for aviators is a disassociated sea tour in which the aviator serves 
in a sea billet that is not in his primary warfighting area. Aviators will attend the Intermediate 
Leadership Continuum Course before their disassociated sea tour. Submarine officers have one 
division officer tour of36 months in length. After the division officer tour (for aviators between 
the division officer tours), officers are assigned to shore duty, either in an institutional support 
billet, obtaining an advanced degree, or both. 
In each community, the department head tour is preceded by a screening board 
and additional training in their primary warfare specialty. The screening board occurs at 
different points in each of the communities, but it has the common purpose of weeding out 
poor performers. After being screened for department head, aviators return to the Fleet 
Replenishment Squadron for refresher training and advanced training in tactics, operations and 
the designated leadership continuum course (the Advanced Leadership Continuum Course). 
The length of trainIng is dependent on the specific platform. Surface warfare officers return to 
SWOS for the 24 week long department head course. The department head course includes the 
two week department head installment of the leadership continuum (Intermediate Level), 8 
weeks of combat systems commonly referred to as the TAO Core (Tactical Action Officer), 
2.5 weeks of afloat safety and shipboard readiness training, 4 weeks of engineering and damage 
control, 5 weeks of tactical employment training, and 2.5 weeks of billet specialty training. 66 
Submarine warfare officers attend the 22 week Submarine Officer Advanced Course (SOAC) 
at the Submarine School. SOAC is intended "to provide submarine qualified mid-career officers 
with training in the advanced aspects of submarine warfare related areas and to prepare them to 
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Figure 5-4. Naval Flight Officer Training Pipeline (Source: The Naval Officer Career Planning 
Guide, 1990) 
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assume the responsibilities as one of the commanding officers principle tactical assistants. ,,67 
The two week intennediate level leadership continuum course is part of the 22 week SOAC 
curriculum. 
Surface warfare officers like their division officer tours have split department 
head tours of24 months and 18 months. Submarine warfare officers have one 30 to 36 month 
department head tour as do aviators. After the department head tour, all three communities 
have a shore tour of about 24 months in length. This is followed by XO screening and 
prospective executive officer (PXO) school for surface warfare officers and submarine warfare 
officers. PXO school for surface warriors is again at SWOS and consists of 6 weeks of 
training in shipboard management, advanced tactics, material readiness and management. 68 
PXO school for submarine warfare officers is at the Submarine School and includes topics in 
advanced tactical sensor and weapons employment and submarine management and 
administration.69 Aviators return to the fleet replenishment squadron for training in tactics and 
management. In addition, surface warfare officers and submarine officers are required to attend 
the two week advanced officer leadership continuum training. 
For aviators, the XO tour leads directly into the commanding officer tour. For 
the surface and submarine communities, there is a 24 month shore tour after the XO tour as 
these officers are screened for command. Both surface and submarine officers have a 
prospective commanding officer course (PCO). The surface warfare PCO course is again at 
SWOS. It last 9 weeks and is focused on the development of a command perspective, material 
readiness, risk assessment based decision making, and tactical training. 7°The submarine officer 
PCO course lasts about six months and includes training in tactics and administration at the 
Submarine School, in nuclear engineering at Naval Reactors in Washington D.C., and 
additional tactics training on board operational submarines. Finally, all officers are required to 
attend the commanding officer installment of the leadership continuum. 
67 Naval Submarine School Website, "Officer Training," 8 August 1998. 
68 Surface Warfare Officers School Website, ''Prospective Executive Officer Overview," 8 Aug . 1998. 
69 Naval Submarine School Website, "Officer Training," 8 August 1998. 
70 Surface W mare Officers School Website, "Prospective Commanding Officer Course Overview," 8 Aug. 1998. 
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The command tour is followed by a senior service college education and! or a 
staff tour on a Navy or joint staff The last milestone in the typical surface, submarine, aviator 
career path is obtaining a major command. Major commands include aircraft earners, 
submarine squadrons, etc. These officers are again screened for these positions and again are 
offered training in this case at SWOS to bring them up to speed in the area of their command. 
The major command course is 2 weeks long and is tailored to meet the needs of the individual 
commander.71 Aviators selected to be XO and CO of nuclear powered aircraft earners are 
required to attend the nuclear power pipeline. 
h. Special Wmfare Officers 
Special Warfare Officers concentrate on the development of skills in the areas 
of unconventional warfare, counter-insurgency, coastal and riverine interdiction, and tactical 
intelligence Collection. The career path for special warfare officers is similar to the other URL 
officers but there are some significant differences. See the special warfare career path displayed 
in Figure 5-5. The initial training for special warfare officers is at Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL training (BUDS). BUDS is a grueling 6 month school that gives the special 
warfare officer skills in all phases and forms of hydrographic reconnaissance, land and 
underwater demolitions, individual and crew served weapons, small unit tactics, land 
reconnaissance, and various types of scuba. After BUDS training, the first milestone of a 
special warfare officer is assignment to a seal team or Seal Delivery Vehicle (SDV) team as an 
assistant platoon commander. After about two years as an assistant platoon commander, the 
special warfare officer will be transferred to another team to serve as a platoon commander for 
two years. At this point, he will rotate ashore for about two years either (1) to obtain a post-
graduate degree, (2) serve as an instructor at a special warfare command, or (3) serve at a 
naval special warfare unit. The major milestones after this are (1) screening for department 
head and the subsequent department head tour of about 3 years in length, (2) XO screening 
71 Stnface Warfare Officers School Website, "Prospective Major Command Commanding Officer page," 8 Aug. 1998. 
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and the subsequent XO tour, and finally (3) CO screening and the subsequent two year 
command tour of a SEAL team or SDV team. In between these milestones, the special warfare 
officer will rotate ashore just like the other communities and after his command tour will be 
screened for the possibility of a major command tour and subsequent promotion to captain.72 
Special Warfare officers attend the leadership continuum in a manner similar to other URL 
officers. 
c. Special Operations Officers 
Special operations officers develop skills, knowledge, and abilities in four key 
functional areas: 
(1) Expendable Ordnance Management (BOM) 
(2) Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
(3) Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 
(4) Diving and Salvage (D&S) 
Each special operations officer is expected to specialize in two of these functional areas by 
completing repeat operational tours within these functional areas before reaching the 
commander promotion milestone. Each officer will have a primary specialty in either EOM or 
MCM and a secondary specialty in EOD or D&S. This ensures that all special operations 
officers will have general diving expertise, and that most officers will share at least one 
specialty. The typical career path for a special operations officer is displayed in Figure 5-5. 
The initial skills training for a special operations officers starts with SWOS with 
the surface warfare community and then separates to 13 weeks of basic diving officer training. 
Additional training is given dependent on the initial tour of the special operations officer. After 
the initial training, officers are assigned to a ship for 30 months. The next milestone is specialty 
72 Navy Bureau of Personnel, Perspective (Jan-Feb 1998), p.33, and Navy Bureau of Personnel, The Naval Officers 
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Figure 5-5. Special Operations/Special Warfare Offi.cer Career Paths (Source: The 
Naval Officer Career Plarming Guide, 1990) 
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billet training and a second 24 month sea tour. The remainder of a special operation officer's 
career is dependent on his specialties and is very diverse with multiple sea and shore billets.73 
Special Operations officers attend the leadership continuum in a manner similar to other URL 
officers. 
3. Restricted Line Officers Primary Warfightingl Support Skills Development 
RL officers have career paths that are very different from the unrestricted line mode1. 
Three of the communities (engineering duty officer, aerospace engineering duty officer, and 
public affairs officers) access officers through lateral transfer from the unrestricted line 
communities after the first or second sea tour. The meteorological/ oceanographic community 
accesses officers both through lateral transfer and through direct commissioning. The rest of 
the RL communities access largely through direct commissioning, but there are still lateral 
entry openings. Each RL community uses a postgraduate education and repeat specialty tours 
to give their officers experience in their field. Unlike the URL communities, there are typically 
no tours outside the officers specialty. See Appendix B for typical RL career paths in the 
Engineering Duty Officer career path and the Intelligence Officer career path.74 Restricted Line' 
officers attend the leadership continuum in a manner similar to URL officers. 
4. Staff Officers Primary Warfightingl Support Skills Development 
Staff corps officers like restricted line officers serve repeat tours in their professional 
area. Most of the officers in these fields are directly commissioned after college, but there are 
programs that allow a limited amount of lateral transfers. All of the communities in this group 
rely heavily on advanced education either as a prerequisite for entering the community or as a 
key milestone in officer development. Sample staff corps career paths are displayed in 
Appendix B in the Judge Advocated General Corps officer career path and the Civil 
73 Navy Bureau ofPersormel, Perspective (Jan-Feb 1998), p.33, and Navy Bureau ofPersormel, The Naval Officers 
Career Planning Guidebook, NA VPERS 15605, (1990), pp.47-52. 
74 Navy Bureau ofPersormel, The Naval Officers Career Planning Guidebook, NA VPERS 15605, (1990), pp.68-88. 
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Engineering Corps career path.75 Staff officers attend the leadership continuum in a manner 
similar to URL officers. 
5. Limited Duty Officers and Chief Warrant Officers 
Limited duty officers and chief warrant officers typically serve as technical mangers and 
specialists in fields related to their former enlisted rating. With 60 specialties within these 
grouping, there is no set career path for these officers. These officers typically serve repeat 
tours in their specialty field like restricted line officers and staff officers. 
6. The Subspecialty System 
In addition to their primary warfare specialty, officers can obtain a subspecialty through 
post-graduate education or through significant experience in a specialist billet. Officer 
subspecialists are managed through the Navy subspecialty system. Each officer after 
completing the required education skill requirements or the required experience level is given a 
5 digit subspecialty code. This code is then used to help assign the officer to billets in which the 
officer can use his subspecialty. In general, the subspecialty system is designed to meet the 
needs of the Navy's shore establishment. Officers in the unrestricted line use their specialty 
primarily while on shore duty. The other officer groups use their specialty during most if not all 
of their tours. Table 5-4 lists the officer sub specialties. 
Officer Subspecialty Codes 
Subspecialty Code 
10 PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
11 ENGLISH 
12IDSTORY 
16 JOINT INTELLIGENCE 





Table 5-4. Officer Subspecialty Codes (Source: Bureau of Personnel Subspecialty Status 
Report, Oct 1995.) 
75 Ibid, pp.91-100. 
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Officer Subspecialty Codes (CONT) 
Subspecialty Code Number of Officers 
17 SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE 128 
18 REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE 10 
19 OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE 13 
20 GENERAL POLITICAL SCIENCE 81 
21 REGIONAL STUDIES: MIDDLE EAST/ AFRICA! ASIA 36 
22 REGIONAL STUDIES: FAR EAST, PACIFIC 46 
23 REGIONAL STUDIES: WESTERN HEMISPHERE 44 
24 REGIONAL STUDIES: EUROPE/ RUSSIA 84 
28 STRATEGIC PLANNING 162 
29 SPECIAL OPERATIONS/ LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT 13 
30 GENERAL MANAGEMENT 8 
31 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 562 
32 MATERIAL MANAGEMENT 196 
33 MANPOWER ANALYSIS 250 
34 TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT 44 
37 EDUCATION/ TRAINING MANAGEMENT 195 
41 APPLIED MATH 39 
42 OPERATIONS ANALYSIS 339 
43 OPERATIONAL LOGISTICS 39 
44 UNDERSEA WARFARE 208 
45 C4 SYSTEMS 102 
46 INFORMATION WARFARE 70 
47 METEOROLOGY/ OCEANOGRAPHY 209 
48 METEOROLOGY 7 
49 OPERATIONAL OCEANOGRAPHY 108 
50 GENERAL NAVAL ENGINEERING 2 
51 NAVAL CONSTRUCTION 141 
52 NUCLEAR ENGINEERING 129 
53 NUCLEAR PROPULSION 270 
54 NAVAL MECHANICAL ENGINEERING 444 
55 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 325 
62 CHEMIST 16 
66 COMBAT SYSTEMS 390 
68 STRATEGIC WEAPONS 26 
69 STRATEGIC NAVIGATION 4 
Table 5-4. Officer Subspecialty Codes (CONT) (Source: Bureau of Personnel Subspecialty 
Status Report, Oct 1995.) 
84 
Officer Subspecialty Codes (CONT) 
Subspecialty Codes 
71 AEROSPACE ENGINEERING 
72 AEROSPACE AVIONICS 
73 FLIGHT PERFORMANCE! TEST PILOT 
76 SPACE SYSTEM OPERATIONS 
77 SPACE SYSTEM ENGINEERING 
89 INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT 
91 COMPUfER SCIENCE 
1101 FACILTY ENGINEERING 
1102 PETROLEUM ENGINEERING 
1103 OCEAN ENGINEERING 
1200 GENERAL LEGAL 
1201 MILITARY JUSTICE CRIMINAL 
1203 OCEANI INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1204 TAX LAW 
1205 HEALTHCARE LAW 
1206 LABOR LAW 
1207 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
1300 GENERAL SUPPLY 
1301 SUPPLY ACQUISITION 
1302 SYSTEMS INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 
1304 TRANSPORTATION LOGISTICS MANAGEMENT 
1305 RETAILING 
1306 ACQUISITIONI CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
1307 PETROLEUM MANAGEMENT 
1308 SUBSISTENCE TECHNOLOGY 
1400 GENERAL RELIGION 
1410 HOMIL YI LITURGY 
1420 RELIGIOUS EDUCATION 
1430 RELIGIOUS CULTURE 
1440 PASTOR! COUNSEL 
1450 ETHICS 
1460 TRAININGIEDUCATION MANAGEMENT 
1470 ECCLESIASTICAL COMMUNION 
TOTAL 



































Table 5-4. Officer Subspecialty Codes (CONT) (Source: Bureau of Personnel Subspecialty 
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7. Joint Duty Qualification 
In 1986, Congress signed into law the Goldwater-Nichols Act which requires almost all 
officers to be joint duty qualified before promotion to flag rank. This requirement was the 
result of a perceived shortfall in the development of military officers in the joint arena. 
Goldwater-Nichols states that officers who are to be joint duty qualified as a Joint Specialty 
Officer have to complete both a Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Program and a 
Joint Duty Assignment. The JPME program is offered at the National War College and the 
Industrial College of the Armed Forces in a one phase program and is offered at the Service 
Colleges and the Armed Forces Staff· College in a two phase program.76 The joint duty 
assignment is a two year tour for flag officers and a three year tour for 0-4 through 0_6.77 . 
Members of the staff corps namely JAG officers, medical officers, dentists, chaplains, nurses, 
-
and medical service corps officers are exempted from this requirement. In addition, some 
officers in the nuclear power field and some officers with the approval of the Secretary of 
Defense may have this requirement temporarily waived.78 The Goldwater-Nichols joint duty 
requirement has placed a great strain on Navy career planning as officers have tried to balance 
primary warfighting skills and joint requirements within a 30 year career. 
D. PROMOTING 
Promotion is the movement of individuals through the organizational structure of the 
Navy. As currently designed, the Navy has a structure of 10 commissioned officer ranks, 
ensign through admiral, and 5 warrant officer ranks as introduced in Chapter IV. Promotion 
decisions are based on an individuals fitness reports, picture, personal awards, any 
76 Phase 1 JPME is accomplished at the Service College's, the Naval Postgraduate School, or through a non-residential 
program. Phase II is accomplished at the AImed Forces Staff College. 
770fficers in critical occupational specialties can shorten their joint duty assignment to two years if going to an 
operational na'Y billet. 
78 Naval Bureau of Personnel, Perspective, (Jan-Feb 1998), pp. 11-12. 
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correspondence that the officer has submitted to the board, and any other matters of official 
record. 79 
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) governs flow 
between the ranks using an "Up-or-Out" design whereby those that are not promoted are 
forced out of the organization at certain years of service plateaus called High Year Tenure 
(HYT) points. 
Under DOPMA, all qualified ensigns are promoted to lieutenant junior grade within 
two years of service and almost all qualified lieutenant junior grades are promoted to lieutenant 
at or around four years of service. After this point, promotion becomes more competitive. 
Lieutenants are considered for promotion to lieutenant commander at the 10 year point plus or 
minus 1 year. DOPMA specifies a target promotion rate of 80 percent for promotion to 
lieutenant commander. Lieutenants are separated for HYT if they fail to be selected for 
lieutenant commander in two promotion opportunities, a one year in-zone opportunity and a 
one year above-zone opportunity. HYT for Navy lieutenants typically occurs around 11 to 12 
years of service. 
The next DOPMA promotion gate is to commander, and it occurs at the 16 year mark 
plus or minus 1 year. The Navy has modified the commander promotion zone so that it starts in 
year 15. The other three services promote 0-4s to 0-5 at the 16 year point. DOPMA specifies 
a target promotion rate of 70 percent for selection to commander. In addition, lieutenant 
commanders, like lieutenants, have two promotion opportunities to commander. HYT 
separation for lieutenant commanders who fail to select to commander is at the 20 year mark 
which coincides with the minimum service obligation for retirement benefits. 
In year of service 22, officers are considered for promotion to captain. The DOPMA 
specified promotion rate target for promotion to captain is 50 percent. HYT for commanders 
who fail to select to captain is 28 years, but DOPMA allows for the mandatory separation of 
30 percent of the commanders who have been passed over twice for promotion to captain. 
Statistics on promotion to flag rank are not published, but selection from captain to rear 
79 Ibid., p: 14. 
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admiral is "known" to be less than 10 percent and is "known" to occur somewhere around the 
27th year of service. HYT for captains is 30 years, but DOPMA allows for the mandatory 
separation of captains after serving four years in grade. 80 Table 5-5 summarizes the promotion 
zones and the promotion opportunity and Figure 5-6 displays the Officer inventory by years of 
service and paygrade with the applicable force shaping tools annotated. 
Summary of DOPMA and Navy Career Promotion Zones and 
Opportunities 
Source Criterion 0-3 0-4 0-5 0-6 0-7 
DOPMA YOS AT PROMOTION 3-5 9-11 15-17 21-23 NA 
SELECTION RATE 100% 80010 70% 50% NA 
HYT 12-13 20 28 30 NA 
NAVY YOS AT PROMOTION 4 10 15 22 27 
SELECTION RATE (FY98) - 75.8% 80.1% 58.0010 NA 
Table 5-5. Summary ofDOPMA and Navy Career Promotion Zones and Opportunities 
(Source: Beth Asch and John T. Warner, A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel 
Policy, 1994 and Tom Lawson, Bureau of Naval Personnel, fax to Tim Smith, 14 Oct 1997.) 
80 Beth 1. Asch and John T. Wamer,A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy, (RAND: Santa Monica, 
CA, 1994), pp. 7-11, and Department of the Nary, The Naval Officer's Career Planning Guidebook, NAVPERS 
15605, (19900, p. 5. 
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Figure 5-6. FY1997 Officer Inventory by Year of Service and Paygrade (Source: Defense 
Manpower Data Center, 1997) 
E. ASSIGNMENT 
Assignment in the Navy is performed through the centralized detailing process in which 
officers are assigned to specific units and in most cases specific billets. Community detailers 
attached to the Navy Manpower Personnel CommandlBureau of Personnel manage the 
process by balancing the desires of the individual officer, the officers career development 
89 
needs, and the needs of the Navy. The detailing process is how the Navy executes the 
development of its officers. 
F. COMPENSATION 
The military compensation system consists of a complex patchwork of active duty 
pays, allowances, retired pay, and non-pecuniary benefits. Active duty pays can be divided into 
two categories. The first and largest active duty pay category is base pay, which is the same for 
everyone within a certain paygrade and a certain year of service. Base pay increases with 
promotion and years of service. The second category is special and incentive pays. This 
category unlike base pay depends on the individual circumstances. Examples of special pay 
include nuclear and aviation continuation pays, submarine pay, career sea pay, hostile fire pay, 
medical officer special pay, and divers pay. 
Allowances include compensation for housing and food. The housing allowance is 
based on rank, location, and marital! dependent status. The food allowance is the same for all 
officers. Allowances are non-taxable income therefore when comparing military and civilian 
wages one should account for the tax benefit of the housing and food allowance. 
Retired pay is the amount funded to offset the accumulating retirement liability of those 
on active duty. To be entitled to retirement benefits the officer has to serve 20 years unless he 
joins the reserves and accumulates enough reserve credit to begin receiving reserve retired pay 
at age 60. Personnel who separate prior to the 20 year mark receive no benefits. There are 
currently three retirement systems in effect. The first system applies to personnel who joined 
the service before FY 1981. Their retired pay is equal to (0.025* years of service *final basic 
pay) so a 20 year retiree will earn 50% of his final base pay and a 30 year retiree will earn 75% 
of his final base pay. The second retirement system applies to personnel who joined the service 
between FY 1981 and FY 1986. It uses the same formula as the first system, but substitutes the 
final base pay with the individual's high three year's average basic pay. Both the first and second 
retirement systems are fully indexed to inflation. 
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The third retirement system was established by the Military Retirement Reform Act of 
1986 and is commonly referred to as the REDUX Plan. The REDUX plan changed the annuity 
formula to ((0.40 + 0.035 * (years of service - 20» * high-3 average basic pay) for years 
between separation and age 62. At age 62, the annuity formula reverts to the FY 1981-1986 
formula. Consequently, at retirement a 20-retiree will receive 40% of his high-3 average basic 
pay and a 30-year retiree will receive 75% of his high-3 average basic pay. In addition, cost of 
living adjustments between separation and age 62 are 1 percent less than the percentage 
growth in the consumer price index. At age 62, retired pay will be fully adjusted to inflation. 81 
The final component of the military compensation system is non-pecuniary benefits or 
payment received in kind. The military provides family health and dental care. In addition, 
military members are able to use the commissary in order to shop for food at subsidized prices 
and can even, play golf at Department of Defense golf courses at reduced rates. 
G. EVALUATION 
The Navy currently uses a behaviorally anchored rating scale (BARS) with a forced 
distribution for appraisal of its officers. BARS is a combination of the behavioral incident 
appraisal method and the rating scale appraisal method. In this method, performance is rated on 
a scale, but the scale points are anchored with behavioral incidents.82 The officer fitness report 
appraises an officer's professional expertise, adherence to equal opportunity, military 
bearing/character, teamwork, mission accomplishment and initiative, leadership, and tactical 
. performance. 
H. TRANSmONING AND FORCE SHAPING 
Transitioning or separation in the Navy with the exception of High Year Tenure (HYT) 
is typically voluntary. Officers are usually commissioned for an indefinite period of time. 
Initially, most officers are obligated for a ceI1ain time span in return for education or training. 
81 Aschand Warner, pp.6-7. 
82 Muchinsky, pp. 229-230. 
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After that obligation often referred to as the minimum service obligation, the officers is free to 
resign his commission. About two- thirds of officers chose to leave the service at this point. 
Officers who chose to stay past the minimum service obligation are encouraged to stay until 
they fail to promote. As discussed in the promotion section, officers who fail to select to the 
next rank after two opportunities may be involuntarily separated at certain years of service due 
to the HYT rule. 
Due to the military drawdown in recent years, the Navy, in addition to HYT, has had 
to use other tools to transition officers out of the Navy. The most popular of these tools has 
been Temporary Early Retirement Authority (TERA). TERA, which is voluntary, allows twice 
passed over 0-4s retirement before 20 years of service. Another tool that the Navy has used is 
Selective Early Retirement (SER) for senior 0-5s and 0-6s. Unlike TERA, SER is involuntary 
and has been effective at inducing people to voluntarily separate when threatened with SER. 
The last tool is Voluntary Separation Incentive! Special Separation Benefit (VSIISSB) which is 
basically a separation bonus given to personnel at the mid-career point to give them the 
incentive to leave without retirement benefits. VSIISSB was mostly used for enlisted personnel, 
but was briefly used for officers in the early 1990s. Like TERA, VSIISSB was voluntary.83 
83 Thie and Brown, pp. 284-285. 
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VI. THE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT IN 2020 
A.OVERVIEW 
In Chapters ill, IV, and V, we gained a :firm grasp on the present. Now, it is time to 
look to the future. According to Colin Gray, any look at the future of warfare has to look at 
three areas or as he calls it "clusters of trends. ,,84 The first area is the international 
environment addressing the questions of who, where, and to some degree how we will fight. 
The second area pertains to the domestic environment and addresses the questions of when 
we will fight and what for. The third and final area is technical and relates to the Navy in 
particular. This area attempts to complete the answer on how we will fight, and will be 
discussed in Chapter VIT. This chapter along with Chapter vn will lay the foundation for 
subsequent discussions of the naval officer of 2020 in Chapters vrn, IX, and X. 
B. THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
When looking at the future of war, it is useful to recall what Carl Von Clausewitz 
stated in On War during the first half of the nineteenth century that "war is a mere continuation 
of policy by other means." He describes war as "not merely a political act, but also a real 
political instrument. ,,85 In this context any discussion of the future of warfare needs to start 
with the political climate or more correctly the international or external environment that would 
lead to war being used as a political instrument by or against the United States. It is this 
external environment that will dictate the nature and character of any future conflict, and it will 
determine who, where, and to some degree how the United States will fight it's next war. 
The future is at best uncertain, and any accurate prediction of society as a whole is 
inherently impossible. The best practice for overcoming this uncertainty is to consider an 
84 Colin s. Gray, "The Changing Nature of Warfare," The Naval War College Review, (Spring 1996), p. 12. 
85 Carl Voh Clausewitz, On War, edited by Anatol Rapoport, (Penguin Books: London, England, 1968), p. 119. 
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appropriate set of futures or contingencies.86 From these contingencies or scenarios, we can 
make an educated guess as to the true course of events. The National Defense Panel applied 
this concept and in their study of long term issues facing U.S. defense and national security, 
analyzed four alternative scenarios in order "to appreciate the range of security considerations 
in 2010-2020. ,,87 
The panel's framework is used in this chapter to describe the scenarios that could lead 
to a future war that would involve the United States. In addition, recent literature as it pertains 
to the future of war within this analytical framework will be summarized. All four climates are 
feasible, and at the same time it is entirely possible that a totally different type of external 
environment will develop. However, the majority of the scenarios envision a world that has 
fundamentally changed as compared to the relative stability of the cold war with the Soviet 
Union. The Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, Admiral J.P. Reason calls this new age 
the "Trans-Industrial Age." Others have named it the "new age," the "post-industrial age," the 
"information age," the "third wave," and the "knowledge age. ,,88 Regardless of the name, 
however, most of the visions describe the future and the near future as a period of uncertainty, 
and complex, dynamic change. 
1. A World of Shaped Stability 
The NDP's first scenario, a world of shaped stability, is the only scenario that envisions 
a world that is not challenged by widespread uncertainty. It describes a world in which 
international cooperation on economic development and security issues have created a 
relatively stable international order. The scourge of terrorism, organized crime, and 
environmental degradation have created broad public support for cooperative security 
arrangements. There is friction in this world in the guise of demographic pressures, shortages 
of national resources, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and continuing ethnic and 
nationalistic tensions, but through the cooperation of law enforcement, the intelligence 
86 Edward S. Quade, Analysis for Public DecisiOns, 3d ed. revised by Grace M. Carter, (Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ, 1989), pp.354-355. 
87 National Defense Panel, p.8. 
88 1. Paul Reason, Newport Paper: Sailing New Seas, (Naval War College, Newport, RI, 1998), p. 1. 
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communities, the military, and various national and international agencies, the rule of law is 
increasingly accepted. The primary role of the military in this climate is the augmentation of 
diplomatic, economic, and political efforts to maintain the stable international order. 89 
There are few who see this scenario as likely to occur. However, there are two recent 
books that predict this future external environment, Bevin Alexander's The Future of Warjare 
and George and Meredith Friedman's The Future of War: Power, Technology and American 
World Dominance in the Twenty-First Century. These authors contend that the twenty-first 
century will be the American Epoch whereby the technological superiority of the United States 
will give it a prominent role in shaping a stable international community. 
Alexander maintains that the only major threats to the United States are (1) attempts by 
one or more powers to seize vital industrial commodities like oil, and (2) attempts by some 
power to gain hegemony or dominance in Eurasia. He maintains that the likelihood of success 
of either of these scenarios is unlikely due to the prohibitive expense of an arms race with the 
United States. According to Alexander, the only likely combat scenario for the U.S. Military is 
low intensity conflict in the form of regional wars fought to counter aggression of minor 
powers and guerilla wars. He believes that the United States will be able to win low intensity 
conflicts to counter aggression, but that guerilla wars will continue to pose a serious challenge 
to the military, but will not pose a serious challenge to the United States' role in the 
international community. He goes on saying that the nu.s. Military must prepare for any 
contingency. This means that the military must have a ready basket or 'toolbox' of flexible, 
general purpose forces and weapons with the capability of responding to a number of 
challenges and performing a range of operations it might be called on to undertake- even 
though Americans are likely to fight low intensity wars mainly against guerillas or semi-
guerillas. ,,90 
The Friedman's support the idea of the American Epoch for similar, but not entirely for 
the same reasons. Like Alexander, the Friedman's argue that technology gives the combat edge 
89 National Defense Panel, p.8. 
90 Bevin Alexander, The Future of Warfare, C'N.w. Norton and Company: New York, 1995), pp. 15-16,35,4547,51. 
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to United States forces, but the Friedman's argue that space is the frontier from which the. 
United States will dominate the international scene. Their logic is as follows: 
"Whoever controls space, therefore, will control the world's oceans. 
Whoever controls the oceans will control the patterns of global commerce. 
Whoever controls the patterns of global commerce will be the wealthiest power 
in the world. Whoever is the wealthiest power in the world will be able to 
control space. ,,91 
The arguments of the Friedmans to some extent resemble the arguments of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan at the beginning of this century.92 The primary difference being that the Friedmans 
replace control of the ocean with control of space. Unlike Alexander, the Friedman's do not see 
guerilla warfare as a significant challenge to the U.S. Military. The Friedman's argue that 
hypersonic precision guided missiles are the biggest threat to U.S. Military power in the form 
of denied sea control. It is only through the control of space and the subsequent elimination of 
an enemy's over the horizon targeting capability that this threat can be countered. 
2. Competition for Leadership 
The second political climate is the traditional balance of power world in which a hostile 
regional alliance is rising to challenge the interests of the United States. The United States 
forms alliances and security relationships to counter the challenge. Military spending is 
increased worldwide and regional arms races develop. Ethnic and humanitarian tensions still 
exist, but they are dwarfed by the bipolar competition. The possibility of major combat 
operations dominates the planning of the armed services as the military must position itself to 
defend the homeland in the guise of weapons of mass destruction or information systems 
disruption. 
91 George and Meredith Friedman, The Future of War, CSt Martin's Griffin: New York, 1996), p. 411. 
92 Alfred Thayer Mahan argues in his first two books that the 'maritime predominance of Great Britain' was the deciding 
factor in Great Britain's defeat of the French, Spanish, and Dutch in the wars .ofthe 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries, and 
that Great Britain obtained this 'maritime predominance' through naval command of the sea and the combination of 
maritime commerce, overseas possessions, and privileged access to foreign markets that produces national 'wealth and 
greatness,' Philip A Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," Makers of Modern Strategy: from 
Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1986), pp. 450-
452. 
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The QDR classified this possibility as a wildcard scenario with little likelihood of 
happening before 2015. Very few scholars think: that this is a likely scenario for the future. On 
the other hand, the QDR did mention it as a possible scenario for the time period after 2015 
where a growing China or a resurgent Russia could threaten the interest of the United States. 
Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro in The Coming Conflict with China depict military 
hostilities between the China and the United States as likely if the United States remains naive 
and China aggressively seeks hegemony of Eurasia. These authors base their conclusion on two 
propositions: (1) that "after floundering for more than a century, [China] is now taking up the 
great power role that it believes, with go.od reason, t.o be its historical legacy, " and (2) within a 
few years, China will be the largest economy in the world and will become a f.ormidable 
military power.93 This is unlikely in the near term, but in the long term, it can not be ign.ored as 
a possibility. 
3. Extrapolation of Today 
The third p.otential external environment scenario of 2020 is a "baseline projection .of 
today's uncertainties int.o an increasingly competitive and politically diverse world." 94 The 
Pacific Rim econ.omic expansion has made China and maybe even India a key player .on the 
w.orld stage. Rogue states and n.on-state actors have acquired the means of delivering weapons 
of mass destructi.on, and the American homeland cann.ot be viewed as immune t.o their threat. 
Consequently, the United States role as the world's leading power is tenuous and uncertain. 
The defense community predicts the future will be like this climate. The Quadrennial 
Defense Review.of 1997 (QDR) maintains that "it is reas.onable to assume that more than .one 
aspiring regi.onal p.ower will have both the desire and the means t.o challenge U.S. interests 
militarily. ,,95 It argues that North K.orea, Iraq, or Iran will pose threats to either their neighbors 
or threats t.o the flow .of trade. In addition, the QDR maintains that the U.S. homeland is n.ot 
immune to asymmetric means .of attack from nati.onal and transnational .organizations such as 
93 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Mtmro, The Coming Conflict with China, (Random House: New York New York, 
1997), pp.3-4. 
94 National Defense Panel, pp. 8-9. 
95 Report of the Quadrennia! Defense Review, p. 2-1. 
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terrorists, drug cartels, and international organized crime. Finally, it states that there is a 
significant possibility of emerging regional powers in the guise of China and a resurgent Russia 
even as early as 2015.96 The Navy's role in this future is guided by its current naval strategic 
document series, Forward .. From the Sea. The Navy sees its future in the littoral environment 
seeing combat in regional conflicts and being used as a crisis response force. 97 
The Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council in its series, Technology for 
the United States Navy and Marine Corps 2000-2035: Becoming a 21st Century Force, 
concurred with the QDR's assessment of the future political climate. It concluded that 
potentially hostile regional powers in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Far East 
pose a threat to United States interests. In addition, the Naval Studies board mentioned the 
growing threat from transnational organizations, but in the end assessment the Naval Studies 
Board emphasized the threat of the regional powers.98 
Samuel Huntington has refined the extrapolation of today's political climate in The 
Clash of Civilizations: Remaking of World Order. He argues that there are nine civilizations in 
today's world and that these nine civilizations will dominate the international political scene in 
the future. He contends that nation-states "are and will remain the most important actors in 
world affairs, but their interests, associations, and conflicts" will be increasingly shaped by 
cultural and civilizational factors. ,,99 Transnational organizations will pose dangers to the 
world, but the stability of the world will depend upon the interaction of the states or groups 
from different civilizations. 
Huntington states that there are three types of wars today and in the future: core state 
conflicts, fault line wars, and transition wars. Core state conflicts are wars that result from 
changes in the global balance of power among civilizations. The participants in a core state 
conflict are typically the major nations of their respective civilization. According to Huntington, 
% Ibid., pp. 2-1 - 2-2. ' 
97 Forward .. From the &a, 5-7, 
98 Naval Studies of the National Research CmUlcil, Teclmology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, 2000-
2035: Becoming a 21st Century Force, Volume 1 Overview, (National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997), 
pp.30-34, 
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the major threat of a core state war in the future comes from the emergence of China as a 
dominant power. Fault line wars occur between neighboring states of different civilizations as 
each civilization vies for its role as the dominant civilization. Huntington claims that fault line 
wars will be prevalent in the future especially between Muslim and non-Muslim civilizations. 
The last category, transition war, is a war that bridges the gap between wars of the industrial 
age and the new clash of civilizations. Both the Soviet War in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf 
War according to Huntington were transition wars. They both started off as relatively simple 
wars of aggression, but they developed into wars upon which civilizations clashed and the new 
world order asserted itself The role of the United States in this new world order is at best 
uncertain. 100 
4. Chronic Crisis 
The fourth and :final scenario is a world that has deteriorated into chaos. Economic 
conditions along with the breakdown of international institutions have created a condition 
whereby weakened nation-states, non-state actors, and coalitions fight over scarce resources. 
Nationalism and ethnic hatred permeate the world. Virtual narco-states exist in regions in Asia' 
and South America and weapons of mass destruction are widely available. Urban chaos 
dominates the world as the United States has lost a great deal of its will to influence world 
events. The American public is focused on domestic issues and domestic security as non-state 
actors increasingly penetrate and target the United States.101 
Martin Van Creveld in The Transformation of War argues that the "state's attempt to 
monopolize violence in its own hands is faltering." He believes that "the rise of low intensity 
conflict may, unless it can be quickly contained, end up destroying the state." Unlike the three 
other scenarios, Van Creveld argues that the transnational organizations will take over and 
dominant war in the future because nation-states are failing in their ability to protect their 
people from the violence of transnational organizations. In this scenario, combatants become 
99 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o/Civilizations: Remaking World Order, (fouchstone: New York, New York, 
1997), p.36. 
100 Ibid., pp. 207-249. 
101 Natioruil Defense Panel, pp. 9-10. 
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intermingled with noncombatants to avoid the threat of modem weapons such a missiles and 
nuclear weapons. This intermingling, Van Creveld maintains, will render modem large 
technologically advanced weapons such as aircraft, ships, and tanks useless. As such, combat 
will resemble the struggles of primitive tribes rather than the high tech warfare envisioned by 
the military-industrial complex of the United States. "Weapons will become less, rather than 
more sophisticated," and "the troops may well have more in common with policemen (or with 
pirates) than with defense analysts. ,,102 
Two recent books have supported Van Creveld's view of the future political climate. 
The first is Robert Kaplan's The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy. In 
it, Kaplan describes his journeys in West Africa and Southeast Asia through the remains of 
disintegrating nation-states. He indicates that of the eighty wars since 1945 only 28 have been 
fought by the regular armies of two or more nation states. Civil wars and guerilla war 
accounted for 46 of these wars. Kaplan argues that overpopulation, ethnic rivalry, 
environmental degradation and host of other factors have contributed to the blurring of national 
borders and have shrunk the world to such a large degree that the United States and the rest of 
the world will have no choice but to get involved. 103 Gary Hart in The Mirmteman: Restoring 
an Anny of the People takes Kaplan's observations one step farther and agrees with Van 
Creveld that "the twenty-first century is going to look a lot less like the twentieth-century Great 
Power chess games and a lot more like the fourth- and fifth- century chaos of decaying 
empires. ,,104 
The National Defense Panel analyzed four different scenarios in order to appreciate the 
full range of possibilities of future contlict in which the United States could be involved. The 
climates in the NDP study covers most of today's theories on the future of war. Almost all 
military futurists believe that we are in a time of significant change and that the military will 
have to be responsive to that change. Michael Wyly in his article "Combat in the 21 st Century" 
102 Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War, (The Free Press, New York, New York, 1991), pp.192-212 
103 Robert D. Kaplan, The Ends of the Earth: A Journey to the Frontiers of Anarchy, (Random House, New York, New 
York, 19%),pp. 8-9. 
104 Gary Hart, The Minuteman: Restoring an Army of the People, (The Free Press: New York, New York, 1998), p. 28. 
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depicts the debate as a battle between dichotomous perspectives. On the one side, 
Technological Superiorists believe that American technical prowess will make the difference. 
On the other side is the Mental Agility Theorists who believe that technical superiority will 
mean little as our transnational enemies fight the United States with asymmetric means. lOS The 
true course is difficult to discern, but to some degree probably both sides are right. The rise of 
transnational actors and non-government organizations has greatly complicated the external 
environment of the United States. At the same time, technological advances that will be 
discussed later in this chapter have greatly increased both the lethality of force and the agility of 
force. The real question is can the Navy and the United States military adapt its technology and 
organization to confront the challenges posed by both governmental and non-governmental 
organizations with internet technology and networked hierarchies. 
C. THE FUTURE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT AS IT PERTAINS TO WAR 
In On War, Clausewitz described the nature of war as a 
"wonderful trinity, . composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred 
and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of 
probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the 
subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to 
reason. The first of these three phases concerns more the people; the second, 
more the General and his Army; the third, more the Government. ,,106 
In the previous section, I discussed the nature of war as a political instrument and thus the 
domain of the government. This section will briefly discuss the nature of war with regards to 
the people. It is within this arena that we look for the answer to the questions of when and for 
what the United States will fight. Military Historian Michael Howard called the social 
dimension one of "the forgotten dimensions of strategy. ,,107 He is correct in asserting that 
domestic politics and the American Society are prominent factors in determining the nature of 
future war. 
105 Michael D. Wyly, "Combat in the 21st Centwy," u.s. News and World Report, (16 March 1998). 
106 Clausewitz, p. 121. 
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There are 4 major ways in which domestic politics and society have a significant impact 
on security policy and the military. The first is purely budgetary~ Relative to the early 1980s, 
the Defense Department has been under tight budget constraints in recent years. The United 
States gets the best defense that it can afford. Both the QDR and the Defense Reform Initiative 
call for a revolution in business affairs so that the military can spend more of its money on 
weapons and operations and less on infrastructure. Outsourcing has been the component of this 
initiative that has received the most attention. The effects of these changes in practices are not 
yet clear nor is their impact on both the security of the United States and the military clear. 
The second way that domestic politics and society effect security policy and the 
military is through political decisions to be involved in international affairs. A stated assumption 
of the QDR was that the United States would remain engaged in the world over the next 15 to 
20 years. 108 This engagement has not always been the policy of the United States. For a large 
part of our history, the United States has held itself relatively aloof from world affairs. With the 
end of the cold war, the isolationist argument has resurfaced. During the cold war, our moral 
and material interests converged. This is no longer the case. 109 The reality is that during the 
1990's material concerns seemed to outweigh our isolationist tendencies while our moral 
interests lay relatively dormant. This is a precarious "roost" from which to manage foreign and 
security policy. However, there is little indication that anything will change. There has been 
little domestic debate over the role of the United States in the world and the material interests 
of the United States will most likely dominate American Policy in the future. 
Third, the demographics of the United States are shifting. Non-white sections of the 
United States populace are growing. See Table 6-1. There is potential for this change in 
demographics to shift the focus of United States foreign policy away from "Eurocentric" focus 
of today to either an Asian focus or even a focus on Africa. Racial/ethnic minorities in the 
United States to varying degrees seem to identifY with the country of their origin regardless of 
107 Michael Howard, "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy," Foreign Affairs, (Summer 1979), pp. 975-986, as quoted 
in Colin S. Gray, "The Changing Nature of Warfare," The Naval War College Review, (Spring 1996), p. 10. 
108 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, pp. 11-2. 
109 Richard K Betts, "Power, Prospects, and Priorities, " The Naval War College Review, CV/inrer 1997), p. II. 
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how much time or how many generations have past. As the demographics shift, we could see 
our nations focus shift with it. 110 
U.S. Demographic Tends 
RaciallEthnic Group 1998 2000 2025 
White 72.5 71.8 62.4 
African American 12.1 12.2 13.0 
Hispanic 11.0 11.4 17.6 
Native/Asian American 4.4 4.6 7.0 
Table 6-1 United States Demographic Trends (Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current 
Population Reports, Series P25-1130, "Population Projections of the United States by Age, 
Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050. " 
The fourth and final effect of domestic politics and society's effect on security policy 
and the military is the civilian societies view or perception of the military. The military to be 
effective needs to have credibility in the eyes of the people it is sworn to protect. The Navy 
needs to be able to recruit from the populace, acquire resources from the populace, and the 
Navy needs to maintain the morale of its people which is at least to some degree dependent on 
how the nation perceives its troops. To maintain credibilitY, the military has to reflect society in 
demographics and to certain degrees in social values. The American populace since the 
founding of our nation has been fearful of standing armies. We can not afford to play into their 
fears. We need to look like our populace and we need to be like our populace. 
110 Both Cuban and Jewish inunigrants have at least appeared to shape United States foreign policy with the country of 
their origin. For Jewish Americans, it is the United States firm support for state of Israel. For Cuban Americans, it is 




vn. THE FUTURE UNITED STATES NAVY 
A.OVERVIEW 
The final part of Clausewitz's trinity, that was introduced in the last chapter, is the 
general and his anny. In the context of this thesis, it is probably more accurate to say the 
admiral and his navy. We looked, in the previous chapter, at the international/external and the 
domestic!mternal environment of the future. In this chapter, we will look at the means offuture 
naval waIfare. As can be discerned from the environment as described by the previous chapter, 
we are most likely entering a time of extreme uncertainty and dynamic complex change. This 
environment is going to place great strains on the military to adapt. As Admiral Gehman, 
Commander in Chief(CINC) of United States Atlantic Command, intimated in a speech to the 
Atlantic Council, non-governmental actors and terrorists have very flat and fluid organizations. 
The United States military will have to adopt similar flat and fluid organizational designs to be 
able to adapt and defeat these forces. III 
The Navy needs to transform itself from the Directive ConfigurationlMachine 
Bureaucracy into the Generative Configuration that was introduced in Chapter II. This is the 
only way that our Navy is going to gain the agility and speed necessary to be effective against 
non-governmental organizations and transnational actors in the dynamic and uncertain future. 
While we must be effective, the Navy must also be efficient due to the scarcity of government 
funds to pay for defense. To be effective and efficient, we must be collaborative to be 
successful and that means we need to change all the design functions of the Navy from tasks to 
technology to structure to people to processes. All need to be changed and all need to be 
congruent with each other and the Navy's new direction. Currently, the Navy is moving in this 
general direction with the revolution in military affairs and network centric warfare, albeit 
slowly and haphazardly. This chapter will discuss the RMA as it gives insight into what the 
III Adminil. Gehman, CINC USACOM, Speech to the Atlantic Council, Norfolk, VA, 24 August 1998. 
105 
tasks, technology, and structure of the Navy will be like in the future. In addition, the fleet of 
2020 will be briefly discussed. 
B. THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS 
There is a growing consensus that we are in the midst of a revolution in military affairs 
(RMA). The professional journals of the defense establishment are dominated by articles 
singing the praises or sounding the warnings of this RMA. A revolution in military affairs is a 
"fundamental shift in military strategy, doctrine, and tactics that occurs generally-- but not 
always-- due to a change in technology.,,112 An RMA is comprised of four elements: 
technological change, systems development,· operational innovation, and organizational 
adaptation. l13 Past RMAs have included the introduction of gunpowder, submarine warfare, 
and nuclear weapons. For a more complete list of potential past RMAs see Table 7-1. 
The current RMA has three primary components. The first major component is what 
former Secretary of Defense William Perry has coined the "systems of systems. ,,114 The 
"systems of systems" is shorthand for a collective synergy achieved by the melding offormerly 
disparate means to establish battlespace awareness, command and control, and precision force. 
The second major component of the RMA is information dominance which is the ability to 
control the flow of data on the increasingly interdependent global information network. The 
third major component of the RMA is the corollary to the second, information warfare. 
Information warfare is the capability to disrupt or override enemy information systems while 
defending our own information systems. 115 
112 James J. Tritten, "Revolutions in Military Affairs," Paradigm Shifts, and Doctrine, (Naval Doctrine Command: 
Norfolk, VA, 1995), p. l. 
113 Jeffiey A Harley, "Infonnation, Technology, and the Center of Gravity," Naval War College Review, (Winter 1997), 
p.7l. 
114 William J. Perry, "Military Action: When to Use It and How to Ensure Its Effectiveness," in Janne E. Nolan, ed. 
Global Engagement: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, (The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C., 
1994), p. 240, as quoted in James R. Blaker, Understanding The Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to 
America's 21st Century Defense, (Progressive Policy Institute: Washington, D.C., 1997), p. 5. 
Il5 James Stavridis, "The Second Revolution," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Spring 1997), p.9. 
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The "system of systems" component of the RMA has received the most attention, and 
it revolves around three advances: (1) advances in the gathering of intelligence, (2) advances in 
Possible RMAs of the Past 
14th Century 
- longbow: cultural 
15th Century 
- gunpowder: technological, financial 
16th Century 
- fortifications: architectural, financial 
17th Century 
- Dutch - Swedish tactical reforms: tactical, organizational, cultural 
- French military reforms: tactical, organizational, administrative 
17th -18th Centuries 
- naval warfare: administrative, social, financial, technological 
18th Century 
- British financial revolution: financial, organizational, conceptual 
- French Revolution: ideological, social 
18th -19th Centuries 
- industrial revolution: financial, technological, organizational, cultural 
19th Century 
- American Civil War: ideological, technological, administrative, operational 
late 19th Century 
- naval warfare: technological, organizational 
19th - 20th Centuries 
- medical: technological, organizational 
20th Century 
- World War I: combined arms: tactical, conceptual, technological, scientific 
- Blitzkrieg: tactical, operational, conceptual, organizational 
- carrier war: conceptual, technological, operational 
- strategic air war: technological, conceptual, tactical, scientific 
- submarine war: technological, scientific, tactical 
- amphibious war: conceptual, political, ideological 
- intelligence: conceptual, political, ideological 
- nuclear weapons: technological 
- people's war: ideological, political, conceptual 
Table 7-1. Possible RMAs of the Past (Source: WtlliamsonMurray, "Thinking About 
Revolutions in Military Affairs," Joint Forces Quarterly, Summer 1997, 70.) 
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the processing and distribution of intelligence, and (3) advances in precision guided· 
munitions. 116 Advances in the gathering of intelligence include what Admiral William Owens 
(ret) calls ISR systems (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). 117 These systems 
include satellites that cover the electromagnetic spectrum, unmanned aerial and undersea 
vehicles, Aegis radars, and JSTARS aircraft (Joint Surveillance and Target Attack radar 
System). Second, advances in processing and distributing of information have evolved under 
the umbrella of C4 systems (Command, Control, Communication, Computer systems). These 
systems include today's Global Command and Control System and the Navy's Cooperative 
Engagement Capability and are the means in which the sensor and the shooter are closely 
linked. The third advance is in long range precision guided munitions (pGM) involving 
weapons like the Tomahawk missile, the Maverick missile, and the Joint Direct Attack 
Munition (JDAM). PGMs give the military the ability to successfully attack targets with fewer 
rounds while at the same time minimizing collateral damage. 
Anyone of these advances, by itself: does not constitute a revolution. It is the synergy 
of these systems that represents the quantum jump in lethality. For in this synergy, the military 
has dominate battlespace knowledge (the knowledge of what and where things are), near 
pettect mission assignment (the ability to apply the right kind of force at the right time against 
the right targets), and near perfect battle assessment (the capacity to know almost immediately 
the results of military operations).1l8 For the Navy, this means that we have the ability for the 
simultaneous massing of dispersed fires on common targets, geographic dispersal for improved 
own force protection, and perhaps most importantly a tremendous increase in the tempo of 
operations.119 The increase in operations tempo will be the result of self-synchronization. Self-
synchronization is the mutual adjustment of the operating core through collaboration vice the 
traditional hierarchical chain of command method of the past. With the chain of command 
decentralized and flattened, officers at the lower levels empowered with the knowledge 
116 "The Future of Warfare," The Economist, (January 1997), p.21 
117 Blaker, p. 7. 
118 Ibid, pp.9-1O. 
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gained by the new sensors and the new information backplane, connected in a 
networked, near boundaryless, virtual organization, can make decisions on the spot 
without the need to consult higher authority on a regular basis for the purpose of 
integrating effort. Figure 7-1 graphically displays the RMA "system of systems" argument. It 
is this increased operation tempo which proponents of the RMA contend will "usher in an era 
of conflict based on paralysis and shock rather than attrition." 120 For the goal is, as Vice 
Admiral Arthur Cebrowski states, to "lock-out" the enemy's alternatives and thus "lock-in" 
success. 121 
Extended information dominance through the ability to control the flow of data is a 
major component of the RMA that many confuse with the "system of systems" component. It 
is a separate component because it allows us to provide information instead of military capital 
stocks and troops. This will allow the United States to better execute alliance obligations, 
undertake stand-off operations, and realize greater combat efficiencies. Information dominance 
in this context becomes a commodity that we can give our allies so that they can leverage their 
systems more effectively while our forces remain relatively safe. 122 This harkens back to the 
days of the Ancien Regime when the British Empire used their financial strength instead of 
military troops to support Prussian military operations on the European continent. 
Information warfare, also referred to as hacker warfare, command and control warfare 
or cyber warfare, deals with the attack on and the defense of information systems and is the 
third major component of the current RMA. 123 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have determined that 
information warfare or Command and Control Warfare consists offive elements: destruction of 
information systems, deception, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and operational 
security.124 In the past year, this new type of warfare has received a good deal of attention as 
119 James R. FitzSimonds, "The Cultural Cballenge of Information Technology," The Naval War College Review, 
(Summer 1998), p. 1. 
120 Thomas G. Mahnken, "War in the Information Age," Joint Forces Quarterly, (Winter 1995-%), p. 40. 
121 Arthur K Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, Network- Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future," United States Naval 
Institute Proceedings, (January 1998), p. 32. 
122 Stavridis, pp.9-1O. 
123 Ibid, p.lO. 
124 Harley, p. 68. 
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Pentagon computer systems have been under attack by computer hackers from different parts 
of the world. The importance of this new area can not be overestimated as every sector of 
society grows more and more dependent on information systems ranging from banking ATMs 
to communications to the internet. 


















Figure 7-1. The RMA "System of Systems" Argument (James R. Blaker, Understanding The 
Revolution in Military Affairs: A Guide to America's 21st Century Defense, Progressive Policy 
Institute, 1997) 
One of the unmistakable characteristics of a revolution in military affairs is that they 
take years to develop. The consensus for the current RMA is that it is still in the early stages. 
The technology and the systems are here and to some degree have been here since before the 
end of the cold war. There can be no doubt that the technology will change and change rapidly, 
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but for this RMA, like the RMAs in the past, operational innovation has been slow and 
organizational adaptation has lagged even farther behind. 125 Arguably the RMA will have the 
greatest potential impact in these areas. 
There are two schools of thought on the effect of the RMA on operations and the 
organization. The majority opinion described by Admiral Reason, Vice Admiral Cebrowski and 
many others is that as previously discussed, the RMA network in the guise of C4 systems will 
bring a flattened and decentralized organization whereby the lower echelons will "self-
synchronize" their efforts through massive amounts of lateral communication in a networked 
virtual organization. An example of this change in its infancy occurred when an single aircraft 
carrier in the western Pacific in early 1997 sent 54,000 e-mails in one month. This constituted 
about half the amount of all message traffic in the entire Western Pacific at that time. 126 The 
argument of this school is that the Navy and the military will become more responsive and thus 
operationally agile and thus be more capable of overcoming the uncertainty and complexity of 
future combat. 
The opposing school of thought believes that the RMA will indeed flatten the 
organization, but at the same time the organization will be highly centralized vice decentralized. . 
Members of this school argue that "there is no reason to expect that they [commanders] will be 
able or willing to avoid involving themselves in actions taken by their subordinates, of whose 
circumstances they will believe they have full knowledge ... Moreover, future knowledge-
empowered commanders are likely to find it ethically unacceptable to absolve themselves of 
accountability for lower-level actions of which they have full knowledge and control, and for 
which they are ultimately responsible." Indeed this trend has been seen in several exercises. In a 
1995 Joint Staff sponsored war game, a centralized theater commander saw his resource 
deficiency as so acute that he assumed the authority to determine when his subordinate ship 
commanders could fire long-range surface-to-air missiles in self-defense. One Aegis 
125 Harley, p. 71. and Reason, p.2-30. 
126 Cebrowski, p.33. 
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commanding officer openly threatened to withdraw his unit from the theater-wide defense 
network if his prerogative to fire in self-defense were taken away.127 
It is still unclear exactly which school will dominate in the next fleet. The pull to 
centralize is very tempting especially with technology giving commanders more and more 
knowledge of the battlefield. In reality however, the evidence shows that centralized control 
works poorly in times of rapid change because no expert can know it all. As Admiral 
Reason states in Sailing New Seas, "the smells, the tensions, the noises, the pulse, the feel, 
the events unconsciously seen and recorded peripherally- all these cannot be verbalized or 
digitized, transmitted, and reconstituted accurately, completely, and quick enough ... Areas of 
expertise, responsibility, and authority must be kept to a level to which the expert can be 
trained and within which the expert can be fully aware of all important, relevant 
information. 128 
B. THE FLEET OF 2020 
As stated by Admiral Reason in Sailing New Seas, it must be assumed that the next 
Navy and the Navy after next will still be composed of ships, submarines, and aircraft, but 
perhaps not exclusively.129 This seems to be a relatively safe assumption, and as such we 
need to analyze the technological trends for these platforms. 
1. Surface Ships and Submarines 
According to current plans, the composition of the surface force and submarine 
force of 2020 will be similar to the one of today. The Navy will still be using Nimitz aircraft 
carriers, Ticonderoga Class Cruisers, Arleigh Burke Destroyers, Wasp Class Amphibious 
Assault Ships, San Antonio Class Amphibious Transport Docks, Los Angeles Class Attack 
Submarines, Seawolf Attack Submarines, and Ohio Class Ballistic Missile Submarines. In 
addition the Navy is projected to have introduced by 2020 the DD-21 land attack destroyer, 
the CVX aircraft carrier, and the NSSN attack submarine. 
127 FitzSimonds, p.4-lO. 
128 Reason, pp. 5-6 
129 Reason, pp. 2-8. 
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The DD-21 land attack destroyer is currently set to replace the aging Spruance class 
of destroyers. The class is planned to consist of 32 ships with the lead ship launched in 
2008. The ship as presently conceived will be minimally manned with a crew of 95 vice the 
current destroyer manning of 340. This reduced manning is to be accomplished through 
automation and control. The driving force behind reduced manning is the goal of reducing 
platform life cycle costs. The largest life-cycle cost of current platforms is the personnel that 
man them. 130 With automation, the Navy hopes to reduce watchstanding requirements, 
machine monitoring requirements and even casualty and damage control requirements. In 
addition to automation, current plans for DD-21 include using remote sensors in equipment 
to reduce or even eliminate the need for preventive maintenance. With current equipment, 
many man hours are used dismantling equipment on a periodic basis to ensure that it works 
on demand. With information technology, support functions will migrate off ship to be 
handled on shore. The amount of disbursing clerks, yeoman, etc on ships will be vastly 
reduced if not eliminated. All of these advances lead to minimally manned ships. Other 
technological advances planned for DD-21 include stealth, a new electric drive propulsion 
system, potentially a new hull form, and the 155 mm vertical advanced gun system that can 
fIre 100 miles at up to 12 rounds a minute. I3I 
The CVX aircraft carrier as currently planned will use the same technology that is 
being developed for the DD-21. The fIrst of the class is planned to join the fleet in 2013 
with the second slated for somewhere between 2018 and 2023. It is planned to have a crew 
size of about a 1000 vice the almost 5000 that man today's carriers. It will be nuclear 
powered like the carriers of today but will have an as-yet -undeveloped electric propulsion 
system. In addition, it will have electro-magnetic catapults vice the manpower and 
maintenance intensive steam catapults that we have today. Unlike the pD-21 however, it 
130 V ADM Daniel Oliver, Testimony before the House National Security Committee, 12 March 1998. 
131 Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council, Technology for the United States Navy and Marine 
Corps, 2000-2035, Volume 6, (National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997), pp. 13-36, and "The Next 
Destroyer: Reinventing Surface Warfare," The Navy Times, (April 20, 1998), pp.12-15. 
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will not have a new hull design until either the second or third ship of the class. The lead. 
ship will be fitted with a Nimitz hull in order to save on development costS.1 32 
The NSSN is the planned replacement for much of the submarines of the Los 
Angeles class. It will realize much of the manpower savings of the DD-21 with regards to 
automation and lowered maintenance requirements. In addition, its modular design will 
allow it to be more flexible with regard to upgrading of systems. The objective of the 
NSSN program is "to produce a multi-mission, easy to upgrade submarine with the acoustic 
performance of the Seawolf, an acquisition cost equal to or lower than the cost of additional 
Los Angeles class submarines, and low life cycle costs. The lower life cycle costs are to be 
gained from reduced manning and an extended reactor core life time that will never require 
refueling.133 . 
Another trend in submarine warfare that is showing potential is unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUV). UUV s show some significant promise in expanding the reach 
of traditional blue water submarines deep into the littoral environment. The missions that 
these UUV s could perform are numerous including mine warfare, antisubmarine warfare in 
particular anti-die'sel warfare, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions. 
These vehicles have the potential of extending the operating range of submarines 
drastically. 
2. Aircraft 
Naval Aviation in 2020 under current plans will rely heavily on the F/A-18 ElF 
Super Hornet and the as-yet-developed Joint Strike Fighter. There is some interest in putting 
more emphasis on unmanned aerial vehicles and cruise missiles as seen by the findings of 
some recent eNO Strategic Studies Groups sessions, but this movement has not gained 
sufficient momentum to displace manned aircraft. The conventional wisdom is that of the 
132 Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council, Technology for the United States Navy and Marine 
Corps, 2000-2035, Volume 6, (National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997), pp. 13-36, and "Evolution of 
the Next Carrier," The Navy Times, (April 20, 1998), pp. 12-15. 
133 Naval Studies Board of the National Research Council, Technology for the United States Navy and Marine 
Corps, 2000-2035, Volume 6, (National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1997), pp. 85-111, Norman Friedman 
and Scott Truver, "It's What's Inside That Counts," The United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (February 
1996), pp. 41-44, and William Kowenhoven and Frederic 1. Harris, "The NSSN: A 21st Century Design," The 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings, (June 1997), pp.35-38. 
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QDR which plans to procure a minimum of 548 Super Hornets. The total number of Super 
Hornets may be raised to 785 depending on the success of the Joint Strike Fighter which is 
being developed for the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps. Eventual procurement 
plans are for 2,852 Joint Strike fighters. 134 Tactical aviation procurement plans have been 
one of the most controversial DoD issue in recent years. It is hard to be certain of the 
direction that the Navy will actually take. 
134 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, p. Vll-9. 
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VIII. THE IMPACT OF THE REVOLUTION ON TOMORROW'S NA VAL 
OFFICER 
A.OVERVIEW 
As seen through the lens opened in Chapters VI and Vll, the environment of the naval 
officer is rapidly changing. In order to determine the impact of these changes on the naval 
officer of 2020, I conducted 23 interviews with senior military officers, civilian officials within 
the Department of the Navy, and academics at the Naval Postgraduate schoo1. The eight major 
themes that emerged from these interviews are presented in Table 8-1. This chapter discusses 
each of the themes and provides supporting evidence in terms of excerpts and/or quotations 
from the interviews with these senior leaders. 
Major Themes from Interviews 
1. Theme I: The naval officer corps in 2020 will require more specialists and fewer but 
broader generalistsIURL officers than those in service today. 
2. Theme II: Information Technology is and is going to be a core competency for all Naval 
Officers. 
3. Theme ill: Naval Officers, even at the most junior level, will be required to be mentally 
agile and able to make quick decisions in a dynamic and uncertain environments. 
4. Theme IV: Future Naval officers will have to be educated and trained in the joint arena to 
include coalition warfare at an early stage in their careers. 
5. Theme V: Information technology and the potential reduction in crew sizes will change 
what it means to be an effective leader. 
6. Theme VI: The officer of the future must be well-versed in building, participating, and 
leading multi-disciplinary teams. 
7. Theme Vll: Outsourcing will pose some difficulties for the officer corps of2020. 
8. Theme VIII: Demographic changes within the United States will be an opportunity for the 
Naval Officer of2020. 
Table 8-1. Interview Themes (Source: Author) 
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B. DATA COLLECTION, CONTENT ANALYSIS, AND THEME DEVELOPMENT 
The 23 interviews were conducted at the Pentagon, at National Center 1 in Arlington, 
VA, and at the Naval Postgraduate School. The sample consisted of 15 active duty military 
officers ranging in rank from 0-6 to 0-10, 2 retired military officers (1 retired 0-6 and 1 
retired 0-8), 2 senior level civilian Department of Navy officials, and 4 academics from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. There were 21 white males, 1 non-white male, and 1 white female. 
In addition, out of the 15 active duty military officers interviewed, 13 were naval officers, 1 
was an army officer, and 1 was a marine corps officer. A standardized interview protocol was 
used and is shown in Table 8-2. The personal interviews were recorded on audiocassettes. The 
information was then transcribed, verbatim, for' complete analysis. A list of interviewees is 
provided in Appendix C. 
Inteniew Protocol Questions 
1. What are going to be the most significant changes in what it means to an effective naval 
officer in 2020? 
2. What skillslknowledgelabilities is the future naval officer going to need? 
3. With regards to the future, will the navy need more specialists or more generalists? 
4. With changes in technology comes changes in organization design. One of the touted 
advantages of network centric warfare is self-synchronization whereby the lower echelons 
communicate laterally to improve organizational effectiveness and speed of command. What 
impact will technology like network computing have on the naval organization of the future. 
Will it :flatten our organization and what potential impact will that have on our officers? 
5. Rightsizing and technology have led the navy into searching how to man ships and 
squadrons with less personnel. What impact if any will these smaller crew sizes have on future 
naval officers? 
6. Outsourcing has been a hot item as of late. What will its impact be on the navy officer of 
2020? 
7. Population projections in the next century predict that there will be no majority in society. 
What does managing diversity mean for the naval officers of the future? 
8. How do we get to the naval officer of2020? 
9. This completes my prepared questions, is there any area not covered by my questions that 
you think will be significant to the future naval officer? 
Table 8-2. Interview Protocol (Source: Author) 
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The data were then organized by question. At this point, certain patterns emerged and 
common themes were developed from the responses. Themes obtained from the different 
questions were then compared and in several cases were merged into overarching themes. 
Techniques described by Patton (1990) provided guidance for the data collection, content 
analysis and theme development. These themes may be viewed'as those reflective of the senior 
Navy leadership. 
C. THEMES 
1. Theme I: The naval officer corps in 2020 will require more specialists and 
fewer but broader generalists/URL officers than those in service today. 
a. Theme 
The Naval Unrestricted Line Officers of 2020 will need to be a well rounded 
generalist, or more accurately, he must be a specialist in warfare. However, the percentage of 
the officer corps that is in the URL will decrease as the Navy relies on more specialists to 
manage and develop the highly technical equipment of the Navy. Advances in information and 
other technologies will increasingly require uniformed experts to better understand, manage 
and adapt technology to the pursuit of war. A smaller cadre of generalists/specialist in warfare 
will be required to integrate the efforts of other specialists, and actually use the results of 
technology in armed conflict. 
b. Justification 
This theme emerged from of the responses to question 3 of Table 8-2 which 
asks whether the Navy will require more generalists or more specialists in the future. Half of 
the interviewees felt that the Navy needed more generalists in order to integrate force against 
the enemy, a quarter of the interviewees felt that the Navy needed more specialists due to the 
increasing demands of technology, while the remaining quarter felt that the Navy required more 
specialists to manage the advanced technology but at the same time required broader 
generalists to integrate the force. After a careful review of the interviewees' statements, it 
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became evident that the response to this question was dependent on the interviewees' 
perception of what a naval officer is. Those who equated the naval officer with the unrestricted 
line officer consistently sided with the generalist vision of a naval officer as evidenced by the 
following except. 
"I honestly believe that line officers are by definition generalist officers. 
They have to be. Officers of the line, the guys out there, have to be because 
they are warfighters, and again I go back to my basic principle of leadership ... 
The traditional Navy model and Marine Corps model, I think will hold true in 
the future. Leadership of people will remain the single most important thing 
that we should ever do ... If you take a look again at a naval ship at sea in the 
year 2015/2020, that ship gets into a situation where suddenly sea mines ... 
become a problem. Due to the utilization of our computer, our information 
technology, our reachback capability, we should be able to use our computers 
and reachback to duty experts in whatever laboratory or wherever they might 
be to be able to get him on the hook, get him on the VTC, getting him on-line, 
and say here we are, we are in this location, we have this problem, the 
following indications and warnings have come up to us. Help us. You have that 
immediate reach back expertise that can help you solve that problem, and other 
decision making tools that the computer should be able to give us. Now I think 
that it is going to be incumbent on all of us to be very confident and 
comfortable in the utilization of information systems. The wrong thing for us to 
do is get into this mind set that we are going specialize and that we are going to 
get away form the basics and the basics being leadership. " 
This caption typifies the response of those who sided with the generalist vision, and it is 
important to notice how this senior official separated the generalist unrestricted line officer 
from the specialist/expert officer back in the lab. On the other end of the spectrum, those who 
believed that the Navy needs more specialists viewed the Naval Officers as encompassing all 
officers. They maintained that technology was driving the entire officer corps to more 
specialization because they believe that no one officer could master the requisite knowledge to 
be a truly successful generalist as ~videnced by the following excerpt: 
[We] "are going to need more specialists ... I really believe that general 
leadership and general overall knowledge is also going to be extremely 
important, but I also am sympathetic to he fact that there is so much to know 
that the naval officer is going to have to be a specialist. " 
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However, the theme that really stood out from both of these was the belief that there will be 
more specialists within the officer corps, but the Navy still needs to rely on generalists to 
integrate the efforts of the specialists on the battlefield. In fact, these generalists need to be 
more generalist than they are today as evidenced by the following two excerpts: 
"I believe that warfighters need more general knowledge of the art and 
science of warfare. For all but the specially gifted, I suggest this takes engaging 
in developing depth and breadth of knowledge--of total navy capabilities, of 
joint capabilities, of how other government and non-governmental agencies act 
in contingencies, of what happens ashore that we are trying to influence, etc--
earlier in an officer's professional development than happens under our current 
design. I think this also means that there is less time in a warrior career for the 
development of subspecialties that do not contribute to their warfighting 
development. Most senior executive level decision making positions that 
continue to be filled by officers (CNO, NS, e.g.) become problematic as to how 
we grow officers to fill them under this scenario. The shrinking force structure 
offers an opportunity to break people out after their commander command to 
become the equivalent of our old concept of a sub specialist. Such officers 
would never compete for a warfighting CINCdom, but they would have 
enough time to become a quality NS, etc. By some definitions, these are 
specialists. Additionally, the business of running the support functions ashore, 
as we discussed, entails very different leadership and management than is 
typical in an operating unit. The few remaining military officer billets here 
require something more than the classic URL who fills these jobs with no 
background or experience. Even if the CO positions continue to be URL 
positions, I suspect that we should back them up with a small cadre of officers 
who bring expertise in a variety of technical areas. Again, [ I ] suspect that an 
officer who intends to compete for unified CINCdom won't have the time to do 
one of these. I am not sure that my opinion would change much if we were 
able to expand career lengths. I believe that the use of military power in the 
early 21 st century will be so subtle as to require extraordinary situational 
awareness that comes with full immersion. The longer career would make it 
possible for a warfighter to commit to that without worrying about 
marketability of his or her experience. " 
"I think that we are going to go in both directions. Certainly, knowledge is 
becoming more and more specialized to the point where the specialties are so 
narrow; they are almost not useful to a naval officer, I mean, you can't possibly 
learn as much as you need to know. You have to rely on specialists. I think that 
military officers are always going to be generalists. The operational military 
officer is always going to be a generalist to some degree and I guess that you 
could argue as specialists become more and more narrow then effectively that 
121 
l 
makes us more and more of a generalist. So that we are more and more 
dependant upon these specialists to do things. So I see that we are going to be 
generalists, but needing knowledge in certain key areas like information 
science, personal psychology, but here is the key, the principal function of a 
generalist is to integrate. To accomplish a mission you have got to integrate a 
bunch of different specialties, a bunch of different people, skills, whatever you 
want to call it. You've got to pull things together with different resources to 
accomplish your mission. So it's that integrating function that is the key to 
actually getting the job done and we are going to have to be very good at that. 
That is whether you are taking about integrating combat systems or integrating 
forces to accomplish a mission in a joint task force or whatever, that integrative 
function becomes more and more crucial to success so how you do that, how 
you learn how to integrate. That is a very broad concept, you have to be more 
specific but learning how to integrate things and the various ways of 
integrating; technically, functionally, operationally, organizationally, that is our 
biggest challenge.... Integrating the system of systems, this is one of biggest 
challenges of the future. Learning how to do that is going to be that and 
training people who are good at that is going to be one of the keys of the 
future." 
2. Theme II: Information Technology is and is going to be a core competency for 
Naval Officers 
a. Theme 
The Naval Officer of 2020 will have to be confident enough in his or her 
understanding of information technology and its related technologies to adapt it to and use it in 
warfare. This does not mean that every officer needs to have an undergraduate or graduate 
degree in computer science or electrical engineering, but that officers need to be educated and 
trained in the use of information technology and information warfare on the battlefield. 
b. Justification 
The interviewees ovelWhelming cited information technology as being the most 
significant change in what it means to be an effective naval officer in 2020 as witnessed by their 
response to question 1 of Table 8-2. They almost all noted that technology will place great 
demands on the officer of the future, but it is significant to note the belief that this technological 
dependence does not necessarily mean that all officers need to be educated in technology in the 
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traditional sense i.e. a technical undergraduate college major like electrical engineering or 
computer science or a graduate degree in the same. The following are excerpts from the 
responses to question 1. 
"Our future officer not just naval, but all of them, warfighters are going 
to need to have a thorough understanding of information technology, and all of 
the other technologies that characterize the information age and the resultant 
changes in profits and organizations ... If you look back at information science, 
I guess is a good way to say it, and it's just not the technology, but the theory 
of information and how you manage it, and how you package it· to make it 
useful, how you tum it into knowledge, that is going to be as important as 
physics and steam engineering and things like that are to us now. I really see 
information science as replacing steam engineering and electrical engineering as 
kind of the baseline building block to knowledge that naval officers are going 
to need in the future. " 
"Officers will have to have an "intense knowledge of technology. How 
it is used. How to manage it. How you insert it. How you link it up with 
operational needs. " 
"It will principally be technology driven change, in particular, 
information technology. I think we need to look to the business world and the 
commercial/civilian sector to see the kinds of changes that have occurred out 
there in leadership and management structures and we can see a little bit of 
what the future challenges will be for naval officers in 2020. Such things as 
speed of command, dealing with information in ways that maybe we now just 
kind of imagine but don't have the present ability to do it. Much greater reliance 
on technical systems that we may not have as full an understanding as we have 
of the present day engineering systems. Information technology in a user 
friendly world that relies on delivery of equipment in a modular way that we 
don't really understand necessarily the interior of the modUles which basically 
trust in their reliability and allow manpower to operate them. " 
The officers in the following two excepts demonstrate the belief that not all officers need 
technical undergraduate backgrounds but that they need the skills to use technology. 
"There is a difference between a changing technological world and a change 
of skills people have with technology. I don't think that we need a bunch of 
computer scientists to fight the problems of the future, but I know that we need 
people comfortable with what technology is bringing. Similarly, we need 
people who are adaptable to change and that is a different naval officer that we 
have today; a different military officer than we have today, and it might very 
well lead to different tactics and doctrines being effective ... " 
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"It would have to be an absolute truism to say that their technical 
competence will have to be much greater than it is today, but we have to be 
careful. It would be bold to say as a result that every guy coming out has to be 
an electrical engineering or a mechanical engineering or something else. That is 
not necessarily the case. We can handle certain complex platforms as we 
have ... but what it does mean is that the training will have to be very network 
centric, very heavily computer centric ... " 
3. Theme ill: Naval Officers, even at the most junior level, will be required to be 
mentally agile and able to make quick decisions in a dynamic and 
uncertain environment. 
a. Theme 
Naval Officers in the future will have to be mentally agile. They will have to be 
flexible, be tolerant of uncertainty and ambiguity, and be able to successfully manage risk in an 
environment filled with governmental and non-governmental organizations who will attack 
asymmetrically. For naval forces to be effective in this dynamic and uncertain environment, 
senior officers believe that naval operations have to occur at a speed never before seen in 
history. To accomplish this feat, the Navy is using information technology and self-
synchronization to flatten the organization. This flattening is driving decision making down the 
chain of command so that operations can respond quicker to stimuli while at the same time 
preventing information overload of task force commanders. One officer cites the Navy/ Marine 
Corps initiative regarding naturalistic decision making as a way of gaining the required mental 
agility.135 Overall, this theme rejects the notion held by some that information technology will 
lead to centralization and more and more micromanaging. While the interviews acknowledged 
this threat, they all rejected the path of centralized control. 
135 Naturalistic decision making is a theory which attempts to explain how decision makers who deal with time 
pressure, high stakes, and uncertainty recognize a situation and choose a course of action. Experts operating under 
these conditions do not use rational choice processes where they construct several alternatives for evaluation. but 
instead rely more on their intuition, Robert Wagoner et al., "Command 21: Speed of Command for the 21st Century," 
Executive Summary of the Command 21 Concept Generation Team, Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies 
Group XVI, (June 1997), p. V-3. 
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h. Justification 
This theme represents the merging of some responses to question 1 and 
question 2, and the responses to question 4 of Table 8-2. The senior civilian official in the 
following excerpt describes the dynamic and uncertain environment of the future and the 
challenge that this different environment poses for naval officers. 
"Our Navy is not likely to be much different in 2020 than our Navy is today 
in terms of force structure, in terms of the tools that we have today, and yet I 
believe that the world is going to be very different in 20 years and I think that 
the only thing that allows you to take today's tools and be nearly as effective as 
the Navy has been for 223 years so far is to have an officer corps that can make 
it that effective ... My view is that like counties no longer matter any more in 
terms of commerce, and states matter very little in terms of commerce, nations 
in the future won't matter very much in terms of commerce, and they are not 
going to matter much in world events. The World Tower bombing showed us 
like the Murrah building did in a way, like the Aum Shinri Kyo in Tokyo, which 
is non-government, non-allied organization like Aum Shinri Kyo are the threat 
of the future. The value of stability and the value of order is not going to 
change, but implementing order and stability is going to be harder if you don't 
know who you are fighting against, and weapons are tremendously 
inexpensive, tremendously impactful... That's the threat I see, How does the 
Navy fit into a world that doesn't have nations or has nations and other things 
but the other things aren't under the control of the other nations where 
information flows faster than government policies can act, where business have 
no international codes of conduct. " 
The officer in the following quote starts to describe how this dynamic environment impacts 
naval officers. 
"They are going to need to be able to operate in a very dynamic 
environment. There is going to be a premium on the ability to learn as opposed 
to just applying what you already know to rote procedures and be able to adapt 
and change." 
The following excerpts demonstrate how the interviewees think: the Navy and the military are 
trying to adapt to the new environment by improving speed of command. This momentous 
increase in speed of command is the product of information technology flattening the 
organization and self-synchronization. As these excerpts indicate, these officers believe this 
flattening will have an important impact in what it means to be a naval officer in 2020. 
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"I guess you could go to a warfighting scenario. Right now, if you have a 
platoon commander that is leading his platoon in combat and suddenly he has 
contact with the bad guys and he is starting to take incoming ... on his position. 
He is going to react to that and he is going to react to it by taking the 
immediate steps locally and he is also going to get on the radio and he is going 
to call for help. He is going to call for artillery, he is going to call for naval 
gunfire, he is going to call for close air support. What we have today is not 
cumbersome but we have a system that has grown up over the years where he 
then goes to his company commander or his battalion commander who goes to 
the brigade or regimental commander who goes to the division commander 
who goes through a DASS (Direct Air Support System) or SAC aboard ship, 
or a fire support coordination center that brings all this stuff together to 
coordinate the right system at the right time to go out and help that young 
. lieutenant in combat. Well in the future, the young platoon commander up 
there is also going to have various hand held devices or small devices of which 
he will be able to neatly plug in. That device will know where he is because we 
will be using GPS. Everybody will know exactly where that platoon is at that 
time. So he will be able to plug in there a distance and range or better yet he 
will use a laser to go and get an exact location of where the bad guys are and 
he will push buttons in there and that message will flash back to a weapons 
system some place which is going to react quickly to be able to go and engage 
that target... That sounds great and that lieutenant there in theory now 
probably get effects on target within a minute or two or three if we do that 
system, but what it does now is, it takes the company commander, the battalion 
commander, the regimental commander, the division commander, all those 
people out of the system because that young lieutenant is now communicating 
directly with the weapon system. I am not saying that is bad. I am just simply 
saying that we have to deal with that. Somehow we have to build a comfort 
level into the chain of command that we can do that, and we have to make sure 
that we the necessary controls systems in there that we don't have a young 
lieutenant or lance corporal starting World War ill on his own ... It does change 
the chain of command, and the speed and accuracy are going to make that 
happen ... 
You need to look at it... in different dimensions. You can think of 
information flow as one dimension. Clearly if you are talking about information 
flow, you are changing the organization. That has already happened ... there is 
already that information flow flattening... That is different from the authority 
relationships. What you typically show in an organizational chart, the wiring 
diagram, is the authority relationships. I think that there is going to be some 
effect on those too. What that means really is typically where there is a 
reporting relationship, there is also a decision making dimension there. Who 
has the authority to make what kind of decisions. If you really want speed of 
126 
command you are going to have to start delegating decisions to lower echelons 
because it just takes too long to go up the chain even with modem 
communications. Typically you slow things down if you have to go up to a 
high level to get a particular decision. So, when circumstances permit, I think 
you are going to see a delegation of authority to lower levels. That does not 
mean that wiring diagram necessarily changed. You still got the reporting 
relationships and you have to be very, very careful about messing around with 
fundamental principles like accountability ad responsibilities so you have to be 
careful how you change the organization. You can change! you can delegate 
authority without fundamentally restructuring the organization. In other words, 
CONOPS, how you operate, and you can do it by issue or type of decision. So 
you can delegate some decisions and not others. So I think that you have to 
maintain flexibility and how to do that, but I do see in g~neral that there is 
going to be more delegation of decision making authority to lower levels ... in 
order to achieve speed of command, and one of those things that will facilitate 
that is the concept of self-synchronization. One of the reasons why we hold, 
decision-making authority at a higher level traditionally in the military is 
because the boss has to synchronize things by command. 
If we are gong to take a hill, then you got artillery and air, and infantry to 
participate. The company commander or the battalion commander 
synchronized all that. If you can depend on those elements to synchronize 
themselves then you can react quicker to changes in the situation. What you 
need! the technology enables that and you need good horizontal 
communications. Everybody has got to have a good tactical picture, a common 
tactical picture, and then you need good guidance from the boss. Mssion type 
orders that everybody understands. 
Inescapable, that it is going to flatten the organization. The impact is much 
tougher to measure, and this will apply whether it is the soldier in the field or 
those of us on board ships. Let's take the Marine on the beach, if he has the 
ability which he has today, to be absolutely netted station into the entire 
complex land force maneuver network. Then you can see that each guy is 
going to playa key role and it argues that you have to get away from and you 
can't be stymied by traditiona1linear structure that has evolved. [He mentions a 
Wall Street commodities trading session that he attended and this was his 
conclusion.] The clear cut message that I came away with was that if you 
equate the soldier on the beach/the Marine on the beach to the youngster on 
the floor speaking out his bids of buy and sell. There is a need for an awful lot 
of more independent lateral capacity than the Marine has today. So if you are 
going to make that happen, you got to flatten the organization. I use that 
example as another reason why we got to be cured from the stovepipes and 
prepare for a lateral/parallel relationship or we are not going to solve this 
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problem ... Otherwise you are never going to achieve speed of command. Speed 
becomes nothing but essential. 
"Yes, flatter organizations, I think it will potentially reduce the officer corps 
but it will be a proportional reduction in that all of our systems will require less 
manpower to operate and maintain. The level of generalist knowledge and to 
some degree technical knowledge will go down into those horizontal 
organizations so that speed of command achieved laterally is done by officers 
or people with the leadership responsibilities and skills that we presently have in 
our officer corps. " 
This officer cites the Navy/ Marine Corps initiative on naturalistic decision-making which may 
prove to be a way to get the required mental agility. 
I think that it is going to have a big impact on training. We really have to 
train to/ there will be change to the organization obviously or to the doctrine/ 
decision making and we have got to train to that. We have to train with the 
new technologies that we expect to deploy, but most importantly, we have to 
give them realistic situations to deal with. So, they can develop experience in 
reacting to rapidly changing situations. One of the things that I have been 
involved in is an area called naturalistic decision-making. This is where 
decision-makers are trained to develop their intuition rather than to follow a 
script. Some structured analytic process to making decisions in a rapidly 
changing environment. The Marines are looking at this pretty closely... It's 
based upon experience. Ideally, a good intuitive decision-maker develops his 
intuition through experience. One of the examples that is frequently cited is fire 
fighters. We went to a fire training academy up in New York City where they 
train battalion chiefs. The typical battalion chief has already been to a couple 
thousand fires by the time he gets to be a chief So, he has already got a lot of 
experience on how to fight a fire. We do not have that benefit in the military. 
Typically, you don't get in a war your whole career. So, we have to have a way 
of instilling that experience and we do that with training, but it has got to be 
realistic scenario based training and not bogus. 
4. Theme IV: Future Naval officers will have to be educated and trained in the 
joint arena to include coalition warfare at an early stage in their careers. 
a. Theme 
Future naval officers will have to be educated and trained in the joint arena to 
include coalition warfare at an early stage in their careers. With decision making driven down 
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the chain of command by the need for speed, relatively junior officers are going to need to 
understand the complexities of joint and coalition warfare because decisions that affect the 
success of the mission will be made at this level. They will have to be versed in the unified 
command plan as well as the strategies, doctrine, and tactics of land warfare, air warfare, and 
sea warfare in order to be able to apply combat power effectively in the environment of2020. 
h. Justification 
This theme emerged from responses to questions 1,2,4,8, and 9 of Table 8-2 
and is strongly related to Theme ill. The officers in the following two excerpts typify the 
feelings of those interviewed. 
"There is no question in my mind when it comes to having the greatest fleet 
in the world and the greatest sailors and the greatest officers of any navy in the 
world, the U.S. Navy stands alone in that regard. When our fleets go to sea, 
when our ships go to sea, they are splendid, but what has happened in the 
world ... and I think that the Navy is just now adapting to it, is that we are not 
likely to go out and fight the Soviets. There is no Soviet Navy anymore. We 
are not going to have great naval battles in the G-I-UK. gap [Greenland-
Iceland-United Kingdom] like we once envisioned.' We are not going to be 
taking on the Soviet fleet in the middle of Mediterranean like we had planned 
for 20 or 30 years. The Navy has made the shift to a littoral navy, and when 
you take a look at what today we are buying in the fleet. We are buying things 
that will support that change in mission... What I am telling you is, I see a 
deficit in the way we educate and train navy officers because we have always 
trained our navy officers to be on a single plane. I mean basically below water 
or above water ... What Navy officers are going to have to understand is that 
they are going to have to have an appreciation of what goes on ashore just like 
they do at sea because in the future we may very well have joint task force 
commanders who are admirals, who are Navy officers and they have to 
understand what is going on not just up to the shore line but what is going on 
50-100 miles or whatever they could influence ashore from their platforms at 
sea. They need to have an understanding of what the battlefield looks like. The 
guys on those platforms at sea have to be able to see the same kinds of things 
that the ground commanders are seeing and young navy officers have to grow 
up and learn the skills- I think to be competent commanders ashore as well as 
they are at sea." 
"We have to understand coalition warfare, not just the other services 
but other nations. I also think that we need, as we deal with these increasingly 
complex scenarios, where it is tougher to discriminate friend from foe, it is 
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tougher getting precise mission guidance, we need to become very, very adept 
at the interagency process. At putting together the right kind of teams, that 
screwing in the right kind of teams with people with very diverse agendas and 
skills and backgrounds. We will be dealing with them as teams. We will be 
leading them in some cases as teams. " 
This officer acknowledges that these skills need to be imparted earlier than in the past. 
"Shaping events on land ... involves a breadth of knowledge outside the 
historic circle of what officers have had to knOw... In order to have that 
knowledge in a way that enables you to think about applying combat power, I 
think that you need to begin to gain [this] earlier than has been done in the 
past. " 
5. Theme V: Information technology and the potential reduction in crew sizes 
will change what it means to be an effective leader. 
a. Theme 
Leadership is one of the most important aspects of being a naval officer and it 
will continue to be extremely important. The problem is that information technology is 
changing what it means to be an effective leader. It is eroding the chain of command and it is in 
some cases replacing interpersonal interaction between superiors and subordinates. Reduced 
crew sizes will increase the workload of officers and reduce the amount of time that they have 
to interact with the troops. In addition, there will be less redundancy in the crew thus increasing 
the impact of lost personnel. Wardrooms will be more senior which makes the training of junior 
officers problematic. We as an officer corps are going to need to deal with these challenges in 
order to be effective leaders. 
h. Justification 
This theme emerged from the responses to question 1, 2, 4, and 5 of Table 8-2. 
Few officers mentioned this theme, but it truly represents a significant challenge to the officer 
of the future. The officers in the following two excerpts illustrate the potential impact that 
information technology is going to have on leadership. 
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"The interaction between the officer and the enlisted is one of the basis of 
what naval leadership is all about in my opinion. You have to ask yourself the 
question is that going to change as we get more into the so-called network 
centric mentality into information technology and decentralization ... I don't 
know that I have the answer but what I am saying to you is that I think that if 
you really believe that the basic premise of an officer is to continue to lead, you 
have to ask yourself the question, how will leadership be affected either 
degraded or improved by these new technologies. I just got a piece of e-mail 
today from the Commandant of the Marine Corps today who just got a letter 
last night from a PFC [private First Class] down in Beaufort, SC who has some 
observations about the Marine corps policy on hazing. That [hazing] is not 
important to my point, but the fact is that the PFC wrote the Commandant. 
The Commandant read it, responded to the PFC, and has now taken that letter 
from the PFC and he has now sent it to all his general officers to read. Think 
about that for a second. You have a PFC who is at the far end of the chain of 
command from the Commandant of the Marine Corps who is now having an 
electronic dialogue with Commandant. I think that that is good. I am not saying 
that that is wrong, but what that does right now, is it calls into question all the 
other chain of command in between and how do people/how do officers and 
senior enlisted from the PFC to the Commandant react to that kind of thing. In 
the past, you know 10 years ago/ 15 years ago, if a PFC worked for me 
somehow went directly to the Commandant of the Marine Corps with some 
ideas, I would have been livid, and just about every other officer or senior 
enlisted, they would be livid too. You don't do that. You go through the chain 
of command because the chain of command back in; those days was letters, 
phone calls, or personal visits, but that machine over there [the computer] has 
changed the world .. .1 submit to you, even from people like me who 10 years 
ago would have found that offensive or not offensive, that is the wrong word 
to use. I would have been angry. Today, I accept that because I now 
understand that the rules have changed dramatically. Leadership has changed 
dramatically. It's a lot more horizontal. It's a lot flatter than it used to be, and I 
think what that means to all of us who wear this rank insignia whether that is 
the railroad tracks of a lieutenant or whether it's the stars of an admiral or a 
general, we now have to understand that. .. " 
"I think handling technology. I think that technology is going to be 
driving warfare, but I think that, in itsel( complicates the leadership 
requirements of a naval officer. Just because, you are going to be dealing more 
remotely or hands-off: I guess, with people. One of the strengths and joys of 
being a naval officer today is being with the troops. i think that there will be 
less of that in the future and that makes it more difficult. So I think that dealing 
with technology not only knowing technology and how to apply it to warfare 
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but leading the people who have to operate it, that technology, it's going to be 
a real challenge. " 
This officer bemoans the effect of reduced crew sizes on leadership. 
"I see that what will invariably happen is that when you have fewer people/ 
fewer enlisted on a ship, particularly in a high stress situation. It probably is 
going to mean a greater workload on officers. Which means the young officers 
in the past who would have had more time for the leadership things ... making 
sure that their guys are happy, are now going to find themselves trapped more 
behind their own computers doing their own thing. What we might see is the 
breakdown of what I call that interpersonal communication or leadership that 
we hope that our officers are out there doing. " 
This officer describes the increased responsibility of each officer. 
Each individual officer will have a greater contribution to make to the 
outcome of operations and warfare because there will be fewer of us. We will 
have more power; more leverage if you will at our fingertips so that the 
individual ability of an officer to contribute to overall success will be increasing. 
This officer notes the increased workload on officers, the increasing dependence on 
technology, and the probable shift to a more senior officer mix and the resultant complications . 
in the training of apprentice officers. 
"Everybody is going to have a heavier workload. Heavier in terms ot: there 
will be fewer people to do things on the ship. Clearly, we have automated and 
outsourced some functions, but I suspect that workloads will go up for people 
that are left particularly when things go wrong. Your automated navigation 
system on the bridge isn't working and you need that 7 man bridge team back. 
You are not going to have it if you don't work hard. I guess in a sense it will 
reduce your workload [in some areas], it will reduce the personnel 
administrative/personnel management workload. You won't have as many evals 
[ evaluations] and things like that.. . You are going to be more dependent on 
technology. So, understanding of it and how to keep it running is going to be 
important. How it works so you know what it is telling you. A lot of us 
especially in the information technologyfmformation management area will be 
depending on expert systems ... that are saving you a lot of work. Like you will 
have an agent that will screen your message traffic. Tell it what you want to see 
and it will dump everything else, but you've got to know how it works so you 
know how to program it and you know what it is dumping so you don't miss 
things that you need to see as an example. So being fiiendly [with]/ 
understanding the technology and how to use it and how to keep it running are 
going to be pretty important to the guys that are up on the ship. My sense is 
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that in general, they are going to be more senior ... There is not much room for 
apprentices. 
This officer bemoans the loss of redundancy in personnel and the resultant complication in 
manning where every unplanned personnel loss has an increased impact on the operations of 
the unit. 
"Certainly, it costs the Navy less to man it's ships with less people, however 
in the past, where you may have had a lot of depth in personnel [you no longer 
have that] ... So the loss of one individual has more impact on your ability to do 
thejob." 
6. Theme VI: The officer of the future is going to have to be well-versed in 
building, participating, and leading multi-disciplinary teams. 
a. Theme 
The officer of the future is going to have to be well-versed in building, 
participating, and leading multi-disciplinary teams. As the environment becomes more dynamic 
and uncertain, officers will have to be able to adapt and lead teams of specialists to come up 
with innovative and effective solutions. This indicates a possible shift from the traditional 
machine bureaucracy to a more innovative adhocracy. 
b. Justification 
This theme emerged from questions 1, 2, and 9 of Table 8-2. Few officers 
mentioned this, but it is significant in that it bespeaks of a potential organizational change 
within the military. The current organization design is that of a machine bureaucracy whereby 
specialists are largely isolated in functional areas. This theme, however, describes an 
organization that has teams of multi-disciplinary experts. This at least on the sunace describes 
what Mintzberg calls an Adhocracy. An Adhocracy is characterized by a "highly organic 
structure, with little formalization of behavior; specialized jobs based on expert training; a 
tendency to group specialists in functional units for housekeeping purposes but to deploy them 
in small project teams to do their work; a reliance on teams, on task forces, and on integrating 
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managers of various sorts in order to encourage mutual adjustment." 136 This change would be 
significant in that this kind of organization demands different leadership skills than the 
traditional machine bureaucracy. The officers in the following three excerpts detail their vision. 
"I think that people are always going to be crucial to our success and I think 
that we need to beef up our understanding of psychology and particularly the 
psychology of organizations. How you build effective teams. That is another 
area, teamwork, which has always been important to the Navy and is going to 
become increasingly important. Teamwork on a broader scale, more complex 
organizations. How you facilitate people, how you build teams effectively and 
enable them to work together. There is going to be more ad hoc teaming 
whereas instead of organizations are going to have to be a lot more flexible and 
adaptive so you are going to have ad hoc types of organizations. That is going 
to place a premium on learning how to work on teams. It is a different kind of 
leadership from what we originally stress. " 
"I think also increasingly the challenge of building cohesive teams which is 
vitally important and increasingly more important as you rise in rank:, is going 
to be something that officer corps of the future is going to have to be better at." 
The "officer of the future is going to have to deal in multi-disciplinary 
environments. He will be asked to do very, very different things from one 
mission to the next. I guess the term to be used for that is versatility ... " 
7. Theme vn Outsourcing will pose some difficulties for the officer corps of 2020. 
a. Theme 
Outsourcing will pose some difficulties for the officer corps of 2020. Officers, 
even unrestricted line officers, will have to be competent contract managers and understand the 
incentive systems of the private sector. In addition, outsourcing could possibly have deleterious 
effects on sea-shore rotation and on the culture of the Navy especially with regards to an 
officers sense ofloyalty to the Navy as measured by retention. 
136 Henry Mintzberg, The Structure ojOrganizations, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1979). 
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b. Justification 
Outsourcing or the more politically correct tenn, competitive sourcing, is an 
important initiative in the Department of Defense because it is seen as part of the solution to 
our modernization funding problems. The impact of this initiative on personnel is not yet clear. 
Most of the interviewees were unsure as to whether outsourcing should continue and to what 
degree it should be done in the military. However, three issues did emerge in the interviews. 
The first issue is that officers will have to be competent contract managers and understand the 
incentive systems of the private sector. The officers in the following two excerpts typify the 
concerns of the interviewees in this area. . 
"Our officers will need to understand the private sector even more than they 
do today because we will be more reliant on them for the provision of goods 
and Services that in many cases provided by uniform personnel. " 
Outsourcing... We are not businessmen, we are trained to be warriors. We 
trained as warriors to work with our own kind, to work with other services, to 
work with coalition forces. When you start doing more and more outsourcing, 
I see that as a difficult transition to make because as you look at it now the true 
outsourcing experts are support base personnel. The more and more 
outsourcing you do, we are going to have more and more line officers, more 
warfighters that are going to be confronted with outsourcing type decisions and 
we are going to have to train our officers to know how to deal with that 
because typically the warnor does not know how to deal with that. 
The second issue deals with the effect of outsourcing on officer sea-shore rotation and the third 
issues deal with the potential deleterious effects of outsourcing on the culture of the Navy 
itself More specifically, two interviewees were concerned with the effect of outsourcing on 
retention. They hypothesized that the closer military officers worked with the civilians, the 
more the military officers would compare compensation packages and find military 
compensation lacking. One officer remarked that: 
"At some point and time what we will find naturally is that too much 
outsourcing is not good that it starts breaking down the culture of the navy, it 
starts breaking down the teamwork of the Navy and Marine Corps. I mean you 
reach a certain point when you say that you can't do anymore than this because 
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you start affecting your sea-shore rotation policy and you start breaking down 
the very core values of the Navy." 
A senior civilian official remarked: 
"I think that it is a political decision. It sort of has become an article of faith 
among Republicans at least, and an increasing number of Democrats, that 
government is broken. Functional areas such as procurement, base ops, all 
could be more efficiently done by the corporations. Actually the argument by 
the more sophisticated people of that mindset is that if you expose the civil 
service or the military organization to competition they have to compete for 
their own jobs and just through the process of competition they will winnow 
themselves down and make themselves more efficient so that you will realize 
quite a savings ... What will it do to officers? It should reduce the requirements 
on officers if you privatize requirements on civil servants, enlisted and officers. 
Somebody has got to watch sea-shore rotation... career development 
considerations. It's going to be interesting as you get more and more military 
working alongside contractors, then they are going to start comparing 
compensation. It's hard to get apples to apples when you do that. " 
8. Theme vm: Demographic changes within the United States will pose a 
significant challenge for the Naval Officer of 2020. 
a. Theme 
Demographic changes within the United States will pose a significant challenge 
for the Naval Officer of 2020. The Navy cannot currently nor in the future will it be able to 
have the necessary number of personnel to accomplish the mission without the extensive and 
equitable use of women. All occupations need to be open to women based on the ability to do 
the job. 
The naval officer corps will have to reflect society so that racial/ethnic 
minorities and women within the enlisted ranks have role models, and to provide the military 
and the Navy credibility in American society. This means that the Navy needs to not only 
tolerate diversity within the officer corps, but value and capitalize on it as diversity often brings 
innovation. Extensive diversity training is a must because naval personnel do not currently have 
nor is society creating sufficient cultural awareness for naval leadership to value and capitalize 
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on the strengths presented by diversity in the workplace in the form of racial/ethnic minorities· 
and women. 
h. Justification 
This theme emerged from the responses to question 7 of Table 8-2 which 
asked what managing diversity meant to the naval officer of the future given the demographic 
shift that is predicted to take place in the next century. The majority of the interviewees 
regarded managing diversity as a real challenge for the naval officer of 2020. There were three 
specific areas that the interviewees addressed. The first one is that the naval officer corps will 
have to reflect society so that racial/ethnic minorities and females within the enlisted ranks have 
role models, and to provide the military and the Navy credibility in American society. One 
senior officer described the Navy's minority accession goals and remarked about their 
importance to the future: 
"As you probably know, we have a 12/12/5 policy. We are going to be there 
as soon as we can. I think that we can get there by 2008. The naval officer 
corps is going to have to reflect the society that it comes from. If our officer 
corps comes from society, reflects that society, and is educated as an officer 
corps, then managing diversity is not a mainline issue. If we fail to meet our 
goals on minorities, then we are going to have what we have today, which is 
essentially a Caucasian male officer corps. Then, we are going to have 
problems. We need to put a lot of money into recruiting minorities. Not only 
recruiting, once you access them, make sure that they have the skills to 
succeed." 
Another officer talked about the importance of the officer corps reflecting society for social 
credibility. 
"I think if the government is going to do much of anything for very long it 
needs public support and to have that public support one of things we will have 
to do is mix the officer corps and the enlisted corps to be rather reflective of 
society. I know that there are all sorts of constraints. Right now for whatever 
reasons, maybe it's socioeconomic certain groups of people, ethnic groups even 
in the countIy don't do well on standardized tests, tend not to finish college, 
have a higher probability at getting in trouble with the law and therefore it is 
harder to enlist and get commissioned officers. I think in order to get the 
support of society we are going to have to reflect the way that society looks. " 
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One officer remarked about the importance of cultural awareness and the fact that we need role 
models for our enlisted force. 
"I am not sure that it means that much other than the fact that you have to 
be comfortable and familiar with various cultural differences, no, I take that 
back, ethnic differences, cultural, we are Americans and that is our culture. 
There may be some ethnic differences or things that people carry with them 
that can not appear to be foreign. I think that it has more to do with what 
cultural upbringing than it does with any need to adapt to an ethnic 
background. If you are from central Nebraska somewhere and you have never 
seen anybody wear a yomakah, that is foreign to you and that has an impact on 
how you react to them. If you are from Long Island like me and you weren't 
Catholic Italian like I am, then you were Jewish, you know, so seeing kids in 
yomakahs is not a big deal to me, and I use that as an illustrative example. It is 
a cultural thing. It is not an ethnic thing. One of the things that we have to do 
which in the Navy is we have to attract qualified, I will call them today, 
minorities officers... we have to attract a representative leadership, role 
models." 
Another officer cited the importance of a reflective officer corps and the importance of role 
models. 
"If you have 12% of your crew is black then you need to have role model 
black officers and chief petty officers in the crew. Not because blacks can only 
relate to blacks but because there has to be that type of representation. " 
The second area of concern for several of the interviewees was the need of the Navy to not 
only tolerate diversity but to capitalize on diversity because this is the path to innovation. One 
senior civilian official remarked that: 
"I would suggest, you take a look at what navy officers look like. There is a 
great sameness. I have noticed that it is very slow to change. The way that you 
get people to move into any organization is when they know of others who are 
in that organization who succeeded. The first immigrants brought other 
immigrants. There is no question in my mind having looked at all the military 
services that the Navy has been the most elitist. There is an image of a naval 
ofE· A-';f. If you don't fit that image, life is tough and anyone can see the picture ... 
1- ; ,::' 'Do') surprise that the Navy has had a very significant problem with minority 
recruitmg. How many Asians do you see in the Navy, Why? Are Asians 
technologically inferior? Stereotypically, no. You admit that being a naval 
officer is very prestigious so it is not because it is an insult. It is not a move 
downward. That couldn't be the reason ... How many role models are there? 
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When did we have the last Asian CNO? Why is it so ludicrous that that is what 
the issue is? So there aren't that many role models and so what we have is a ... 
very clubby atmosphere in the Navy whether it is written and unwritten. It is a 
fact. The Navy has had a tough time integrating women. The rules are [one 
thing] and then the private conversations are another. No one group is better 
than any other. We are all Navy just like we are all Americans and that fact is, if 
it does not occur, the quality will decline because it makes no sense to recruit 
from one pool. Mathematically, I could prove it to you. You lose when you do 
that. I think that this is critical. I don't believe in quotas. Hopefully, there will be 
some representation so that you can bring on people who are the best and the 
brightest of all groups. Now that's good for another reason because it will help 
you deal with the enemy because by bringing on a diverse group you have 
people who understand the other side better. I think that. it leads to a more 
effective force. " 
Another senior civilian official remarked that: 
"For the next century or so there will still be a domination by those of 
European descent. For the military, there are a number of propositions. A 
military has got to represent its population. Otherwise it will pose a great risk. 
It will either become an elitist organization or a second rate organization. If a 
military does not represent its population, there are opportunities for divisions 
to form in the military which will be detrimental to its mission. The shortsighted 
people say substantially that you won't find people to support military 
capability. I have a little longer-term perspective. I don't think that you can be 
an effective military without having the diversity that is built into the country. " 
The third area addressed by the some of the interviewees is the need for an education in 
diversity and what it means for leadership. One officer states: 
"I think it means that the officer needs to have an appreciation for other 
cultures, other backgrounds. He needs to have some educational! some of this 
is going to come through education. He needs appreciation and he may not get 
it from his upbringing so we are going to have to educate him. " 
Another officer remarks about the role of diversity training in the leadership continuum training 
that all officers and enlisted now have to attend: 
"Managing an ethnically diverse population, mostly what we are trying to 
do in the formal leadership training for both officers and enlisted is to give them 
the tools to account for the individual sets that diversity of all kinds brings to 
the table ... If you believe that everyone who comes into the Navy can perform 
to prescribed standards [then] you want to accomplish that [accession and 
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indoctrination] without eliminating the special uniqueness that they bring, that 
might enable them to see different solutions to problems. " 
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IX. THE NAVAL OFFICER OF 2020 
A.OVERVIEW 
The naval officer of 2020 must be different than the naval officer of today or the naval 
officer of the past. The environment has changed and the military and the naval service has to 
change with it in order for the naval service to be effective and relevant in the dynamic and 
uncertain environment of the future. This demands that the combat forces, at least, within the 
Navy be organized in a very flat hierarchy. There will be LITTLE or NO time for information 
to flow up and down the chain of command. Decisions are going to have to be made at the 
most junior level possible. The Navy needs to undergo a transformation from the Directive 
Configuration/Machine Bureaucracy that it has operated with in the past and move to the 
Generative Configuration. Consequently, the Navy will require officers capable of working and 
leading in the Generative Configuration. Officers capable of making decisions and officers, 
more importantly, capable of leading decision makers. See Figure 9-1. This chapter will revisit 
the Systems Model and use it as a conceptual framework within which to describe a vision of . 
the naval officer of 2020 and the skills, knowledge, abilities, and attributes of the naval officer 
of2020. The policy implications ofthls vision will be discussed in Chapter 10. 
B. THE SYSTEMS MODEL AND CONGRUENCE REVISITED 
Chapter IT introduced the Systems Model and Nadler and Tushman's Congruence 
Hypothesis. The Systems Model views organizations as the sum of 5 design factors: (1) Task, 
(2) Technology, (3) Structure, (4) People, and (5) Processes! Subsystems. These design factors 
are shaped by the organization's environment/context, the key success factors, and the system 
direction! strategy, and are intended to create a culture that leads first to outputs and then to 
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Figure 9-1. The Importance of the Naval Officer of2020 and theRMA to Speed of Command 
and Effectiveness 
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outcomes. This Systems Model for the Navy of 2020 is depicted in Figure 9-2. Nadler and 
Tushman's Congruence Hypothesis states that 
"other things being equal, the greater the total degree of congruence or fit 
among various components [design factors], the more effective will be the 
organization- effectiveness being defined as the degree to which actual 
organizational output is similar to expected or planned, as specified by 
strategy ... Therefore, the question is not how to find the 'one best way of 
managing,' but how to find effective combinations of components [design 
factors ]that will lead to congruence among them. ,,137 
These two theories can be used to describe a vision of what the naval officer will have to 
understand and be able to accomplish. 
The most likely environment, tasks, technology, and military structure for the Navy of 
2020 are described in chapters VI and VII, and are summarized in Figure 9-2. The task is now 
to discern the skills, knowledge, abilities, and attributes (SKAA) that will be congruent with the 
other design factors and support the organization's direction and strategy. 
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Figure 9-2_ The Systems Model for the Navy of2020. 
C. A VISION OF THE NAVAL OFFICER OF 2020 
1. Specialists versus Generalists 
The naval officer corps of 2020 will need to be populated by more specialists than 
generalists (URL officers). There are three factors that will necessitate this shift. First, the 
future reduction in crew size and the probable shift in emphasis from manned to unmanned 
144 
aviation and precision guided missiles will lead to the need for fewer generalists. 138 Second, the 
growing complexity of technology, especially information technology, will require specialists 
capable of understanding and applying technology at greater depths than ever before 
throughout the fleet. A prime example is the current absence of, and need for, a designated 
information warfare community. Under the current system, this area is assigned to both the 
etyptologists (1610) and fleet support officers in the Space and Electronic Support core 
competency. There has been a move to merge these two groups by the Chief of Naval 
Operations, but after a year it has still not taken place. 139 This is an area for potential disaster as 
the Navy and as the rest the military grows more and more dependent on these information 
systems. Third and most importantly, the growing complexity of warfare will require the full 
immersion of the generalist warfighter into the study and use of all types of force in war and 
conflict short of war. As a senior military officer interviewed noted, "the use of military power 
in the early 21 st century will be so subtle as to require extraordinary situational awareness that 
[ only] comes with full immersion." There will not be time in the warfighters career to manage 
or learn how to manage an organization as large as the Navy or the Department of Defense. 
Consequently, the jobs in support of fleet operations that generalists have filled in the past will 
have to be filled primarily by specialists. Generalists or more accurately specialists in warfare 
while on shore duty should generally perform functions that hone their combat skills and/or 
create combat skills in other specialists in warfare. In essence, the URL officer needs to 
become more generalist and concentrate more of his time and effort on becoming more a 
specialist in the practice of naval warfare. 
2. Skills, Knowledge, Abilities and Attributes of the Naval Officer of 2020 
Table 9-1 and Table 9-2 list the Skills, Knowledge, Abilities, and Attributes (SKAA) of 
the officer of2020. These were formed by synthesizing: 
(1) selected readings on modern leadership and management, 
138 Unmanned aviation and precision guided missiles will never totally eliminate the need for manned aviation. There 
will, however, be a shift in emphasis that will reduce the need for naval aviators and consequently will reduce the need 
for generalistllJRL officers as aviators represent the largest part of the URL. 
139 Arthur K Cebrowski, Director Naval Warfare Development Center, to Students at the Naval Postgraduate School, 3 
Aug. 98. 
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(2) recent literature on the future operating environment, the future of conflict, and 
the revolution in military affairs, 
(3) the Skills, Knowledge, and Attributes for the field grade Anny officer of the 
21 st Century as identified by the Science Applications International 
Corporation for the Anny's OPMS XXI Task Force, and 
(4) the interview results of 15 active duty military officers ranging in rank 
from 0-6 to 0-10, 2 retired military officers (1 retired 0-6 and 1 retired 0-8), 
2 senior level civilian Department of Navy officials, and 4 Professors from the 
Naval Postgraduate School. 
The SKAA are organized into Task clusters. Skills refer to the capability to perform job 
operations with ease and precision. Knowledge refers to the body of information necessary to 
make adequate job performance possible. Ability refers to the cognitive capabilities necessary 
to perform a job function.140 Finally, attributes are the baseline characteristics that ALL naval 
officers need to be successful. These SKAA are applicable to the URL officer/specialist in 
warfare of the future at the senior division officer/ department head level. They also apply, but 
to a lesser degree, to the specialists that we are going to need in the future. 
L Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities for the Naval Officer of 2020 
(A) Traditional platform centric cluster 
• Ship and aircraft handling and maneuver. 
• Knowledge of and the ability to apply technology on the platform level. 
• Knowledge of and the ability to perform single unit operations and tactics. (More 
emphasis is needed here than is typically done today) 
Table 9-1. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (Source: 
Author) 
140 Mucl:rinsky, p. 182. 
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L Ousters ofSkiUs, Knowledge, and Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (CONI) 
(B) Leadership cluster 
• Ability to lead in the new era with more emphasis on collective learning and less 
concentration on charismatic leadership. 
3. Ability to deal with the shifting nature of power in the information age 
and the ability to deal with the loss of control of leaders in an 
information technology revolution. 
4. Ability to undertake what Senge's calls the leader's new work. 141 
• design and/or engineer processes. 
• education and training of subordinates, superiors, and peers. 
• stewardship of subordinates and the mission. 
• Ability to delegate to the lowest possible level. 
• Ability to develop and embody a vision. 
• Ability to build, participate in, and lead multi-discipliruuy teams. 
• Ability to lead and manage personnel from diverse backgrounds. 
• Knowledge of the human dimension warfare and the ability to use it one's own 
advantage. 
(C) Decision making cluster 
• Ability to make quick decisions in a dynamic and uncertain environment. 
• Thorough understanding of naturalistic (intuitive) decision making. 
• Thorough understanding of the principles of heuristic decision making and risk 
management. 
• Ability to use a full complement of rational analytical skills 
(0) Integrative cluster 
• Ability to integrate .naval, joint, and coalition forces to formulate, articulate, and to 
link. mission requirements to direct actions. 
• General understanding of the art and science of war to include: 
- Understanding of how the u.s. military and our potential allies organize to 
conduct military operations. 
- Understanding of the tactical, operational, and strategic characteristics of 
potential adversaries ranging from terrorists to world powers. 
- Understanding of the historical and contemporary role of the military in 
American society. 
Table 9-1. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (CONT) 
(Source: Author) 
141 Peter M Senge, "The Leaders New Work: Building Learning Organizations," Sloan Management Review, (Fall 
1990). 
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L Ousters of Skills, Knowledge, and Abilities for the Naval Officer of 2020 (CON]) 
(E) Information technology cluster 
• Ability to employ sensors to optimal advantage. 
• Ability to utilize C41 systems to obtain and disseminate information. 
• Ability to utilize information systems to direct weapons. 
• A general understanding of information technology and science to include topics on 
computers, satellites, etc. 
(F) Management Cluster 
• A general understanding of and the ability to apply modern management principles 
and techniques. 
• A general understanding of financial management, contract management, and 
general business practices. 
• A general understanding oflogistics management. 
(G) Communication cluster 
• Ability to communicate a vision and current reality. 
• A thorough understanding of the use of communications media: individual contact, 
meetings, video teleconferencing, e-mail, memos, etc. 
• Ability to express oneself clearly and concisely in both writing and speaking. 
Table 9-1. Clusters of Skills, Knowledge, Abilities for the Naval Officer of2020 (CONT) 
(Source: Author) 
a. Traditional Platform Centric Ouster 
The generalist naval officer of 2020 like the generalist naval officer of today 
will have to be capable of: understand how, and be able to drive and handle ships, submarines, 
and aircraft. Officers will have to be able to handle and maneuver their platforms as well as 
understand the engineering and operation of their platforms. In addition, officers will need a 
better understanding of the tactical employment of their platforms. 142 There is no substitute for 
competence in this cluster. It is the baseline capability for the URL officer/specialist in warfare. 
Without this capability, the other SKAA clusters are irrelevant. Unfortunately for the naval 
officer of 2020, the attainment of SKAAs is not a zero-sum game. The addition of required 
142 There is a perception among at least a few naval officers that there is not enough emphasis on tactical employment in 
the development of naval officers especially relatively junior ones. Lieutenant Jolm Hindinger in an October 1997 
United States Naval Institute Proceedings noted this lapse in tactical expertise at the Submarine Officer Advanced 
Course (Depar1ment Head School for Submarine Officers) where officers apparently failed even the most basic tactical 
exercises: 
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SKAAs in one area due to a change in the environment do not lead to reductions in SKAA in . 
other areas rather they build on each other. 
b. The Leadership auster 
Stories like the one about Commander Evans and the Johnston in Chapter IV 
stir the blood of any leader or officer just like the stories of the one anned, one eyed English 
naval hero Horatio Nelson. These men were absolutely courageous and in their day, great 
leaders. The problem is that all too often we model today's leadership after them. Yes, there are 
lessons to be learned from the exploits of these great men, but the days of solely relying on 
charismatic leadership are waning. In today's complex and uncertain world, there is too much 
information for one man to digest. In addition, there is no time for the information to travel up 
and down the chain of command so that the charismatic leader of old can act. The world has 
changed. Conflict in the Naval context is almost exclusively over the horizon and dispersed. 
Due to the nature of future conflict, decision making will have to be driven down the chain, in 
order for the Navy to be effective. Speed is absolutely essential. 
In ,addition, information technology has changed the rules of leadership. In the 
past, the chain of command has served as the conduit and filter for information flow between 
the upper and lower ranks. Today, any junior enlisted or officer can e-mail the highest levels 
within the Navy organization. The Marine Corps General's story in the previous chapter of the 
private first class e-mailing the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Commandant 
sending that message to all his generals is particularly germane in this context. The ability of 
subordinates to bypass the chain of command electronically is making the traditional role of the 
chain of command increasingly irrelevant. In some cases, e-mail has reduced the amount and 
quality of the inter-personal interaction which has been the hallmark of the traditional 
leadership approach. 
The major issue, that arises from the need for speed and therefore delegation of 
decision making and the relative irrelevance of the chain of command, is the leaders loss of 
control and the associated shift of power in the information age. This has and will continue to 
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have a significant impact on what it means to be a leader. Naval officers must adapt and find a 
new leadership model in order to fit into the Navy of2020. 
Peter Senge provides a potential new leadership model when he describes his 
vision of a learning organization. In the Senge model, the leader is not concerned with 
controlling the work of his organization. He ensures the organization's effectiveness through 
what he calls "The Leaders New Work" which is comprised of three roles. The first role is that 
of designer. As a designer, the leader is responsible for the designing of processes that (1) 
develop a vision and core values for the organization, (2) develop policies, strategies, and 
structures that translate guiding ideas into business decisions, and (3) develop effective learning 
processes. The leader is not in control of making these decisions. He is instead designing the 
processes to make these decisions. The second role of a leader is that of a teacher. As a 
teacher, the leader should "help people restructure their views of reality to see beyond the 
superficial conditions and events into the underlying causes of problems- and therefore to see 
new possibilities for shaping the future." The third role of a leader is that of a steward. 
According to Senge, the leader's stewardship operates on two levels: (1) stewardship for their . 
subordinates and (2) stewardship for the larger purpose of the organization.143 A critical 
component in "The Leaders New Work" is the ability to develop and embody a vision for it is 
this combined with the accurate view of reality that forms the creative tension that leads to 
generative learning. 
Another important aspect ofleadership that is emerging is the need for officers 
to be able to build, participate in, and lead multi-disciplinary teams. In the past, leaders have led 
organizations consisting of relatively homogenous officers. Aviators led aviators, surface 
warriors led surface warriors, and intelligence officers led intelligence officers. With the number 
of generalist officers potentially decreasing and the number of specialists potentially increasing 
as discussed earlier in this chapter, the need for and the growth of multidisciplinary teams is 
inevitable. As a senior military officer noted, the "officer of the future is going to have to deal in 
multi-disciplinary environments. He will be asked to do very, very different things from one 
143 Senge .. 
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mission to the next ... [and that is a skill set] that the officer corps of the future is going to have 
to be better at. " 
Another dimension in leadership that has garnered a great deal of attention in 
the past and will continue to demand the attention of naval leaders' in the future is the ability to 
lead and manage personnel from diverse backgrounds e.g. ethnicity, race, and sex. Population 
projections for the future predict that the non-white proportion of the population will grow by 
36% from 27.5% in 1998 to 37.6% in 2025. 144 Consequently, the ability to lead and manage 
personnel from diverse backgrounds will become more important as they make up more and 
more of the force. Several officers and officials that I interviewed noted the progress that the 
Navy needs to make in this area. They contend that the Navy has done relatively well in 
"tolerating" the integration of minorities, but it has fallen short in any effort to value and 
capitalize on diversity. In addition, the appropriate integration of women, particularly in recent 
years, has been difficult for the Navy to attain as evidenced by the examples of Tailhook and 
the repercussions associated with the death ofLT Kara Hultgreen. Naval officers need to be 
skilled in creating environments that value and capitalize on the diversity in the form of 
racial/ethnic minorities and in the form of women in uniform. This is crucial as the role of 
women in the Navy expands with more and more ships being outfitted to support gender 
integration. Unfortunately, today's Navy is still to a large degree a "white man's club." 
To be able to capitalize on diversity, the leader first needs to be aware of his 
own biases and emotional "baggage" and then he needs to be aware of the cultural and 
behavioral differences between racial/ethnic groups and/or genders. Through this, the leader 
can develop intercultural trust or inter-gender trust and a better cross-culturallcross-gender 
understanding. The officer can then develop skills in intercultura1!mter-gender communication 
and facilitation that will aid him in developing an environment that will capitalize on the 
contributions of people from diverse backgrounds. 145 
144 ''Population Projections of the United States by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin: 1995 to 2050." 
145 Cheryl D. Manning, "Managing Diversity in the United States Navy," Masters Thesis, (Naval Postgraduate School, 
March 1997), pp. 86-90, Beverly A Battaglia, Skills for Managing Multicultural Teams," Cultural Diversity at Work, 
v.4, (1992), and Charles Kreiner, Interview by author, Monterey, CA, April 18, 1998. 
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The final area in the leadership cluster is the need to understand the human. 
dimension of warfare and the ability to use this human dimension to one's own advantage. The 
underlying truth in understanding the human dimension in war is as William Tecumseh 
Sherman stated, "War is at best barbarism .. .Its glory is all moonshine. It is only those who have 
neither fired a shot nor heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded who cry aloud for blood, 
more vengeance, more desolation. War is hell." As such, war has a significant impact on the 
human psyche and can significantly reduce human effectiveness and therefore military 
effectiveness. In Achilles in Vietnam: Combat Trauma and the Undoing of Character, Dr. 
Jonathan Shay notes several leadership and organizational characteristics that prevented or 
alleviated the onset of combat trauma, most notably the maintaining of unit integrity. The 
officer of the future needs to understand the impact of war on the human psyche and how 
through leadership, teambuilding, and personnel management he can prevent or alleviate the 
onset of combat trauma and thus maintain combat effectiveness. 
c. Decision Making Ouster 
J11e naval officer of 2020 will have to be able to make· quick decisions in a 
dynamic and uncertain environment. Therefore, we need to treat decision making as a discrete 
event that is critical to mission success. Consequently, all naval officers require the tools of 
decision making especially at the junior level because that is where a great deal of the decisions 
will be made as we try to be respond with great speed to the dynamic and uncertain 
environment. These tools include an understanding of naturalistic{mtuitive decision making, for 
use in combat situations where speed is of the essence; an understanding of heuristic decision 
making and risk management, when the uncertainty is high but speed is not as essential; and 
finally officers will have to be skilled at rational analytical analysis for complex non-combat 
related decisions. 
d Integrative Ouster 
This skill cluster is related to the decision making cluster in that it also is the 
result of the migration of decision making down the chain of command. In the past, military 
force was integrated through a vertical hierarchy. With speed becoming the driving factor, 
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vertical hierarchy is becoming irrelevant. Integration in the future will be accomplished through 
self-synchronization by relatively junior personnel. Consequently, senior division officers and 
department head level personnel will need to be able to integrate naval, joint, and coalition 
forces in formulating, articulating, and linking mission requirements to direct actions. This 
capability requires that junior naval officers have a breadth of knowledge that they have never 
had before. They will have to understand at least to some degree the art and science of warfare. 
They will be required to have a thorough knowledge of how the U.S. and any potential allies 
organize and conduct military operations. Junior officers will have to an understanding of the 
tactical, operational, and strategic characteristics of potential adversaries ranging from terrorist 
non-governmental organizations to other world powers. Finally, they will have to understand 
the historical role of the military in American society with an emphasis on the importance of 
civil-military relations. 
e. Information Technology Cluster 
Information technology is the enabler for the speed that is going to make the 
Navy effective and relevant in the year 2020. As such, it is going to be a core competency for 
the Navy. We will need specialists in both information management and in information warfare. 
In addition, generalistJURL officers will require a thorough understanding of the information 
science and information teclu,tology that enables the speed of command that we need. In 
particular, generalist officers will have to able to employ a variety of sensors remote and local 
to their platform's optimal advantage. They will have to be able to utilize C4I systems to obtain 
and disseminate information, and finally, they will have to be able to use information obtained 
via the network to direct weapons, and they will have to be able to do this fast, very fast. 
f. Management Ouster 
Over the years, people have argued over the differences between leaders and 
managers and over which area, leadership or management, it is best to place emphasis. As 
introduced in Chapter IV, leadership in this context refers to the setting of system direction 
while management is the mastery of system design elements. Consequently, naval officers, in 
order to be leaders, have to be competent managers, first. This is a baseline capability and not a 
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competitor or detractor from leadership as so many have implied. As such, the naval officer of 
the future requires a general understanding of the modem principles and techniques of 
management. In particular, this includes an understanding of financial management, contract 
management, and general business practices, because as competitive sourcing/outsourcing 
becomes more widely done within the Department of Defense (this is inevitable because of the 
need for funds to re-capitalize the force), officers particularly specialists but even URL officers! 
specialists in warfare will need to be able to interact with and in some cases manage and lead 
personnel from the private sector. Finally, officers will need a general understanding oflogistic 
management because it is an essential dimension to the application of force, especially for the 
distances over which the United States military needs to be able to apply force. 
g. Communications cluster 
An essential dimension of management and leadership is the ability to 
communicate. This has been critical in the past, and as the information age overwhelms us with 
droves of more and more data, it will be critical in the future, probably more so. Naval officers 
need to appreciate the intricacies of communication especially with regards to the importance 
of shared schema in creating shared visions of reality and shared visions of the future. Officers 
need to understand that the highly active mind of the readerllistener is not only the decoder of 
what is trying to be communicated to him, but is also the supplier of much of the essential 
information that is not being written or spoken. l46 Therefore, an essential part of 
communication is the training and imbedding of a common schema in the entire 
organization. 147 For without this common schema, true dialogue within an organization is 
nearly impossible 
In addition, the officer of the future will require a thorough understanding of 
communications media, e.g. face to face, e-mail, and video teleconferencing. Each media 
146 A prime example of this is in the naval setting is phone talking. New personnel often have great difficulties 
understanding initially what is being said over sound powered phones. Over several days and months, these new 
personnel rapidly pick up the schema and are able to understand communications even when they are garbled. 
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choice has its own advantages and disadvantages and is appropriate in different situations. 148 
The leader needs to understand and be able to apply this knowledge to improve his 
effectiveness. Finally, the naval officer needs to be able to express himself clearly and concisely 
in both writing and speaking. Time is of the essence in the dynamic environment of the future. 
Officers require this skill to be successful, today and tomorrow. 
II. Attributes of the Naval Officer of 2020 
A Engenders Trust through 
• Honesty/ Integrity 
• Responsibility 
• HonorlDedication to Duty 
• Courage 
B. Inspires Loyalty 
C. Creative/Innovative 
D. Action-Oriented 
E. Views Their Self in Proportion 
F. Disciplined! Professional 
G. Mutuality/Systems Perspective 
Table 9-2. Attributes of the Naval Officer of2020 (Source: Author) 
k Attributes 
Attributes in this case refer to the characteristics that all naval officers should 
possess. As one senior officer remarked to me, "these are the price of admission. " 
• The first and most important attribute is that an officer engenders trust. There are 
two dimension to this attribute. The first, is that an officer engenders trust in his 
subordinates so that· they feel secure enough to make decisions on their own 
without fear of significant reprisals. The second, is that officers engender trust in 
their superiors and peers to make the "same kind of' decisions that either the 
superiors or their peers would make. It is important to note the difference between 
the "same decisions" and the "same kinds of decisions". The former implies a lack 
of freedom while the latter implies that the subordinate can show initiative and has 
147 E. D. Hirsch, "The Discovery of Schema," Readings in Managerial Communications, edited by Gail Fann Thomas, 
Jim Suchan, and Bob Banios Choplin, 2nd ed, (Simon and Schuster Custom Publishing: Needham Heights, MA, 
1997), pp. SI..{i3. 
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the freedom to act. Both dimensions of engendering trust are critical prerequisites 
for any learning or networked organization. Engendering trust, itself, has four 
prerequisite officer traits which if absent will prevent the development of 
engendering of trust. These traits are: 
1. Officers must be honest and have integrity no matter the 
consequences. 
2. Officers must be responsible for their actions. 
3. Officers must be honorable and dutiful. They must stand up for and 
do what they believe is right regardless of the repercussions. 
4. Officers must be courageous in combat and in everyday life. 
• Like today, officers must inspire loyalty to the mission, the Navy, and their country 
(patriotism). We are charged with going into hanns way. Loyalty is a vital 
ingredient in the glue that keeps us together. 
• To deal with the dynamic, complex, and uncertain environment of the future, 
officers must be creative and innovative to be successful. They must recognize that 
each situation that they encounter is not exactly the same as the last and that 
cookbook tactics and strategies, while at times are helpful, do not cover the full 
complexity of every scenario. 
• Naval Officers must be action oriented. The environment of the future demands 
speed and we need officers who are not afraid to make the tough decision even if 
they are the wrong decisions. In many cases, a wrong decision is easier to recover 
from than a decision put off 
• Officers need to view their self in proportion to the organization. Many people 
have cited the "evils" of careerism in the military. This is hypocrisy. The rational 
model of human behavior states that people do what is in their own perceived best 
148 Linda Kleebe, et aI., "Understanding Managers' Media Choices: A Symbolic Interactionist Perspective," Readings in 
Managerial Communications, edited by Gail Fann Thomas, Jim Suchan, and Bob Barrios Choplin, 2nd ed, (Simon 
and SchUster Custom Publishing: Needham Heights, MA, 1997), pp. 51-63. 
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interest. 149 Officers must instead put their best interest in perspective and be able to 
align their actions with the good of the organization in mind. 
• Leadership is hard and it takes a great deal of commitment. Officers must be 
disciplined and professional to survive it's rigors. 
• Officers need to have mutuality and be able to think using a systems perspective. 
They need to be able to see the grand scheme and where their organization and 
their actions fit in and be able to act for the greater good of the system. 
149 Allan c. Stockman, Introduction to Economics, (1he Dryden Press: Fort Worth, 19%), p. 23. 
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x. POllCY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
A.OVERVIEW 
The vision of the naval officer of 2020 presented in this thesis demands revolutionary 
change in Navy human resource management. The current system will not create the kind of 
officer we need in 2020. As a whole, our current system tends to hamper innovation and does 
not prepare junior officers for the decision making that they will have to do in the future. It is 
not congruent with the direction of the Navy or the future environment in which the Navy is 
going to operate. Consequently, the system requires drastic and radical change. This radical 
change does not, however, have to occur overnight and it would be disastrous if it did. We do 
not have a sufficient inventory of people who can operate in the future environment and in the 
future Navy. We need to take the systems approach and design processes that are congruent 
with our vision. In particular, we need to steer our personnel development and management 
systems in the right direction. With the right processes, we can get to 2020 with the officers 
that we need to succeed. 
B. PART 1: A SHARED VISION OF THE FUTURE NAVAL OFFICER 
The first step in our journey to the naval officer of 2020 is for the Navy to develop a 
shared vision of what will make the future officer successful. This vision needs to be 
understood and actively supported by the entire organization from the Chief of Naval 
Operations to the "nub" ensign in the fleet. To formulate this shared vision, the officer corps 
needs to conduct an open dialogue throughout the organization. This is not a time for top 
down directed change. A great deal of work needs to be done in this area. 
C. PART 2: THE DESIGN OF CONGRUENT PROCESSES 
Human resource management as described in Chapter II and Chapter V has 7 
functions: accession, development, promotion, evaluation, compensation, assignment, and 
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separation! transition. The manner in which each of these functions is conducted needs to be in 
congruence with the task, technology, structure, and people in the organization for the 
organization as a whole to be more effective. Therefore, comprehensive studies need to be 
conducted that detennine how best to align human resource management with the 
organization's shared vision. My recommendations for aligning human resource management 
with the Navy's direction are summarized in Table 10-1. The overarching conclusion, however, 
is that every aspect of human resource management should be decentralized and directly 
related to performance in one way or another, either group performance or individual 
performance. Every aspect of our system should emphasize effectiveness, collaboration, and 
efficiency. 
1. Reshape the Officer Corps 
As discussed in the two previous chapters, our Navy will require more specialists in the 
officer corps of 2020. Where will we get these specialists? We will get them from the URL 
after their department head tours. A lateral transfer after the division officer tour or preferably 
the department head tour ensures that the specialists will have a basic understanding of what 
operating forces do and the constraints on operating forces. We will then educate and train 
these former URL officers in specialties in information operations, fleet support, or 
engineering. Finally, we will need to create viable career paths to flag rank for these officers to 
demonstrate that they are a vital part of the organization. The remaining URL/specialists in 
warfare officers will shift generally to shore duties that involve the honing of their warfighting 
skills or the creation of warfighting skills in others. They should obtain graduate degrees in 
fields that enhance their warfighting ability. In addition, the best officers should periodically be 
sent to schools where the next generation of warriors in their respective community are being 
educated and trained. 
In addition, a community or communities need to be created that are charged with 
information systems management, information systems defense, and offensive information war. 
As discussed earlier, there is an initiative currently being pursued that will do this, but it has not 
come to fruition as of yet. We need to fill these information technology communities using 
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Recommendations 
1. Reshape the officer corps. 
• Increase the population of specialists through post division officer or preferably 
post-department head lateral transfer of URL officers to the RL. Educate and 
train them in specialties such as: information operations, fleet support, or 
engineering and create viable career paths for these officers to flag rank. 
• Shift the remaining URL/specialist in warfare officers to shore duties that involve 
the honing of their warfighting skills or the creation of warfighting skills in others. 
• Create a community or communities charged with information systems 
management, information systems defense, and offensive information war 
2. Access the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• The Navy needs to use all means to meet its officer diversity goals in its 12/12/5 
Policy. In addition, the Navy needs to incorporate the accession of women 
officers into its diversity programs. 
3. Develop the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Integrate the indoctrination of the officer corps by placing the Naval Academy 
under the cognizance of the Director of Naval Training (N7). 
• Charge the officer accession sources and the initial and intermediate level skills 
courses like the Submarine Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Surface' 
Warfare Officer School's Division Officer and Department Head Courses with 
developing curriculum that support the SKAAs of the new naval officer. Enlarge 
program scope and length as necessary. 
• Conduct further study on the development of intuitivelmi.turalistic decision 
making. Design programs to create these abilities at all levels within the officer 
corps. 
• Increase tour length at sea and shore. Consider means to reduce the impact of 
longer tours on quality of life by looking at ways to reduce OP1EMPO/ 
PERS1EMPO through the use of multi-crew ships. 
• Assign all generalist officers and specialist officers as applicable to two 
professional military education experiences. The first should be more oriented 
toward the technical and science aspects of war while the later experience should 
be oriented toward the strategic art of war. Specialist officers as a minimum 
should have at least 'one professional military education experiences in their area 
of specialization. 
Table 10-1. Recommendations (Source: Author) 
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Recommendations (CONT) 
3. Develop the Naval Officer of 2020. (CONT) 
• Develop competency to manage diversity in all officers through extensive and on-
going diversity training. 
4. Promote the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Advise Congress to revise or rescind DOPMA. 
• Consider establishing a rank-in-position promotion system rather than a rank-in-
person promotion system or if that is not feasible, enlarge promotion zones and 
adjust promotion rate targets as necessary to support a more stable up and stay 
career structure. 
5. Assign the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Consider shifting to a more decentralized assignment process whereby the officer 
applies for his next position directly to his prospective senior through the use of 
information technology. 150 
6. Compensate the Naval Officer of2020. 
• Base pay at least some extent on performance rather than totally on longevity. 
This performance measure can be either group or individual based depending on 
the context of the situation. 
• Reduce the emphasis on non-pecuniary benefits and shift this money to raise 
regular military compensation. 
7. Evaluate the naval Officer of 2020. 
• Ensure that the Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale currently in use reflects our 
vision of the successful naval officer of2020. 
• Consider the use of a 360 degree evaluation system. 
8. Separate! Transition the Naval Officer of 2020. 
• Increase career length to at least 35 years and perhaps longer to maximize the 
utilization of the experience that we will be building in our specialists and our 
generalist warfighters. 
• Consider shifting retirement benefits to either a defined contribution plan like a 
401K or maintain a defined benefits plan that vests somewhere between the 5 and 
10 year point but does not payout benefits until actual retirement age. 
Table 10-1. Recommendations (CONT) (Source: Author) 
ISO Jules Borak, Interview by author, Naval Postgraduate School, 29 April 1998. 
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inputs from the cryptology community, parts of the fleet support community, and officers from 
the unrestricted line. In addition, we should consider the use of lateral entry from the civilian 
sector, as necessary, to cover areas of expertise not sufficiently covered by uniformed 
expertise. 
2. Access the Naval Officer of 2020 
The Navy needs to use all means to meet its officer diversity goals in its 12112/5 Policy, 
and it needs to incorporate the accession of women officers into its diversity programs. This is 
crucial because the minority representation within our enlisted force needs role models. In 
addition, the Navy and the military need credibility in the eyes of Congress and the American 
people, and that credibility comes from the Navy and the military reflecting society. Without 
that credibility, it may become hard to garner the resources necessary to successfully 
accomplish our mission. Finally and most importantly, diversity is critical to mission success in 
that it often is accompanied by unconventional thinking that often provides us with the answers 
to complex problems. Consequently, we need to value and capitalize on diversity and use it to 
our advantage. 
3. Develop the Naval Officer of 2020 
We should integrate the indoctrination of the officer corps by placing the Naval 
Academy under the cognizance of Director of Naval Training (N7). In our quest to reach the 
naval officer of 2020, we need to all move in the same direction toward our shared vision. 
Competition between the Naval Academy and CNET is counter-productive to these purposes. 
In addition, our officer accession sources and the initial and intermediate level skills courses like 
the Submarine Officer Basic and Advanced Courses and the Surface Warfare Officer School's 
Division Officer and Department Head Courses need to be charged with developing curricula 
that support the SKAAs of the naval officer of 2020. This will require an enlarging of some of 
these programs with regards to scope and length. All URL officers/specialists in warfare and 
specialist officers as applicable will need to be assigned to at least two professional military 
education experiences. The first should be more oriented toward the technical and science 
aspects of war possibly at the Naval Postgraduate School while the later experience should be 
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oriented toward the strategic art of war possibly at one of the War Colleges. Specialist officers· 
as a minimum should have at least one professional military education experiences in their area 
of specialization. This is education should most likely take place at the Naval Postgraduate 
School due to the DoD focused education that is obtained there. 
We need to conduct further study on the development of intuitive/naturalistic decision 
making, and design programs to create these abilities at all levels within the officer corps. This 
is an area of much promise at least on the surface. It may aid us greatly in achieving the speed 
of command that we will so desperately need in the future environment. 
We need to increase tour length at sea and shore. The current Naval Officer Career 
Path breeds a "minimalist" philosophy among officers. Officers tend to be risk adverse and lack 
empowerment due to sea and shore tours that are too short to develop officers properly and 
too short for the officer to risk changing the system and reaping the subsequent benefits. Under 
the current system, there is little incentive for the officer to "own" the performance of their unit 
in any long-term sense. The problem with this, however, is the spillover effect on retention. The 
perception, and it is probably right, is that longer at sea times will lead to a reduction in quality 
of life which will Cause significant problems with officer retention. To reduce the impact of 
longer tours on quality of life, we need to consider means to reduce OPTEMPO/ 
PERSTEMPO possibly through the use of multi-crew ships. 
Finally, we need to develop the competency to manage diversity in all officers through 
extensive and on-going diversity training. This development needs to occur for two reasons. 
First, the potential racial/ethnic and the potential female populations within the Navy are 
increasing. We as officers need to be able to understand and lead these groups of minorities and 
women. Second and potentially more important, the rapid infusion of racial ethnic minorities 
and women into any organization often leads to white males becoming angry and disengaging 
from the organization. 151 The Navy can not afford to have any portion of its population 
disengaging from the organization. We need managing diversity training for white males, in 
151 Frederick R Lynch, Invisible Victims: White Males and the Crisis of Affirmative Action, (Praeger: New York, 1991), 
except in Taylor Cox and Ruby Beale, Developing Competency to Manage Diversity, (Berret-Koehler Publishers, Inc.: 
San Francisco, CA, 1997), pp. 104-105. 
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particular, to ensure that they do not feel threatened and that they remain engaged in the Navy 
of 2020. Navy leadership must model behavior that indicates authentic acceptance of 
differences and demonstrates an understanding of the connection between valuing differences 
and increasing the probability of success of the Navy's missions. 
4. Promote the Naval Officer of 2020 
We need to advise Congress to revise or rescind DOPMA. It greatly restricts our 
flexibility in tailoring a system to support our strategy through strategic human resource 
management. Second, we need to consider establishing a rank-in-position promotion system 
rather than a rank-in-person promotion system. A rank-in-position system would eliminate the 
need for promotion boards. An individual's rank would be dependent on the level of 
responsibility associated with his current position. As such, officers would have more incentive 
to perform because if they are not selected for a new assignment at the same level or a more 
advanced level, they would be demoted to the rank of the position that they are qualified for. 
This would give us a great deal more flexibility in rewarding innovation and good performance 
as it is more directly based on performance than the current rank-in-person system, and it 
would account for the fact that not everyone develops at the same rate. If a rank-in-position is 
found not feasible, we should enlarge promotion zones and adjust promotion rate targets as 
necessary to support a more stable up and stay career structure as Thie et al. suggested in their 
1994 study of officer career management systems. 152 
5. Assign the Naval Officer of 2020 
Coupled with the rank in position promotion system, we need to consider shifting to a 
more decentralized assignment process whereby the officer would apply for his next position 
directly to his prospective senior through the use of technology. This would directly tie 
performance to assignment and thus give the individual officer added incentives to perform 
because his rank is dependent on performance. In addition, it would give seniors the ability to 
build and tailor their own teams for mission accomplishment. Finally, it would serve as a 
152 ThieandBrown, pp. 197-199. 
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motivator for commanders/seniors to perform well because if they do not, they will have 
difficulty attracting qualified personnel. 
6. Compensate the Naval Officer of 2020 
We need to base pay at least to some extent on performance rather than totally on 
longevity. There can still be a component of pay that is based on longevity to insure internal 
equity, but there should be a variable component under the control of the unit commander that 
is dependent on some performance measure. This performance measure can be either group 
based or individual based depending on the context of the performance. This change will 
motivate officers to perform and innovate because perfonnance means money. In addition, 
commanders could use it under the decentralized assignment process to attract quality 
personnel or if necessary use it as a wage differential to overcome unattractiveness of some 
duty stations. 
Outsourcing or competitive sourcing is increasing the amount of contact between 
civilian workers and military personnel. This has led to a greater awareness of military 
personnel to the opportunities in the civilian sector. When military personnel compare civilian 
wages to military wages, the military wages invariably come up short. The truth, however, is 
that the military-civilian wage gap is not as large as it seems to many because of the relatively 
large amount of non-pecuniary benefits that military personnel are entitled to. Unfortunately, 
the truth will not stem the tide of people who will leave because of perceived differentials and 
opportunities on the outside. To combat this potential loss of people, we need to be on the 
same playing field as the civilian sector. We should reduce the emphasis on non-pecuniary 
benefits and shift this money to raise regular military compensation so that our people when 
comparing military and civilian wages can "compare apples to apples instead of oranges and 
apples." An added benefit to this shift in compensation is the potential savings in military 
infrastructure. 
7. Evaluate the Naval Officer 0(2020 
We need to ensure that the Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale currently in use 
reflects our vision of the successful naval officer of 2020. Evaluation is a critical aspect in 
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validating to the entire officer corps what it takes to be successful. If evaluations do not reflect 
our shared vision of the SKAAs of the successful naval officer, officers will have a significant 
incentive to undermine the attainment of the shared vision. In addition we should consider 
implementing a 360 degree evaluation system. A 360 degree evaluation system would consist 
of subordinate evaluations of the officer, peer evaluations of the officer, in addition to the 
standard senior evaluation. As such, this would incentivize officers to be better stewards for all 
parts of the system and would provide a great deal more feedback for the officer to learn about 
their performance. 
8. Separate! Transition the Naval Officer of 2020 
In order to maximize the utilization of the experience that we will be building in our 
specialists and our generalist warfighters, we need to increase the allowed career length of our 
non-flag officers to at least 35 years and perhaps longer. We are going to invest significant 
amounts of time and money into these officers. It is counterproductive to force them to leave 
while they can still contribute to mission accomplishment. In a related concept, we need to 
seriously consider shifting retirement benefits to either a defined contribution plan like a 401K 
or maintain a defined benefits plan that vests somewhere between the 5 and 10 year point and . 
has an increasing benefits based on time in service but does not payout benefits until actual 
retirement age. The current system gives people a very powerful incentive to leave at the 20 
year mark. They get retirement benefits immediately and they are still young enough after 20 
years in the military to pursue a second career. This does not lead to an effective nor efficient 
use of human capital. Either the defined contribution plan or the 5-10 year vesting plan has the 
potential to at least to support our future shared vision. Both of these plans would give officers 
the incentive to stay past 20 years. In addition, it would reduce the amount of officers who are 
just waiting to retire with 18 and 19 years of service. Finally, both of these plans are so 
different from the current plan that it would be difficult to assess the impact of any change an 
individual officer's career. Consequently, any potential effect on retention would be minimized. 
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C. A FINAL WORD 
Our environment has changed and will continue to change. Our tasks, technology, and 
structure are changing with Joint Vision 2010 and Network Centric Watfare to meet the 
challenges of the dynamic and uncertain future. We need to align our people and human 
resource management with technology and structure to transform the Navy to the Generative 
Configuration. We as an organization need to be effective, collaborative, and efficient in order 
to be successful. Speed and responsiveness need to permeate through every "nook and cranny" 
of the organization. This requires that we develop a shared vision of the future naval officer and 
that we align our human resource management with this vision. The needed changes will 
require a great deal of open dialogue and comprehensive research. 
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APPENDIX A: TECHNOLOGICAL TOOLS OF TODAY'S NAVY 
A.OVERVIEW 
This appendix is a brief description of the technology currently in the force in the fonn 
ofplatfonns, weapons, and C4ISR systems. It is not a complete list of Navy technology. The 
purpose of this section is to give the reader a feel for the Navy's current level of technology. 
The information is unclassified and was predominantly obtained from the United States Navy 
Homepage and Norman Palmar's The Ships and Aircraft of the u.s. Fleet (I987) which was 
published by the United States Naval Institute Press. 
B. THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER AND THE NAVAL TACTICAL AVIATION WING 
The centerpiece of the Navy's warfighting force has been and is the aircraft carrier and 
its attendant naval tactical aviation wing. Since the battle of Midway Island in 1942, United 
States aircraft carriers have dominated the world's oceans. The key to this dominance has been 
the steam powered catapult. 
"One of the reasons American carriers have been so effective is because the 
aircraft that have flown off of them have been as capable as land-based 
aircraft. Land-based aircraft- even-single engine fighters without heavy bomb 
loads- are heavy, which means that they need long runways for their engines to 
reach takeoff speed. These long runways are not available on carriers. The 
American innovation, simple in conception, complex in design, and 
revolutionary in political significance, was the steam-powered catapult. What 
the catapult did was accelerate the aircraft dramatically, so that, with its engine 
at full throttle, it would be hurled off the end of the carrier deck at a speed 
sufficient to make it airborne. The stresses involved in takeoff and landing 
meant that aircraft had to be particularly robust, designed to withstand high g's. 
This drove up the price of carriers and their planes dramatically. But because of 
the catapult, attack aircraft could cany substantial tonnage of munitions to the 
target. II 153 
153 Friedman, p. 181. 
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Aircraft carriers have given the Navy the ability to conduct strike and sea control missions . 
independent of land bases. This capability has contributed significantly to the national military 
strategy. 
1. Aircraft Carriers 
The primary United States aircraft carrier in the current inventory is the Nimitz Class 
aircraft carrier. The Nimitz and her six sister ships are powered by two water-cooled nuclear 
reactors which can propel the ship up to speeds of greater than 30 knots. The Nimitz is 
manned with 3,200 ships company personnel and 2,480 air wing personnel. The ship carries 
approximately 85 aircraft in addition to Sea Sparrow surface to air missiles and the Phalanx 
Close-In-Weapons-System (CIWS). The Nimitz first deployed in 1975 and there are currently 
two new Nimitz Class carriers under construction. 
The other nuclear power aircraft carrier is the Enterprise which was first deployed in 
1961. The Enterprise is powered by eight water-cooled nuclear reactors and like the Nimitz 
can reach speeds greater than 30 knots. The ships is manned with 3,350 in the ships company 
and 2,480 in the air wing. The Enterprise also like the Nimitz carries and air wing of 85 
aircraft and is armed with both the Sea Sparrow missile and the Phalanx CIWS. 
The four remaining carriers are conventional powered and are members of the 
Forrestal Class, the Kitty Hawk Class, and the John F. Kennedy Class. The first ship of each 
class was first deployed in 1955, 1961, and 1968 respectively. Each carrier is powered by eight 
boilers and, like their nuclear powered brethren, they can reach speeds greater than 30 knots. 
These ships are manned with a ships crew that ranges from 3,019 to 3,117 personnel and all 
have an air wing of2,480 personnel. The Forrestal Class Carrier Independence has 75 aircraft 
while the remaining two classes have 85 aircraft. All these carriers have both Sea Sparrow 
missiles and the Phalanx CIWS. 
2. Strike Aircraft 
The strike aircraft of the Navy arsenal is the F/A-18 Hornet, The Hornet is an all-
weather fighter and attack aircraft that either seats one or two aviators depending on the 
model. It was designed for traditional strike applications such as interdiction and close air 
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support without compromising its fighter capabilities. The Hornet is powered by two turbofan 
engines that give it a range of 1,379 nautical miles as a fighter and 1,333 nautical miles as a 
strike aircraft. In addition, the Hornet can reach speeds greater than Mach 1.7. It is armed with 
a 20 mm canon and can carry a myriad of missiles weighing up to 17,000 pounds not including 
the two AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles on the wingtips. The ordnance that the Hornet can deliver 
are listed in Table A-I. 
F/A-18 Ordnance 
AIM-9 Sidewinder air to air missile 
AIM-7 Sparrow air to air missile 
AIM-120 AlvfRAAM air to air missile154 
AGM-84D Harpoon Anti-ship missile 
AGM-84E SLAM! SLAM-ER Stand-off Land Attack Missile 
AGM-65 Maverick Guided Missile 
AGM-88 HARMHigh Speed Anti-Radiation missile 
AGM-45 Shrike Anti-Radiation Missile 
AGM-62 Walleye Glide Bomb 
Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) 
Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) 
Table A-I. F/A-18 Ordnance (Source: ''Navy Fact File," UnitedStatesNavyHomepage, April 
1998) 
The A and B models first saw service in 1983 and the C and D models first became operational 
in 1987. 
3. Fighter Aircraft 
In addition to the Hornet, the Navy uses the F-14 Tomcat in the fighter aircraft role. 
The F-14 Tomcat is a supersonic, twin engine, variable sweep wing, two seated fighter 
designed to attack and destroy enemy aircraft at night and all weather conditions. The two 
turbofan engines with afterburners give the Tomcat a range of 500 nautical miles in the air 
intercept configuration at speeds up to Mach 2.4. It is armed with a 20 mm canon and up to 
154 AMRAAM is an abbreviation for Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile. 
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13,000 pounds of AIM-54 Phoenix missiles, AIM-7 Sparrow missiles, AIM-9 Sidewinder 
missiles, and/or air to ground ordinance. The Tomcat was first deployed in 1973. 
4. Carrier Based Fixed Wing Undersea Warfare Aircraft 
The primary carrier based fixed wing asset used in the Undersea Warfare role is the S-
3B Viking. The Viking is extremely versatile aircraft that can in addition to the undersea 
warfare role be used as an armed scout in the anti-surface role as well as the capability of being 
equipped for tanking, mining, and limited electronic surveillance. 155 The four seat aircraft is 
powered by two turbofan engines that give the aircraft a range of2,300 nautical miles at speeds 
of up to 450 knots. The Viking can be loaded with almost 4,000 pounds of ordnance including 
the AGM-84 Harpoon missile, the AGM-65 Maverick missile, the MK-46 torpedo, the MK~ 
50 torpedo, in addition to mines, rockets, and conventional bombs. The aircraft was first 
deployed in 1975. 
5. Carrier Based Electronic Warfare Aircraft 
The Navy depends on two aircraft to perform in the electronic warfare role. The first 
one is the E-2C Hawkeye. The Hawkeye provides airborne early warning, command and 
controL surface surveillance coordination, strike and interceptor control, and search and rescue. 
The Hawkeye has a crew of five and has two turboprop engines that give it a range of 200 
nautical miles with an on station time of six hours at speeds of up to 300 knots. The distinctive 
feature of the E-2C is the round APS-125 radar saucer mounted on the top of the aircraft. The 
Hawkeye is not armed and was first deployed in 1964. 
The second is the EA-6B Prowler which is the Navy's electronic counter-measure 
aircraft. The Prowler provides an umbrella of protection over strike aircraft and ships by 
jamming enemy radar, electronic data links, and communications. The aircraft carries a crew of 
four and is basically a modification of the now retired A-6 Intruder airframe with two turbojet 
engines. The EA-6 has a range of over 1,000 nautical miles with speeds of up to 500 knots. 
155 When the S-3B is outfitted for electronic smveillance, the aircraft is redesignated to be an ES-3 Shadow. The prirnaty 
difference between a Viking and a Shadow is that the bomb bay has been converted to avionics racks. 
172 
The aircraft can be anned with two AGM-88A HARM missiles and was first operational in 
1971. 
6. Weapons of the Naval Tactical Aviation Wing 
The weapons of choice today in the Navy's arsenal are precision guided munitions of 
both the air to air and the air to ground categories. Air to air missile are divided into ranges: 
long range, medium range, and short range. The following table, Table A-2, summarizes the 
key characteristic of each air to air missile: 










Primary Function Warhead Range Guidance System Date 
Long Range 
Air to Air 
Medium Range 
Air to Air 
Medium Range 
Air to Air 
Short Range 
Air to Air 
Deployed 
135lbs 100 NM Semi-Active! 1974 
Active Horning 
30-501bs 40 NM Command-Inertial! 1991 
Active Radar Horning 
90lbs 30 NM Semi-Active 1976 
20.81bs 10 NM Infra-red 1956 
Table A-2. Air to Air Missiles of the Carrier Tactical Aviation Wmg (Source: "Navy Fact 
File," United States Navy Website and Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. 
Fleet 14th ed.) 
The air to ground missiles of the carrier air wing are divided into anti-ship missiles and air to 
ground missiles. Table A-3 summarizes the key characteristic of each anti-ship and air to 
ground missile. 
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Anti-ship and Air to Ground Missiles of the Carrier Tactical Aviation Wing 






























60 NM High Subsonic Active Terrnina1! 1985 
Radar Homing 
60 NM/ High Subsonic Inertial Navigation 1993 
150 NM with GPS/ Infrared 
Terminal Guidance 
17NM Classified Electro-optical! 
Infrared! 
Laser Guided 
80NM 760 mph Radar Homing 
1972 
1985 
TableA-3. Anti-ship and Air to Ground Missiles of the Carrier Tactical Aviation Wmg 
(Source: Derived from "Navy Fact File," United States Navy Website and Norman Polmar, The 
Ships and Aircraft of the u.s. Fleet 14th ed.) 
C. LAND BASED AVIATION 
1. Undersea Warfare and Anti-Surface Aircraft 
The land based Undersea Warfare and Anti-Surface aircraft in the United States Navy 
arsenal is the P-3C Orion. The Orion is powered by four turboprop engines that give its twelve 
man crew an endurance of fourteen hours at speeds of up to 405 knots. In order to detect 
surface ships and submarines, the P-3C has the APS-U5 I-Band radar, the Directional 
Frequency and Ranging Sonobuoys, and the Magnetic Anomaly Detection System. The P-3C 
is armed with up to 20,000 lbs of MK-46 torpedoes, the AGM-84D Harpoon missiles, AGM-
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65 Maverick Guided Missiles, depth charges, and mines. The P-3C Orion was first deployed in . 
1969. 
2. Airborne Command Post 
The airborne command post for the nation's military is the Navy's E-6A Mercury 
aircraft. The mission of these airborne command posts is to provide secure, survivable, jam 
resistant strategic communications relay for fleet ballistic missile submarines and other parts of 
the nations strategic nuclear forces. The aircraft is a converted commercial Boeing 707 with a 
low frequency communications system and wire antenna several thousand feet long that is 
winched in and out of the aircraft. The aircraft has a range of 6,600 nautical miles with a loiter 
time of six hours. The E-6A was first accepted in 1989. 
3. Logistic Aircraft 
The fixed wing logistics aircraft of the Navy are the C-2A Greyhound, the C-130 
Hercules, and the C-9 Sky train. The C-2A is a two engine carrier capable logistics aircraft 
while the C-130 is one of the most widely flown military transports. The C-9 is the military 
version of the cormnercial DC-9 and is largely used for personnel transport. 
D. ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT 
1. Ship Based Helicopters 
The primary helicopter of the force is the SH-60 Seahawk. The Seahawk is a twin-
engine helicopter with a crew of three which is used for undersea warfare, search and rescue, 
drug interdiction, anti-surface warfare, cargo lift, and special operations. The SH-60B is 
operated from cruisers, destroyers, and frigates while the SH-60F is carrier based. The top 
speed of the Seahawk is 180 knots and it has a range of about 380 nautical miles. The Seahawk 
can be equipped to carry three MK-46 torpedoes and is usually outfitted with two 7.62 mm 
machine guns in the windows. The SH-60 was first received in 1983. The other two multi-
purpose helicopters in the fleet are the SH-2G Seasprite with a crew of three and the H-3H Sea 
King with a crew of four. The Seasprite is typically deployed on a surface combatant and is 
used in undersea warfare, anti-surface warfare, and over-the-horizon targeting role while the 
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Sea King is used for helicopter combat recovery, utility and torpedo recovery, carrier based 
undersea warfare, and search and rescue. The top speed of the Seasprite is 150 knots while the 
top speed of the Sea King is 136 mph. The range of the two helicopters is 340 nautical miles 
and 542 nautical miles, respectively. Both helicopters can be armed with two MK-46 
torpedoes. The SH-2 was first operational in 1962 while the H-3H was first operational in 
1961. 
As previously mentioned, the primary weapon of the Navy's helicopters is the MK-46 
torpedo. The MK -46 is a n air and ship launched light weight torpedo with an active or passive 
acoustic homing system. The torpedo has range of8,000 yards at speeds greater than 28 knots. 
It is armed with a 98 lbs high explosive warhead. The Mk -46 is slowly being replaced by the 
MK-50 light weight torpedo. The MK-50 has an active or passive homing system and can 
travel faster than 40 knots. The range of the MK-50 is currently classified. In addition to 
torpedoes, naval helicopters can be equipped with the Penguin Anti-ship missile. The Penguin 
is a inertial and infrared guided missile with a range of 21.7 nautical miles at speeds of up to 
Mach 1.2. The warhead on the Penguin is 265 lbs of semi-armor piecing explosive. The. 
Penguin was deployed in 1993. 
2. Mine countermeasure Helicopters 
The MH-53E Sea Dragon is the Navy's airborne mine countermeasure platform with 
the capability of pulling the MK 105 minesweeping sled and the MK 103 minesweeping 
system. In addition to mineclearing, the Sea Dragon can be used to carry a payloads of up to 
10 tons. The three engine MH-53E has a range of 1,120 nautical miles at speeds up to 150 
knots. The Sea Dragon was first deployed in 1983. 
3. Logistics Helicopters 
The logistics helicopter of the fleet is still the four man CH-46 DIE Sea Knight. The 
Sea Knight is typically used in the vertical replenishment role but can be used for delivery of 
personnel. The helicopter has two rotors with two engines that give the aircraft a ferry range of 
600 nautical miles at speeds of up to 145 knots. The Sea Knight was first received by the Navy 
in 1961. 
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E. SURFACE SHIPS 
1. Combatants 
Surface combatants are broken down by size and mission into three categories: 
cruisers, destroyers, and frigates. Cruisers and destroyers are multi-mission combatants that 
perform the traditional roles of anti-air warfare, anti-surface warfare, strike warfare, and 
undersea warfare. Frigates are smaller and are usually relegated to primarily undersea warfare. 
Currently, the Navy has three types of cruisers: the Ticonderoga Class, the Virginia 
Class, and the California Class. The Ticonderoga Class is powered by four gas turbine engines 
while the Virginia and California Classes are powered by two water cooled nuclear reactors. 
All three classes can go in excess of30 knots. Additionally, the Ticonderoga Class cruisers are 
coupled with the AEGIS combat system. The AEGIS combat system is an advanced, 
automatic detection and tracking, multi-function phased array radar with the ability to track 
over 100 targets. It is the center of the Battlegroups anti-air capability. The armament on the 
cruisers is summarized in Table A-4. 
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Cruiser Armament 
Oass Missile Launcher Missiles Guns Torpedoes 
Ticonderoga MK26Twin Standard 2 :MK 45 5" Guns 6 MK46 
(CG47-CG51) Rail Missile ASROC 2 Phalanx CIWS Torpedoes 
Launcher Tomahawk 
Ticonderoga MK41 Vertical Standard 2:MK45 5" Guns 6 MK46 
(CG52-CG73) Launching System ASROC 2 Phalanx CIWS Torpedoes 
Tomahawk 
Virginia MK26Twin Standard 2 :MK.45 5" Guns 6 MK46 
Rail Missile ASROC 2 Phalanx CIWS Torpedoes 
Launcher Harpoon 




California MK26Twin Standard 2 MK 45 5" Guns 4 MK46 
Rail Missile Harpoon 2 Phalanx CIWS Torpedoes 
Launcher Tomahawk 






Table A-4: Cruiser Armament (Source: Derived from "Navy Fact File," United States Navy 
Website and Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the u.s. Fleet 14th ed.) 
The Ticonderoga was first deployed in 1983 while the Virginia and the California were first 
deployed in 1976 and 1974, respectively. 
In addition to cruisers, the Navy currently has three classes of destroyers: the Arleigh 
Burke Class, the Kidd Class and the Spruance Class. The Arleigh Burke Class is a guided 
missile destroyer with the AEGIS combat system similar to the Ticonderoga Class cruiser. All 
three classes are powered by gas turbine engines that can sustain speeds of greater than 30 
knots. The Arleigh Burke differs in armament from the Ticonderoga class in that it has fewer 
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vertical launch cells and it has only one 5" gun. Several of the Spruances have been backfitted 
with a vertical launch system but some only have a Sea Sparrow Box Launcher. For 
Spruances without the vertical launch system, Tomahawk armored box launchers have been 
installed to give the destroyer a strike capability. The Kidd Class is equipped with MK26 twin 
rail missile launchers like the early Ticonderoga Class cruisers. In addition all three destroyers 
are equipped with the Harpoon missile quad launchers. The Arleigh Burke was first deployed 
in 1991 while theKidd and the Spruance were first deployed in 1981 and 1975, respectively. 
The sole frigate of the Navy is the Oliver Hazard Perry Class and this platform is being 
phased out due to its limited capabilities. The FFG's are powered by two gas turbine engines 
that can propel the class at speeds up to 29 knots. The Perry Class has some anti-air capability 
with the :MK13 single rail missile launcher, but it has predominantly been used in the undersea 
warfare role. In addition to the :MK13, the Perry Class is armed with the 76 mm 010 melera 
rapid fire gun, four Harpoon missiles, one Phalanx CIWS, and six :MK46 torpedoes. The first 
Perry Class was deployed in 1977. 
The combatants of the Navy are currently armed with precision guided munitions and 
more conventional naval guns. Table A-5 summarizes the capabilities of current surface ship. 
weapons. 
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Weapons of the Surface Fleet 
Weapons Primary Speed! Date 
System Function Warhead Range Rate of Guidance Deployed 
Fire 
BGM-109 Land Attack 1,000 lbs of 870NM 550 :tv1PH Inertial, 1986 
Tomahawk and Anti-ship High Explosives TERCOM, 1995 
Cruise or a Submunitions DSMAC, for 
Missile Dispenser GPSfor Block 
Block ill ill 
BGM-84D Anti-ship 488lbs 60NM High Active! 1985 
Harpoon Subsonic Terminal 
Radar Homing 
SM-l/2 MR Medium High 15-20NMI Super- Semi- 1970 
Standard range Explosive 40-90NM sonic Active (SM-
Missile Surface to Radar IMR) 
Air Homing 1981 
(SM-2MR) 
SM-1I2 ER Long High 65-100NM Super- Inertial! 1981 
Standard Range Explosive sonic Semi-
Missile Surface to Active 
Air Radar 
Homing 
RUR-5A Undersea MK46 6NM 40 knots Active/ 1961 
ASROC Warfare Torpedo Passive 
Missile! Acoustic 
Torpedo Homing 
Table A-5. Weapons of the Surface Fleet (Source: Derived from ''Navy Fact File," United 
States Navy Website and Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft of the Us. Fleet 14th ed.) 
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Weapons of the Surface Fleet (CONT) 
Weapons Primary Speed'· Date 
System Function Warhead Range Rate of Guidance Deployed 
Fire 
MK45 Naval Gunfire 5" shells 13NM 16-20 N/A 1971 
5"Gun Rounds 
per Minute 
MK75 Naval Gunfire 76mm shells 10NM 80 N/A 1978 
76mm Rounds 
Oto Melera per Minute 
Phalanx Terminal 20mm Classified 3,000 to N/A 1980 
CIWS Anti-Air APDS shells156 4,500 
Defense Rounds 
per Minute 
MK38 Heavy 25 mm shells 2700 yards 175 N/A 1986 
25mm Machine Gun Rounds 
Machine Gun per Minute 
Table A-5. Weapons of the Surface Fleet (CaNT) (Source: Derived from "Navy Fact File," 
United States Navy Website and Norman Polmar, The Ships and Aircraft oj the U.S. Fleet 
14th ed.) 
2. Amphibious Ships 
Amphibious Ships come in three major categories: Amphibious Assault ships, 
Amphibious Transport Docks, and Dock Landing Ships. The Amphibious Assault ships are 
further subdivided into LHA's, LHD's, and LPH's. These ships are primary landing ships and 
resemble small aircraft carriers. Their primary function is to put troops ashore with Landing 
Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vehicles and support them with Marine AV -8B Harrier VSTOL 
(Vertica1 and Short Take Off and Landing) aircraft and Marine combat helicopters. These ships 
can also perform sea control and limited power projection missions. There are three classes that 
are in this category; the Wasp which was first deployed in 1989, the Tarawa which was first 
156 APDS is the abbreviation for Annor Piercing Discarding Sabot shells. 
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deployed in 1976, and the lwo Jima which was first deployed in 1961. All three class are . 
powered by boilers and are capable of speeds greater than 20 knots. 
The next category of amphibious ships is Amphibious Transport Docks or LPD's. The 
current LPD's are of the Austin Class. The Austin Class is powered by two boilers which give it 
speeds greater than 20 knots in the mission of Marine transport. LPD's can carry landing craft, 
amphibious assault vehicles, and helicopters along with a Marine detachment of 700 to 900 
troops. The Austin class was first deployed in 1965 and is being replaced by the San Antonio 
Class. 
The final category is Dock Landing Ships (LSD). There are three classes of LSD's: the 
Harpers Ferry Class, the Whidbey Island Class, and the Anchorage Class. The newer Harpers 
Ferry Class and the Whidbey Island class are diesel powered and are capable of speeds greater 
than 20 knots while the Anchorage Class is powered by boilers and is capable of going 22 
knots. The LSD's mission is to support amphibious operations by transporting LCACs, 
conventional landing craft, and helicopters onto hostile shores. The Harpers Ferry is capable of 
carrying two LCACs while the Whidbey Island Class and the Anchorage Class are capable of 
carrying four. Tlie Marine detachment on the ships varies from 330 Marines to 402 Marines 
with the capability of a surge of 102 more. The ships are armed with mix of MK3 8 Machine 
guns, .50 cal. machine guns, Phalanx CIWS and for the Anchorage Class a 3" twin barrel gun. 
The Harpers Ferry Class was first deployed in 1995 while the Whidbey Island and Anchorage 
Classes were first deployed in 1985 and 1969, respectively. 
The Navy has two major types of landing craft: the Landing Craft, Air Cushioned 
Vehicle (LCAC) and the Landing Craft, MechanizedlUtility Vehicle (LCMlLCU). The LCAC 
is an air cushioned vehicle that is powered by four gas turbines: two for propulsion and two for 
lift. The gas turbines give the LCAC a range of 200 miles at 40 knots with a payload. The 
LCAC can carry 60 to 75 tons of payload which includes 24 troops or one main battle tank. 
The advantage of the LCAC over the LCMlLCU is that can reach 70% of the world's coastline 
while the LCMlLCU can only reach 15%. The LCMlLCU is a more conventional landing craft 
of World War IT vintage. These craft are diesel powered and can reach speeds of9 to 12 knots. 
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They can carry anywhere from 34 tons in the LCM-6 to 180 tons in the LCM-8. The LCAC 
was first deployed in 1982 while the newest of the LCMlLCU type was first deployed in 1959. 
3. Command Ships and Amphibious Command Ships 
The Navy currently has four Command ships! Amphibious Command ships. These 
ships serve as the flagships of the four operational fleets. The two Command ships are 
converted LPDs while the two Amphibious Command ships were originally designed for this 
function. All the ships in this category are boiler powered and are capable of speeds greater 
than 20 knots. The distinguishing feature of these ships is there C4ISR systems. The La Salle 
Command ships was commissioned in 1964 while the remaining three ships were 
commissioned in 1970 and 1971. 
4. Mine Countenneasure Ships 
In addition to the MH-53E, the Navy has several surface ships that fulfill the mine 
countermeasure role. The biggest of these ships is the Mine Countermeasure Ship (MCS) 
Inchon. The MCS's mission is to provide dedicated command, control, and support for mine 
countermeasure operation. The Inchon is a converted amphibious assault ship that now houses 
eight· MH-53E helicopters and four MCMlMHC small mine countermeasure ships of the 
Avenger and Osprey Classes. The Inchon was first deployed in 1970. 
The Avenger Class mine countermeasure ships (MCM) are designed as mine-hunter 
killers capable of finding, classifying, and destroying moored and bottom mines. It is powered 
by four diesels and is capable of 14 knots. The MCM is manned with 84 officers and enlisted 
personnel. The smaller Osprey Class Minehunter Coastal (MHC) is manned with 51 officers 
and enlisted. The Osprey has some of same capabilities of the larger Avenger but is much more 
limited in endurance. It has only two diesels that make it capable of 10 knots. Both ships 
typically operate in conjunction with a larger task force usually with the MCS Inchon. The 
Avenger was first deployed in 1987 and the Osprey was first deployed in 1993. 
5. Brown Water Combatants 
The Navy's coastal and riverine warfare capability centers around the Cyclone Class 
Patrol Craft (PC) and the MK5 Special Operations Craft. The Cyclone was designed for 
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coastal patrol and interdiction surveillance. These ships can also provide full mission support 
for SEAL and other special operations force missions. The PC is powered by four diesels and 
go in excess of 3S knots. It is anned with two :MK38 machine guns, two .SO caliber machine 
guns, two grenade launchers, and six Stinger surface to air inissiles. The :MKS Special 
Operations Craft is used to transport special operations forces into and out of areas where the 
threat is considered low to medium. The:MKS is capable of SO knots. 
6. Auxiliary/ Logistics Support Ships 
The Navy operates S major categories of support ships. The Navy operates fleet oilers 
in the Cimarron Class, Kilauea Class ammunition ships, Fast Combat Support Ships of the 
Sacramento Class, Salvage Ships of the Safeguard Class, and Submarine Tenders of the Simon 
Lake Class and Emory S. Land Class. These ships fulfill missions of underway replenishment, 
salvage, and maintenance. 
F. SUBMARINES 
1. Fast Attack Submarines 
Fast Attack Submarines (SSN) are the Navy's original stealth platform. They are 
capable of performing strike warfare, anti-surface warfare, undersea warfare, SEAL and special 
operation force insertion, mine warfare, and intelligence gathering. There are five classes of 
Fast Attack Submarines ranging from the newest Sea Wolf Class to the older Sturgeon and 
Benjamin Franklin Classes. The most common fast attack submarine is the Los Angeles Class. 
All of these submarines are powered by water cooled nuclear reactors and are capable of 
speeds in excess of20 knots at depths greater than 400 feet. Fast Attack Submarines are anned 
with Tomahawk missiles, Harpoon missiles, the :MK48 ADCAP (Advanced Capabilities) 
torpedo, the MK48 torpedo, and are capable of laying mines. The Sea Wolf underwent sea 
trials in 1996 while the Los Angeles Class, the Narwhal Class, the Sturgeon Class, and the 
Benjamin Franklin Class were first deployed in 1976, 1969, 1967, and 1965, respectively. 
The most common submarine weapon is the :MK48 ADCAP and :MK48 torpedo. The 
ADCAP torpedo is a heavy weight torpedo used in undersea and anti-surface warfare. It has a 
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range of greater than 5 miles at speeds greater than 28 knots. It is wire guided with passive or 
active acoustic homing. It has a warhead of 650 lbs of high explosive which is designed to 
break the keel of surface ships. The MK48 was first deployed in 1972. 
2. Ballistic Missile Submarines 
The strategic deterrence platform of the Navy is the Ohio Class fleet ballistic missile 
submarine (SSBN). The Ohio Class provides the sea "leg" of the triad of U.S. strategic 
offensive forces. It carries 24 Trident C-4 or D-5 Fleet Ballistic Missiles. Like the fast attack 
submarines, the Ohio Class is powered by a water cooled nuclear reactor which makes it 
capable of speeds greater than 20 knots at depths greater than 400 feet. It was first deployed in 
1981. 
The Trident Fleet Ballistic Missile is the Navy's Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. It is a 
three stage, solid propellant, inertially guided missile with a range of more than 4,000 nautical 
miles. It is outfitted with Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles and 
Maneuverable Re-entry Vehicles with each vehicle having a nuclear warhead worth many 
megatons worth of TNT. The C-4 variant was first deployed in 1979 and the D-5 variant was 
first deployed in 1990. 
G. C4ISR SYSTEMS: THE BIRTH OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE 
The Navy's C4ISR system is currently being designed around ''Network Centric 
Warfare." The goal of "Network Centric Warfare" is to tie the shooter to the sensor in an easy-
to-manipulate information grid in order to create speedy and efficient command and contro1. 
The ''Network Centric" C4ISR system is comprised of three systems: (1) the Global Command 
and Control System (GeCS), (2) the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (ITIDS), 
and the Co-operative Engagement Capability System (CEC).157 
GeCS is the key command, contro~ communications, computers, and intelligence 
system in the "C4I for the Warrior" concept. It provides a fused picture of the battlespace by 
incorporating core planning and assessment tools into a client-server computer architecture. 
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GCCS is basically an intranet for the military, but it also includes capabilities for near 
continuous voice, video, data, text, graphics, and imagery. The two aspects of GCCS that 
"Network Centric Warfare" will use the most is the Joint Maritime Command Information 
System (JMCIS)I Common Operating Environment (COE) and the Joint Defense Intelligence 
Support System (JDISS). JMCIS provides a single integrated command, control, information 
system that receives, processes, displays, and maintains geolocation on fiiendly, hostile, and 
neutral land, sea, and air forces. JMCIS is the descendent of the Navy's Joint Operational 
Tactical System (JOTS), the Naval Computer and Telecommunications System (NTCS), and 
the Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS).. JDISS is a software application that gives intelligence 
analysts access to a wide number of intelligence databases and the ability to perform 
independent multi-disciplined intelligence analysis in the field. JDISS allows images to be 
received, transmitted, and manipulated. GeCS with-JMCIS and JDISS is designed to provide 
force coordination capability for the joint force commander to include predictive planning and 
preemption, integrated force management, and execution of time-critical missions for 
thousands of military users.I5S 
JTIDS or Link-I6 is a high-capacity digital information system that provides rapid, 
secure, jam-resistant! frequency hopping communications, navigation, and identification 
capabilities for force control. Its the data circuit with a "big enough pipe" to enable the huge 
volumes of data that will flow when ''Network Centric Warfare" is fully developed. JTIDS is 
the descendent of Link-II, but unlike Link-II which was limited to a transmission rate of 5 
kbps, Link-16 will have the capability of at least 64 kbps which will allow for increased range 
and track capability, multi-source identification, up-to-date digital maps, and embedded 
training. Link 16 is designed to handle about 250 military users. 159 
157 Cebrowski and Gartska, pp. 29-35. 
158 Scott C. Trover, "Harnessing the C4ISR Revolution," Jane's Navy International (October 1997): pp. 31-35, 
Department of Defense, C4I Handbook for Integrated Planning, (1996), pp. 7-44 - 7-54, and Archie Clemens, 
Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, speech to AFCEA west '98 Conference, January 15, 1998. 
159 Scott C. Trover, "Harnessing the C4ISR Revolution," Jane's Navy International (October 1997), p. 35, and Archie 
Clemens, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, speech to AFCEA West '98 Conference, January 15, 1998. 
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The third and final leg of this network architecture is the CEC. CEC integrates the· 
sensor data of each ship and aircraft into a single, real-time, fire control quality composite track 
picture. It also provides interfaces with the weapon systems of each CEC-equipped ship in the 
battIegroup to allow for integrated engagement capability i.e. the control ship can shoot 
another ships missiles when the system is in "automatic." In essence, CEC extends the range at 
which a ship can engage hostile missiles well beyond the ships own radar horizon. The system 
was originally designed to counter cruise missiles, but has been extended to combat theater 
ballistic missile defense and the Naval Surface Fire Support concept called the "Ring of Fire. " 
As currently designed, CEC will be able to provide weapons control capabilities for 
approximately 40 military users. 160 
The ~nstraint on ''Network Centric Warfare" has been and will continue at least for 
the near future to be bandwidth. With Link-II and the Naval Tactical Data System which has 
been in use since the 1960's, the bandwidth has ranged from 600 to 5000 bps. The problem is 
that primary imagery requires 768 Kbps and video Tele-conferencing requires at least 128 
Kbps. The technology limitation for the Navy with these data flow rates is the size of the 
antenna. Few surface ships and submarines can sport an antenna designed for these data flow 
rates. Challenge Athena was the Navy's attempt to get high bandwidth satellite communications 
to Joint Task Force command capable ships e.g. carriers, air-capable amphIbious assault ships, 
and command ships. It provides a data flow rate of 1.544 Mbps with commercial of the shelf 
technology. The problem with Challenge Athena is the preclusive size of it antenna for smaller 
combatants. 
The Navy's current answer to this dilemma is ATM or Asynchronous Transfer Mode. 
ATM is essentially a push-pull system of data flow. A small combatant will transmit small 
requests for information and will receive large influxes of data or the large amounts of data will 
be pushed without the small combatant having to ask for it. Consequently, the smaller 
combatants do not require the use of large satellite antennas with which to transmit requests. 
160 Ibid. 
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All that is required is a relatively small INMARSAT B (International Maritime Satellite) 
receiver capable of 64 Kbps as a part of Link 16 initiative. 
In addition, the smaller combatants will be able to receive line of sight broadcasts of up 
to 512 Kbps from the flagship using the Digital Wide Band Transmission System (DWTS). 
DWTS will allow the flagship to disseminate material derived from Gees to the smaller 
combatants thus vastly improving connectivity within the battlegroup. Smaller combatants will 
finally be able to participate in collaborative planning with DWTS. 161 
161 Archie Clemens, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, speech to AFCEA west '98 Conference, January 15, 1998. 
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APPENDIX B: OFFICER CAREER PATHS 
CAPT Surface Warfare Career Path 
22-




Commanding Officer Tour (24 Months) 
16 - Staff Tour Joint Tour 
14 - XO Tour 
LCDR 
12 - Shore Tour 
10- Second Department Head Tour (18-24 Months) 
First Department Head Tour (24 Months) 
8 -
LT 
6 - Shore Tour (24 Months) 
4 - Second Division Officer Tour (18 Months) 
LTJG 
2 - First Division Officer Tour (24 Months) 
ENS 
o -










Submarine Warfare Career Path 
Major Command (36 Months) 
Shore Tour 
Shore Tour (36 Months) 
Commanding Officer Tour (33 Months)· 
14- ~------------------------------------------~ LCDR 
12 -









Department Head Tour (30-36 Months) 
Shore Tour (24 Months) 





DH Tour (18-24 
Months) 



















Aviation Officer Career Path 
Major Command 
~-------------------------------------------------4 
Sea or Shore Tour (24 Months) 
COIXO Tour 





Department Head Tour (30 Months) Ship 
Disassociated Sea Tour (24 Months) 
Shore Tour (36 Months) 
First Squadron Sea Tour (36 Months) 
Figure B-3. Aviation Officer Career Path (Source: Navy Bureau of Personnel Perspective, 
Jan-Feb. 1998) 
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CDR Commanding Officer Tour 
18 
16 Shore Tour (24 Months) 
LCDR 14 
XO Tour 
12 Shore Tour (36 Months) 
10 Department Head Equivalent Tour 
LT 
8- Shore Tour (24 Months) 
6- Platoon Commander Tour 





Figure B-4. Special Warfare Officer Career Path (Source: The Naval Officer Planning 
Guidebook, 1990) 
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Special Operations Officer Career Path 
CAPT 
_ 22 Shore Tour 
20 
Commanding Officer Tour 
CDR 
18 
16 Shore Tour (30 Months) 
14 0-4 COIXO 
LCDR 
12 
Shore Tour (36 Months) 
10 
8 -
LT Department Head Tours 
6-
4-
Billet Specialty Training EOD, D&S, MCM Options 















Engineering Duty Officer Career Path 
Senior Captain Shore Tour 
Captain Shore Tour 
Mid-Career Professional Tour: 
-Fleet Staff! INSURV / Systems Command Projects/ SUPSHIPS/ 
Naval Plant Reps! Tender Repair Officer/ Shipyards/ 
Ship Repair Facility/ Ship Department Head or Division Officer 
LCDR ~--------~ 
Engineering Duty 










Initial Specialization Tour 
Post Graduate 
School 
Engineering Duty Qualification Program/ 
Initial Specialization Tour 
Department Head Tour Department Head Tour! 
Second Sea Tour 
Initial Shore Tour/ Post Graduate School 
Initial Sea Tour 








Intelligence Officer Career Path 
Shore Tour 
Numbered Fleet Tour 
Shore Tour 















Two Shore Tours 
Sea Tour 
Sea Tour 
Two Shore Tours: Operational Intelligencel 
Joint Intelligence Toursl Post Graduate School 
Operational Sea Tour (CV, Air Squadron) 
























JAG Corps Officer Career Path 
Judge Advocate General Deputy Judge Advocate General 
Assistant Judge 
Advocate General 
CO Naval Justice School! CO Legal Service Office! Chief Judge 
Deputy Assistant JAG! Director Appellate Division! 
Major Staff! Appellate or Circuit Judge 
Fleet Staff! XO Naval Justice School! Judge! XO! 
Senior Service College! Legislative Affairs! OPNA V 
Department Head Naval Justice School! Hospital! Staff! 
Detachment OIC! Division Head! XO! Judge 
Postgraduate Utilization Shore Tour 
Postgraduate Law Training! Interservice College 
OIC Legal Service Detachment! Staff! Instructor! Ship 
Hospital 
Staff! Appellate Counsel! Ship Legal! 
Naval Legal Service Office 
Naval Legal Service Office Staff Appellate Counsel 
Figure B-8. JAG Corps Officer Career Path (Source: The Naval Officer Planning Guidebook, 
1990) 
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Civil Engineer Corps Officer Career Path 
CAPT 26 - Public Works: Public Works Officer/ COIXO of Public Works Command 
Construction Contract Management: 
24 - OICCCO Shore Activity Com- SEABEES: CO CBC/ 
mand Type Comm and Staff 
22 - & 4-6 
Staff: HQ Systems Command/ COIXO/ 
Adv- Tours 
Department Head EFD Reg. 
anced Prof. 
CDR 20 - Public Works: Public Works Officer/ Eng-
MGMT XO/ Production Officer of ineer/ Public Works Command Arch-
18 -
Construction Contract Management: itect Prof. ROICClDeputy OICC Mil. 
SEABEES: COl Type Command Staff Ed. 
16 - Staff: Facilities E 
sComm 
14 - Mid-
Public Works: Publics Works Officer 
LCDR grade Construction Contract Management: ROICC/ 
Eng. 2-3 AROICC 
12 - & 
Tours SEABEES: XO/ Operations Officer 
Staff: Facilities Officer 
Dev. 
10 -
Public W orks:Staff Civil Engineer/ Assistant Post-
LT 8 - Public Works Officer 
grad. 
Construction Contract Management: AROICC Eng. 
School 
2-3 
6 - Tours 
SEABEES: Company Commander/ in 
Plans and Training Officer/ OIC CBU Train-
Basic Staff: Assistant Facilities Manager ing 
LL!Q 4- Dev. 
Public Works: Activity Civil Engineer 
2 - Initial Construction Contract Management: AROICC 
ENS Tour SEABEES: Assistant Company Commander 
0-
Figure B-9. Civil Engineer Corps Officer Career Path (Source: The Naval Officer Career 
Planning Guide, 1990) 
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APPENDIX C. LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
Military 
Rear Admiral Bepko, Deputy Commander MSC 
Captain Brooks, N88B 
Rear Admiral Chaplin, Superintendent, Naval Postgraduate School 
Rear Admiral Christenson, N889 
Rear Admiral Eaton (RET) 
Rear Admiral Foley, N13 
Major General Hanlon, N85 
Rear Admiral Hart, N86B 
Captain Hughes (RET) 
Captain Loren, N51B 
Lieutenant Commander Maloney, N87D 
Rear Admiral McGinn, N88 
Rear Admiral Nutwell, N6B 
Colonel Parlier, U.S. Anny P A&E 
Admiral Pilling, VCND 
Captain Strott, N85B 
Vice Admiral Tracey, N7 
Civilian Defense Official 
Dr. Jules Borak, NPRDC 
Dr. Allen Zeman, N7B 
Academic 
Dr. Richard Elster, Provost, Naval Postgraduate School 
Dr. Reuben Harris, Chairman Systems Management, Naval Postgraduate School 
Dr. Carl Jones, Professor, Naval Postgraduate School 
Dr. Peter Purdue, Dean, Naval Postgraduate School 
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